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This thesis seeks to explain the roots of security thinking in Australia and New Zealand and 
what it argues has been a gradual divergence in the two countries' approaches to defence 
issues. Drawing upon constructivist international relations theory, it highlights the importance 
of ideational rather than material influences on policy formulation. It focuses on two key 
variables: strategic culture and identity, arguing that they provide significant clues as to the 
varying threat perceptions, policy preferences and the domestic values that underpin thinking 
on security matters in these two countries. By tracing the evolution of Australian and New 
Zealand defence policies over a long historical timeframe, the study identifies persistent 
cultural norms and preferences that explain policies seemingly difficult to reconcile with a 
materialist understanding of world politics. After providing a detailed comparison of the 
influences on defence thinking in each country, the study compares Australian and New 
Zealand perspectives on regional security in the Pacific and the rationales given for 
participating in the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMS I) in 2003. 
The thesis concludes that compared to a materialist approach, an examination which includes 
ideational variables such as strategic culture and identity better explains why the two 
countries have pursued divergent security paths and provides a more comprehensive 
understanding of the logic shaping thinking on defence issues in these two states. 
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Strategic Culture, Identity and the Shaping of Security Policy: 
A Comparative Study of Australia and New Zealand 
Australia and New Zealand are two similar neighbours situated in the Asia-Pacific 
region. They share a British colonial history, a common language and adherence to Western 
political principles. For many decades they have also had similar foreign policies and defence 
strategies. Yet in the second half of the twentieth century the two countries' security policies 
have noticeably diverged, revealing a difference in worldviews and policy preferences. 
Different threat perceptions have become apparent, along with distinct approaches to security 
matters. Australia considers itself more vulnerable in the region than New Zealand, and has 
given emphasis to a traditional security approach that stresses the need for military might and 
maintaining a strong relationship with a powerful ally - currently the United States. Australia 
has been consistently increasing its military capabilities, in part because of fear of the growing 
military might of its Asian neighbours. 1 New Zealand, on the other hand, despite facing 
a relatively similar environment, has for decades been downgrading its military capabilities, 
in the belief that the country is not directly threatened and that problems in the Asia-Pacific 
region require a less forceful approach. In contrast to Canberra, Wellington does not perceive 
an alliance with the United States as essential to its security. The differences between the 
Australian and New Zealand approach to defence have led to questions over the strength of 
their alliance and their ability to promote a shared security agenda. 2 
Why has this divergence in security matters taken place, and how can it be explained? 
What are the key influences on the development of Austr~lia's and New Zealand's 
defence policies? Traditionally, dominant explanations for state behaviour in International 
1 Department of Defence, Defence 2000 - Our Future Defence Force (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 
2000), p. 24 
2 Guy Wilson-Roberts (ed.), Australia and New Zealand: The Defence Policy Gulf, Strategic Briefing Papers, 
Vol. 4, Part 2, November 2000, Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, p. 2 
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Relations have focused on the distribution of material power or the balance of threat. 3 
This thesis argues that such theories can't adequately explain the differences in New 
Zealand's and Australia's defence approaches and their responses to regional instability in the 
Pacific. Instead, the study focuses on the importance of ideational variables, which it argues 
can help to explain the origins of security interests and provide greater insights into policy 
formation. Specifically, I argue that the gradual development and consolidation of very 
different strategic cultures and state identities in Australia and New Zealand has had 
a significant impact on their respective national security interests and priorities. 
These ideational factors, including culture, identity and domestic values, provide a framework 
for the consideration of what are deemed to be "appropriate" strategic options and policy 
choices. Despite changes in governments on both sides of the Tasman, I argue they have 
consistently defined Australian and New Zealand interests. While my analysis does not ignore 
the place of material factors in influencing foreign policy, the thesis argues that it is the 
interpretation of material factors, the way they are seen through a lens of values and shared 
meanings that explains why Wellington and Canberra have such different threat perceptions 
and why they have developed such different approaches to security in the Pacific. 
The study begins with the assumption that the way countries perceive their security 
largely depends on their cultural values and sense of identity.4 These ideational factors 
underpin their assessment of their regional environment and what constitutes a threat or 
threatening behaviour. In each country's case foreign policy is influenced and determined by 
both internal and external factors. However, it is the former which shape the interpretation of 
external factors and the way international conditions are perceived. How material factors, 
such as the level of military capabilities in regional countries, are viewed depends on 
3 See, for instance, Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Addison-Wesley, 1979) and 
Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987) 
4 See Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 
and Peter J. Katzenstein, 'Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security' , in Peter Katzenstein 
(ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1996), pp. 1-32 
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a cultural and social context of a country's policymaking environment. Material power 
therefore, may or may not be viewed as inherently threatening. As will be argued, adopting 
strategic culture and identity as independent variables influencing state behaviour, reveals the 
way threats are socially constructed and uncovers the guiding values and beliefs that drive 
security thinking in each country. Despite strategic assessments across the Tasman indicating 
that both Australia and New Zealand remain unlikely targets of military invasion, the former 
has historically adopted a realpolitik attitude, maintaining large and sophisticated levels of 
military capabilities designed for conventional warfare in securing the country. I attempt to 
show the roots of such behaviour, by pointing to the role of ideational influences and identity 
on Australia's security policy. Adopting a historical approach, the study traces the general 
divergence in attitudes between the two nations and the emergence of distinct strategic 
cultures and identities, which provide each country with a set of persistent guiding ideas, 
beliefs and policy preferences. 
The thesis is in five chapters. Chapter 1 provides a theoretical introduction, making the 
case for the use of a social constructivist approach over the dominant materialist theories of 
International Relations. Chapter 2 provides a study of historical patterns in Australia's 
defence approaches and policy preferences, demonstrating a consistency of a politics of fear, a 
culture of realist thinking on security and dependency on a great power protector. 
A comparative assessment of New Zealand's defence posture follows in Chapter 3. 
It examines New Zealand's emerging sense of strategic culture and identity since the late 191h 
century. In both case studies I trace the influence of ideational factors on state policies 
through a historical analysis of bipartisan political discourse, defence policy documents and 
public opinion data. While showing direct causal linkages between ideational variables and 
policy outcomes is never simple the study aims to highlight the influence of strategic culture 
and identity on state behaviour, by contrasting ideational explanations with the materialist 
predictions of neorealism. I find a striking dissimilarity in policy responses between the two 
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neighbours even when they are faced with similar situations in terms of strategic geography 
and the regional distribution of power. 
Chapter 4 tests this larger claim by looking in detail at one case- the rationales given 
by Australia and New Zealand for their participation in the regional peacekeeping mission to 
the Solomon Islands in 2003. Despite their differences, both countries have frequently 
participated in shared initiatives, particularly in the Asia-Pacific. Yet, while both countries 
had the ultimate objective of bringing security to the region and stopping the violence in the 
Solomon Islands, their justifications for involvement in this cause were strikingly different. 
I argue these different rationales provide significant clues as to the ideational factors that 
underpin both countries' security policies. A comparative assessment reveals how the two 
countries frame regional security in the Pacific in different ways and offers insights as to the 
ideas and values that dominate political thinking on security in Australia and New Zealand. 
Finally Chapter 5 provides a comparative assessment of the two countries' broad 
security approaches and summarises the argument made here. It includes a critical evaluation 
of the usefulness of strategic culture and identity as explanatory variables in the study of state 
behaviour. The thesis closes with some concluding remarks as to challenges for future 
research on the security policies of states. 
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Chapter 1 
Explaining the Security Interests of States: 
A Theoretical Overview 
In the last few decades the study of international relations has centred on two 
dominant theoretical approaches: neorealism and neoliberalism. Both share a common 
materialist ontology and a rational choice methodology. While these two conceptual 
frameworks diverge in their assumptions about the possibility of co-operation between actors, 
they share the belief that states have fixed interests, which are formed exogenous to 
interaction. They therefore share the supposition that states are undifferentiated, self-
interested actors. 
In accordance with their materialist ontology, neorealism and neoliberalism also 
assume that anarchy is the central feature of the international system and that power, largely 
defined in military capabilities, is the determining influence on state behaviour. 
However, while neorealists are pessimistic as to whether states can work together, viewing 
interaction as a zero-sum game, neoliberalists take a more optimistic view that states can 
achieve absolute gains by the use of co-operative mechanisms, such as regimes and 
institutions. Neoliberals believe that states may freely choose to create norms and institutions 
to promote co-operation, knowing that it is likely to benefit their long-term interests.5 
Neorealists differ on this point with neoliberals, preferring a more Hobbesian view of 
anarchy, and viewing relations between states as inherently competitive, since "a state cannot 
be sure that today's friend will not be tomorrow's enemy".6 
5 Michael Barnett, 'Social Constructivim ', in John Bayliss and Steve Smith, The Globalization of World Politics 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 253 
6 Kenneth Waltz, 'Structural Realism after the Cold War', International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2000, p. 10 
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This section focuses on examining Kenneth Waltz's version of structural neorealism, 
largely because of its dominance as an international relations theory and importance m 
explaining the security objectives of states.7 Of particular interest to this study 1s 
a determination of the causes of Australia's and New Zealand' s differing approaches towards 
their defence interests and policies, as well as their diverging outlooks concerning regional 
security. Given neorealism's traditional dominance in security studies, my objective is to 
briefly assess its explanatory potential with specific reference to the two countries under 
examination. 
Neorealism has been the dominant international relations theory of the second half of 
the twentieth century and arguably, still remains as one of the most prevailing approaches 
used to explain world politics. It is based on the idea that the structure of the international 
system is the key factor that influences state policies. According to Kenneth Waltz, three 
basic factors influence world politics: first the international system is an anarchy; second that 
the units (states) are alike and pursue policies of self-help; and third, that the distribution of 
power capabilities determines state behaviour. Of greatest significance to neorealists is the 
distribution of capabilities between states, something that is usually understood as military 
resources. Neorealists assert that it is the quantity and distribution of this power, which 
determines the foreign policies of states. Because the international system is an anarchy, states 
face an ever-present security dilemma, leading them to respond to the acquisition of military 
power by another state by adopting a worst case scenario interpretation of that actor's 
objectives. 8 In order for states to survive, they must maximise their interests by adopting a 
policy of self-help. 
7 See Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Addison-Wesley, 1979), Kenneth N. 
Waltz, 'Political Structures ', in Robert 0 . Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1986), pp. 70-97, Kenneth N. Waltz, 'Structural Realism after the Cold War', International 
Security, Vol. 25, No. 1, Summer 2000, pp. 5-41 
8 Nicholas Wheeler and Ken Booth, 'The Security Dilemma', in John Baylis and Nicholas Rengger (eds.), 
Dilemmas of World Politics. International Issues in a Changing World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 
p. 30 
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According to Waltz, all states share similar goals and the internal character of each 
state is irrelevant in explaining state relations or policy choices. He argues that "[s]tates are 
alike in the tasks that they face, though not in their abilities to perform them."9 This assumes 
that states possess a universally predetermined set of policy preferences. Neorealists do not 
believe that a state's interest can change through interaction and reject the importance of 
domestic variables, including the social setting where policymaking takes place. Waltz is 
dismissive of the possible influence of ideational factors on state interaction, arguing that 
"state behaviour [ ... ] varies more with differences of power than differences of ideology, 
internal structure of property relations, or in governmental form." 10 The problem with this 
approach however is that it fails to show how power acquires meaning. It also has difficulty 
accounting for cases where countries specifically choose not to pursue possible power 
maximising strategies. For instance, the theory fails to explain why Germany and Japan have 
deliberately chosen not to pursue possible power maximising strategies, despite having the 
resources to do so. 11 
While Waltz's pessimistic view of international relations may have resonance with 
some parts of the world, where self-help strategies dominate, the logic behind such action lies 
in process, rather than structure. 12 Neorealists are wrong to assume that self-help follows 
unavoidably from the anarchical structure of the international system. For instance, 
neorealism fails to explain why the United States views North Korea's five nuclear weapons 
as more threatening than 200 British nuclear weapons. 13 This is because power and threats 
9 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 96 
10 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 329 
11 Thomas U. Berger, 'Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan ', in Peter Katzenstein (ed.), 
The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1996), pp. 317-318 
12 Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics' , International 
Organization, Vol. 46, No.2, Spring 1992, pp. 394-395 
13 Alexander Wendt, ' Constructing International Politics', International Security, Vol. 20, No.1 , Summer 1995, 
p. 73 . In his article published in 1995 Wendt refers to the presence of 500 British nuclear weapons, however as 
of2008 the number of nuclear weapons estimated to be in British possession is 200 - an updated figure I have 
added to replace the original estimate, retaining the overall point made by Wendt. 
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are not automatically linked and in this case the British are friends of the United States, while 
the North Koreans are not, which determines how their respective material capabilities are 
interpreted. 14 As we will see, constructivists argue that realpolitik and self-interested 
behaviour is part of the social structure of international relations, rather than its material 
structure. Where neorealists assume the distribution of power has led to competition between 
states, constructivists argue it is the result of a culturally and identity-based system of hostile 
interaction. Paul Schroeder, who studied the usefulness of neorealism in accounting for 
international relations during the Westphalia era from 1648 to 1945, came to the conclusion 
that the theory "[ ... ] gets the motives, the process, the patterns, and the broad outcomes of 
international history wrong [ ... ]." 15 He argues that this theory, which aims to prescribe and 
predict a determinate order for history, fails when it is checked against the historical record.16 
Its rationalism and materialist ontology contributes to its crucial shortfalls in explaining how 
states define their interests and which factors influence state interaction and the development 
of foreign policies. 
This thesis considers this critique of neorealism by exploring the security approaches 
taken by Australia and New Zealand. While both countries historically had a similar approach 
to security, I argue that the divergence in their attitudes and policies that has taken place in the 
past several decades cannot be explained by simply focusing on the international structure of 
the state system or on their respective military capabilities. Despite facing a relatively similar 
environment and objectively low levels of military threat, both countries have developed 
divergent threat perceptions; have different objectives for achieving national security, and 
different ideas about what constitutes adequate responses to security challenges. 
What is the cause of this divergence in attitudes? While at first glance Australia 
appears to exhibit typical "realpolitik" behaviour in accordance with neorealist predictions, 
14 Wendt, 'Constructing International Politics' , p. 73 
15 Paul Schroeder, 'Historical Reality vs . Neo-realist Theory', International Security, Vol. 19, No. I, 
Summer 1994, p. 147 
16 Schroeder, 'Historical Reality vs . Neo-realist Theory', p. 147 
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I argue that its sources do not lie in the structure of the international system, but in the 
country's domestic cultural milieu. The social context of Australia's policymaking suggests 
the nation has consistently acted towards its Asia-Pacific neighbours on the basis of a culture 
of fear. This sense of vulnerability and threat, however, is hard to reconcile or relate to any 
material military threat. For example, material explanations fail to provide an explanation for 
the fragile relationship between Australia and Indonesia and the former's constant sense of 
fear of the latter, despite Indonesia's lack of military capabilities. Simon Philpott makes a 
strong case that Australia has had this fearful relationship, much in the same way it has based 
its relationship with the materially unmatched United States on the basis of trust. 17 
Neorealism is not equipped to account for influences that are outside of a materialist 
framework. It is incapable of grasping how threats exist independent of material capabilities. 18 
Neorealism also fails when applied to New Zealand's defence policies and 
attitudes towards regional security. Waltz suggests that for states to survive and maintain their 
security in an anarchic system, they must pursue self-help either by acquiring military might, 
or sustaining a strong alliance. 19 This is why he believes that balance of power is 
a reoccurring pattern in international relations.20 However, New Zealand's determination to 
pursue an independent stance in world affairs and security matters, rather then a close military 
relationship with the United States seems at odds with neorealist predictions. Moreover, the 
theory is further challenged by New Zealand's reluctance to acquire greater military 
capabilities. Indeed, New Zealand's attitude towards defence may be characterised by 
a decades-long reluctance to acquire large military capabilities and a rejection of the adoption 
of an aggressive, pre-emptive posture in regional security matters. 
17 Simon Philpott, 'Fear of the Dark: Indonesia and the Australian National Imagination', Australian Journal of 
International Affairs, Vol. 55, No.3, 2001, p. 371 
18 Anthony D. Lott, Creating Insecurity: Realism, Constructivism, and US Security Policy (Burlington: Ashgate, 
2004), p. 26 
19 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 118 
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° Kenneth N. Waltz, 'Structural Realism after the Cold War', International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1, 
Summer 2000, p. 27 
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Over the last decade scholars have increasingly shifted their attention to non-material 
variables that may help explain international relations. In particular, researchers have 
increasingly been turning to theories that highlight the influence of ideational variables, at 
both the domestic and international level, on the foreign policies of states. Broadly lumped 
under the umbrella of "constructivism" there has been a proliferation of approaches that have 
gained prominence in seeking to explain international relations and how states approach the 
issue of security. An increasingly vibrant debate has been taking place among scholars 
concerning the inadequacies of neorealism in explaining the field of national security studies 
and the potential of ideational approaches and social variables in accounting for changing 
state interests and preferences. Neorealists have struggled to defend their theory without 
incorporating non-material variables, leading Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik to 
conclude that neorealists have abandoned the essence of the theory?1 
In his assessment of neorealism and neoliberalism in the post-Cold War era, the 
prominent neoliberal, Robert 0. Keohane admits that neither of these two theories have the 
power to predict state interests or explain their evolution.22 He also acknowledges that 
"[w]ithout a theory of interests, which requires analysis of domestic politics, no theory of 
international relations can be fully adequate."23 Recognising that an adequate explanation of 
the formation of state security policies requires consideration of ideational variables and the 
domestic context where interests and policies are formed, the following section turns to 
constructivist theory. 
21 Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, ' Is Anybody Still a Realist?', International Security, Vol. 24, No.2, 
Fall 1999, p. 6 
22 Robert 0. Keohane, 'Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War', in David A. Baldwin 
(ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 
p. 285 
23 Keohane, 'Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War', p. 294 
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Constructivism and Ideational Influences 
Constructivism's focus is on ideational, as opposed to solely material factors in 
accounting for state interests, behaviour and interaction. It is concerned with how variables 
such as identities, culture, norms and ideas shape international relations. Therefore, it 
provides a wider set of explanatory tools than neorealism. Constructivism is also a social 
theory, which argues that relationships between states are not formed by egoistic states on the 
basis of the international system's material structure, but instead are rooted in the social 
meanings that states assign to each other through interaction. The father of modem 
constructivism, Alexander Wendt, believes that it is necessary to observe the formation of 
social relationships between states in terms of"[ ... ] the intersubjective understandings and 
expectations, and the 'distribution of knowledge', that constitute their conceptions of self and 
other. "24 This helps to explain why a state may prefer to co-operate with one actor or 
community, while forming a more difficult, or even hostile, relationship with another, 
irrespective of the distribution of material power. 
By adopting a sociological approach to international politics, constructivism suggests 
that actors act towards each other on the basis of the meanings that the other has to them.25 
While material factors continue to matter in world affairs, how states respond and interpret 
them depends on the social fabric of international relations. In the language of security 
"[s]ocial threats are constructed, not natural."26 For example, as will be discussed in the 
following chapter in more detail, Australia assigns the idea of a threatening "other" to 
Indonesia, while viewing the United States as a close friend, despite the fact that materially 
the US has a much greater ability to inflict harm on Australia. 
Another constructivist insight, which may better explain divergences in states' foreign 
24 Wendt, 'Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction ofpower politics', p. 397 
25 Ibid, pp. 396-397 
26 Ibid, p. 405 
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policies, is that interests are formed endogenous to interaction. Wendt to a limited extent 
accepts the rationalist assumption that states share some similar objectives. He argues that 
actors possess a corporate identity, which generates interests such as physical security and the 
desire for predictability in relationships.27 He says, "these corporate interests provide 
motivational energy for engaging in action at all and, to that extend, are prior to interaction 
[ .. .]."28 However, he argues that "[a]ctors do not have a "portfolio" of interests that they carry 
around independent of social context; instead, they define their interests in the process of 
defining situations."29 How a situation is defined and interests formed, largely depends on the 
social identity of the state. Identities may be regarded as "relatively stable, role-specific 
understandings and expectations about self', and are considered to be "inherently 
relational".30 An identity may encompass a number of variables such as the ideas, ideology, 
history, culture and norms that constitute a state's sense of self. It is simultaneously shaped by 
both the domestic and international environment. It is identity that is the basis of interest 
formation, as actors are often incapable of determining what constitute their interests prior to 
knowing "who they are".31 By informing an actor "who it is", identities set out a set of 
preferences with regard to options for action and with respect to particular actors.32 
Nevertheless, treating identity as a variable requires caution, as states can possess multiple 
identities, which may complicate study. As Peter Katzenstein admits the process of 
constructing a nation's sense of self is usually overtly political and sets in opposition 
27 Alexander Wendt, 'Identity and Structural Change in International Politics', in Yosef Lapid and Friedrich 
Kratochwil (eds.), The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), 
p. 51 
28 Wendt, 'Identity and Structural Change in International Politics', p. 51 
29 Wendt, 'Anarchy is what states make of it', p. 398 
30 Ibid, p. 397 
31 Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter 1. Katzenstein, 'Norms, Identity, and Culture in National 
Security', in Peter Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 59 
32 Ted Hopf, ' The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory', International Security, Vol. 23 , 
No.1, Summer 1998, p. 175 
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conflicting viewpoints against each other.33 However, there is usually a dominant identity, 
which a state propels onto the world stage, and that is often discursively reproduced by 
politicians and policy-makers. 
While constructivists do not reject the neorealist claim that the international system is 
one of anarchy, they believe that "anarchy is what states make of it" and argue that anarchy 
does not inevitably lead states to pursue self-help strategies. 34 How states behave, act and 
identify with each other, is influenced by the social structure of the international system. 
According to Wendt "there is no "logic" of anarchy apart from the practices that create and 
instantiate one structure of identities and interests rather than another; structure has no 
existence or causal powers apart from process."35 It is collective meanings, which shape the 
nature of the system under anarchy, and a security dilemma is by no means an essential 
feature of this condition. In fact, Wendt argues that sovereignty and the socialisation of states 
into obeying various international norms have created a world that more resembles a Lockean, 
rather than a Hobbesian nature of affairs.36 Hostility in international relations and 
relationships based on distrust are not an inevitable characteristic of the international system, 
but a reflection of the social structure of international politics and culturally constructed inter-
state relations. 
This focus on the ideational foundation of the national security policies of states is 
relevant to this study's goal of accounting for the diverging approaches to defence of 
Australia and New Zealand. According to constructivist logic, there are three layers to the 
international environment where national security policies are created.37 They include formal 
33 Peter J. Katzenstein, 'Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security', in Peter Katzenstein (ed.), 
The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1996), p. 6 
34 Wendt, 'Anarchy is what states make of it', p. 396 
35 Ibid, pp. 394-395 
36 Ibid, p. 415 
37 Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter J. Katzenstein, 'Norms, Identity, and Culture in National 
Security', in Peter Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics 
(New York: Columbia University Press, I 996), p. 34 
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institutions or security regimes, world political culture including international law, and 
"international patterns of amity and enmity". 38 It is in particular the last layer that helps to 
shed light on Australia's and New Zealand's diverging conceptions of threat. 
Why Australia views its environment as more threatening than New Zealand cannot be 
simply narrowed down to a materialist variable like the geographical position of the country. 
Instead, it is necessary to understand the ideational influences, including established beliefs 
and values, which impact on their respective regional assessments. Specifically, why does 
Australia explicitly uphold the idea that the Pacific region represents a threat to its national 
security, because, as it claims, weak or collapsing states in the country's proximate "arc of 
instability" may be used for terrorist activity, while New Zealand does not prioritise such an 
argument to pursue its security objectives? Similarly, why does Australia seem acutely 
sensitive to any shifts in the military capabilities of its Asian neighbours, stressing the need to 
maintain a competitive edge over other regional powers? As I will show later, this pessimistic 
interpretation of the environment is not matched in New Zealand's threat assessments and 
formulation of security policies. As Lott points out, the sources of insecurity are found in 
cultural ideas, rather than material capabilities.39 
David Campbell argues that security marks "the ethical boundaries of identity rather 
than the territorial borders of the state. "40 I apply this view to the two countries under 
consideration, concluding that New Zealand is more comfortable seeing itself as part of the 
Pacific region than Australia, while the latter has also struggled to build a shared regional 
identity with its northern Asian neighbours.41 There are different ways of exploring the 
38 Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter J. Katzenstein, 'Norms, Identity, and Culture in National 
Security', p. 34 
39 Lott, Creating Insecurity: Realism, Constructivism, and US Security Policy, p. 57 
40 David Campbell, Writing security: United States foreign policy and the politics of identity (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1998), p. !56 
41 See, for instance, Paulo Gorjao, 'Australia's dilemma between geography and history: how consolidated is 
engagement with Asia?', International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 3, Issue 2, August 2003, pp. 179-196, 
Kim Beng Phar, 'Excluded from the club: Why Australia is not yet a part of East Asia' , Harvard Asia Pacific 
Review, Vol. 5, No. 1, Winter 200 I, pp. 43-44, Simon Dalby, 'Continent Adrift?: Dissident Security Discourse 
and the Australian Geopolitical Imagination', Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 50, No. 1, 1996, 
pp. 59-75 
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construction of identity but one variable that seems to provide insights about why Australia 
and New Zealand have exhibited different behaviour and ideas concerning security, is the 
notion of "strategic culture". 
The Variable of Strategic Culture 
"Strategic culture" refers to "a nation's traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of 
behaviour, habits, symbols, achievements and particular ways of adapting to the environment 
and solving problems with respect to the threat or use of force. "42 It provides a context for the 
development of policymaking, acting as a background to how states perceive their 
surroundings, how threats are framed and interpreted and what behaviour prevails in the 
nation or political community under study. It points to a collective's values, fears, beliefs, 
traditions and biases and is influenced by factors such as the country's geopolitical setting and 
interpretation of past historical experiences. As such, it is an ideational variable that can help 
explain certain patterns of behaviour and policy choices, which materialist theories fail to 
account for. 
Although the concept of "strategic culture" is relatively new and under-theorised, there 
IS a large literature suggesting it can provide theoretical and empirical insights in world 
politics. Strategic culture was introduced and first applied to explain the United States-Soviet 
Union relationship in the 1970s. Jack Snyder coined the term in a 1977 research report for the 
RAND Corporation, in which he was critical of the United States' confidence that a rational 
analysis could predict Soviet behaviour towards limiting its use of nuclear weapons. 
He warned of the dangers in assuming that the Soviet Union would likely abide by American 
notions of restraint and adopt its notion of strategic rationality.43 Instead, Snyder argued that it 
42 Ken Booth, 'The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed' , in Carl G. Jacobsen (ed.), Strategic Power: 
USA/USSR (New York: StMartin's Press, 1990), p. 121 
43 Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations (Santa Monica: 
RAND Corporation Report R-2154-AF, September 1977), p. v 
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was necessary to examine the Soviet approach and thinking by referring to its "strategic 
culture".44 He defined this as "the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and 
patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community have acquired 
through instruction or imitation."45 His argument was that as a result of socialisation into 
a particular Soviet way of thinking, "a set of general beliefs, attitudes and behavioral patterns 
with regard to nuclear strategy has achieved a state of semipermanence that places them on 
the level of 'culture' rather than mere 'policy' ."46 Snyder claimed that strategic culture grew 
out of the Soviet historical experience, persisted over generations of policy-making and 
continued to be the basis of how issues were interpreted and framed. He argued strategic 
culture was a variable with predictive power. 
Writing around the same time, Ken Booth was also critical of the rationalist approach, 
instead stressing the need to incorporate the cultural variable in any analysis of international 
relations. Booth's 1979 book Strategy and Ethnocentrism, shared with Snyder the idea that 
strategic culture has a significant influence on the behaviour and policies of states. It warns of 
the problems of ethnocentrism, viewing and interpreting other actors' intentions via one's 
own cultural system of values and analysis of events. Instead, Booth called for the 
replacement of the "rational Strategic Man" with a shift towards "'strategy with a human 
face"'. 47 He modified Snyder's definition of strategic culture, opting for "nation" to replace 
the reference to "national strategic community" and broadening its applicability from "nuclear 
strategy" to "the threat or use of force". 48 Booth's work provides a valuable expansion of the 
term "strategic culture", bringing it closer to a universally applicable notion. 
44 Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations, p. v 
45 Ibid, p. 8 
46 Ibid, p. v 
47 Ken Booth, Strategy of Ethnocentrism (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979), pp. 17-18 
48 Lawrence Sondhaus, Strategic Culture and Ways of War: An Historical Overview (New York: Routledge, 
2006) p. 126 
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Subsequently scholars have sought to add greater theoretical rigour to the concept. 
Colin Gray notes that strategy encompasses several dimensions; one of which is cultural.49 
He believes that culture includes ideas and certain models of behaviour. 50 He cautions about 
the explanatory power of the variable, however, asserting that "strategic culture offers 
context, not reliable causality."51 In a similar vein, Michael O'Keefe maintains that the 
concept "describes the context within which policy is developed and decisions made, but this 
does not mean that it determines decisions and outcomes."52 Despite these reservations Gray, 
along with other scholars, accepts that strategic culture guides action. 53 
There is disagreement, however, as to the precise nature of the link between strategic 
culture and state behaviour. In contrast to Gray's assertion that all behaviour is affected by 
strategic culture54, Alastair lain Johnston argues that behaviour is an independent variable, 
allowing for the conceptual possibility that it may be explained independently of strategic 
culture. 55 Johnston seeks a concept of strategic culture that is "falsifiable, or at least 
distinguishable from non-strategic cultural variables. "56 At the same time he claims that 
strategic culture can offer policymakers "a uniquely ordered set of strategic choices from 
which we can derive predictions about behavior; that can be observed in strategic cultural 
objects57; and whose transmission across time can be traced."58 He defines strategic culture as 
an "integrated system of symbols (e.g. argumentation structures, languages, analogies, 
metaphors) which acts to establish pervasive and long lasting preferences by formulating 
49 Colin S. Gray, 'Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back', Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 25, Issue 1, January 1999, p. 51 
50 Gray, 'Strategic Culture as Context', p. 52 
51 Ibid, p. 62 
52 Michael O'Keefe, 'Australian Intervention in Its Neighbourhood: Sheriff and Humanitarian?', in Tony Coady 
and Michael O'Keefe (eds.), Righteous Violence: The Ethics and Politics of Military Intervention (Carlton: 
Melbourne University Press, 2005), p.80 
53 Gray, 'Strategic Culture as Context', pp. 62-68 
54 Ibid, p. 59 
55 Alastair lain Johnston, 'Strategic culture revisited: reply to Colin Gray', Review of International Studies, 
Vol. 25, 1999, p. 523 
56 Alastair lain Johnston, 'Thinking about Strategic Culture', International Security, Vol. 19, No.4, Spring 1995, 
p.45 
57 By 'strategic cultural objects' Johnston refers to empirical referents such as texts, documents and doctrines 
58 Johnston, 'Thinking about Strategic Culture' , p. 46 
21 
concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs. "59 At the most 
general level, therefore, strategic culture offers "the existence of a perceptual lens or milieu 
through which information is received, mediated and processed into appropriate responses."60 
In terms of permanence, scholars generally agree that while strategic culture is 
persistent, its content "is not cast in concrete for all time."61 However, as O'Keefe argues 
"the influence of strategic culture transcends the politicking of a particular government -
governments come and go but the background influence of strategic culture is enduring."62 
Still, there is lack of theoretical clarity when it comes to identifying the factors that determine 
a fundamental change in a country's strategic culture. Booth seems cautious about the impact 
of material circumstances on a nation, stating that the durability of strategic culture or its 
cultural elements "tend to outlast all but major changes in military technology, domestic 
arrangements or the international environment."63 Gray, on the other hand, opts for a more 
social explanation, stating that strategic culture "[ c ]an change over time, as new experience is 
absorbed, coded, and culturally translated."64 More recently, Kerry Longhurst notes that while 
strategic culture is "persistent over time [ .... ] although it is not permanent or static" it 
"can alter, either fundamentally or piecemeal, at critical junctures in that collective's 
experiences. "65 
The impact of strategic culture on policymaking has both restrictive and prescriptive 
values. In other words, it can rule out certain political options, while pushing to the forefront 
other alternatives and policies. Snyder noticed how due to strategic culture, thoughts and 
debates are framed a certain way, establishing a vocabulary and conceptual boundary of 
59 Johnston, 'Thinking about Strategic Culture', p. 46 
60 Stuart Poore, 'Strategic Culture', in John Glenn, Darryl Howlett and Stuart Poore (eds.), Neorealism Versus 
Strategic Culture (Burlington: Ashgate, 2004), p.50 
61 Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture, p. 40 
62 O'Keefe, 'Australian Intervention in Its Neighbourhood: Sheriff and Humanitarian?', p. 80 
63 Ken Booth, 'The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed', in Carl G. Jacobsen (ed.), Strategic Power: 
USA/USSR (New York: StMartin's Press, 1990), p. 121 
64 Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 131 
65 Kerry Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force: The Evolution of German Security Policy 1990-2003 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), pp. 17-18 
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strategic debate.66 Johnston, in a similar vein, argues that a strategic culture "is an ideational 
milieu which limits behavioral choices".67 
These arguments have been incorporated into a growing body of scholarship, which 
highlights the limits of neorealism and explores the usefulness of culture as an explanatory 
variable. John Duffield and Thomas Berger have demonstrated that the domestic culture of 
Germany since 1945 has significantly contributed to the country's antimilitarist stance and 
tendency to prefer multilateral avenues and co-operation for resolving international matters. 68 
Similarly, Peter Katzenstein argues ideational approaches provide an explanation for Japan's 
post-World War II reluctance to acquire military might, while opting instead for influence by 
economic means.69 Proponents of strategic culture aim to demonstrate that elites or 
policymakers in every country will be socialised into their strategic culture, which may result 
in a choice of different options even if the situation being faced is comparable. Ulrich Krotz 
found this to be the case, when he adapted role conception theory to explain why France and 
Germany, despite being similar in many respects and sharing a similar environment, have 
significant differences in their foreign policies. While Krotz's use of role theory differs from 
the approach used here, he admits that his approach shares much with other cultural 
explanations, within a broad constructivist research program. 70 
The one scholar who has undertaken a lengthy historical study of strategic culture is 
Alastair lain Johnston, whose work focuses on China's strategic traditions and what he calls 
"cultural realism". Johnston believes that "structure cannot account for Chinese realpolitik".71 
66 Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture, p. 9 
67 Johnston, 'Thinking about Strategic Culture', p. 46 
68 John Duffield, 'Political Culture and State Behaviour: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism', International 
Organisation, Vol. 53 , No.4, 1999 and Thomas Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in 
Germany and Japan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998) 
69 Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Post-War Japan (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 207 
70 Ulrich Krotz, 'National Role Conceptions and Foreign Policies: France and Germany Compared', Program for 
the Study of Germany and Europe, Working Paper 02.1p. 6, available online at 
http: //www.ces.fas.harvard.edu/publications/docs/pdfs/Krotz.pdf (version current at 13/05/07) 
71 Alastair lain Johnston, 'Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China', in Peter Katzenstein (ed.), 
The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1996), p. 218 
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Instead, he points to the explanation offered by strategic culture, stating that 
"China's realpolitik behavior is ideationally rooted."72 He argues that the Chinese 
predisposition to view the world and security in a realist fashion is not caused by outside 
influences like the material distribution of power and structure ofthe state system. Rather, it is 
influenced by long-held domestic values and sets of beliefs that can be traced throughout the 
country's history. 
Strategic culture's emergence during Cold War assessments of nuclear ambitions and 
superpower relations meant the idea was mostly confined to assessing military manoeuvring 
between states. However, recent scholarship considers the variable in broad terms, applying 
the concept of strategic culture not just to the military domain, but to various national policy 
areas. 73 Although states possess a "statist military logic", which refers to the nearly universal 
logic of state survival and maintenance of some form of military capability, they also acquire 
"national strategic traditions", where strategic culture plays an important part. 74 As this thesis 
will argue in the following chapters, the notion of 'strategic culture' can explain the 
difference and continued divergence between Australia's and New Zealand's defence postures 
and their views on regional security in the Asia-Pacific. 
Methodology 
How then do we go about demonstrating the influence of strategic culture? This study 
offers a historical survey of patterns in security thinking, attitudes and behaviour by using 
strategic culture and identity as independent variables. The main objects of textual analysis 
72 Johnston, 'Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China', p. 221 
73 John Glenn, Darryl Howlett and Stuart Poore (eds.), Neorealism Versus Strategic Culture (Burlington: 
Ashgate, 2004), p. 9 
74 Allan Macmillan, Ken Booth and Russell Trood, 'Strategic Culture', in Ken Booth and Russell Trood (eds.), 
Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), pp. 13-14 
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for the study include official defence policy documents and strategic assessments issued by 
the governments of the two countries. The use of these primary documents will be supported 
by a study of political discourse, with particular attention paid to speeches given by Prime 
Ministers, Ministers for Defence and Ministers for Foreign Affairs. My study also benefits 
from interviews carried out with officials based in the Pacific. 
This thesis will largely adopt Johnston's approach to strategic culture with the aim of 
demonstrating its apparent effect on behaviour and policy outcomes. 75 Despite the practical 
difficulty in studying a state's strategic culture and the complexity of an ideational approach, 
it is a task that can be empirically undertaken and, which I argue should not be discarded to 
due its complexity. Johnston sets out a methodology that identifies the existence of 
a particular strategic culture by identifying a central paradigm, in which different strategic 
cultures may be located along a continuum according to their characteristics. Depending on 
their assumptions about the strategic environment and view of conflict (e.g. if it is viewed as 
inevitable or an aberration), their outlook on the nature of the adversary (zero-sum or variable 
sum) and approach towards the role and value of force in international affairs; states may 
range from possessing a "hard realpolitik" version of strategic culture at the one end, to 
a moderate "soft idealpolitik" at the other end.76 The study uses cognitive mapping and 
symbolic analysis to analyse strategic culture. The first involves a study of the content of . 
documents in terms of the cause-effect statements, looking for underlying causal arguments. 77 
The second method involves symbolic analysis, which can include a study of the frequency of 
use of certain phrases and idioms, key words or analogies, which become embedded as valid 
descriptions of a strategic environment. 78 Depending on the initial interpretation of the 
environment, states will adapt different assumptions and choices as the operational level, 
ranging from offensive strategies to more moderate diplomatic means. Johnston points to the 
75 Johnston, 'Thinking about Strategic Culture' , pp. 46-4 7 
76 Ibid, pp. 46-47 
77 Ibid, p. 51 
78 Ibid, p. 52 
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usefulness of studying symbols in the analysis of political discourse, such as "frequently used 
idioms or phrases, which are axiomatically accepted as valid descriptions of a strategic 
content (e.g. "if you want peace, prepare for war")."79 
This kind of analysis should provide a noticeable pattern of political thinking and 
behaviour, despite the likely existence of competing discursive narratives and ideas. 
Scholars studying strategic culture agree that one dominant type of strategic culture prevails 
in a polity, and because it is deeply embedded, it is difficult to challenge it. By examining 
ranked preferences of strategic choice it is possible to test the consistency of a strategic 
culture. For example Johnston maintains that the existence and persistence of a strategic 
culture can be proven if rankings of preference are continuous across analysed objects over 
a long period of time. 80 Political discourse will simultaneously be analysed with reference to 
policy outcomes, in order to confirm a consistency in argumentation. 
Another way this study will identify the existence and content of Australia's strategic 
culture will be by examining the attitudes, prevailing values and fears of its population. 
As Lantis points out "[p ]ublic opinion is an important part of the ideational milieu that defines 
strategic culture, and it must help to shape the broad parameters of acceptable state 
behavior."81 This argument is particularly relevant for a parliamentary democracy, because of 
the government's need for domestic support. As will be demonstrated in the chapters that 
follow, public opinion poll data on security matters prove helpful in explaining the divergence 
between Australia and New Zealand. Therefore, the methodology adopted combines discourse 
analysis with an assessment of public opinion reflected in a variety of surveys. Opinion poll 
data should provide some confirmation of the ideational factors identified in the discourse 
analysis of key texts. 
79 Johnston, 'Thinking about Strategic Culture', p.52 
80 Alastair lain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 38 
81 Jeffrey S. Lantis, 'Strategic Culture and National Security Policy' , International Studies Review, Vol. 4, 
Issue 3, Fall 2002, p. 109 
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The second independent variable examined is that of state identity. Due to the 
complexity and difficulty in operationalising such a fluid concept, the study will be limited to 
a general assessment of the prevailing themes that link identity with the security interests of 
each country. Specifically, I examine statements and policy papers issued by the two 
countries, where reference is made to identity, a sense of self and other and to regional 
obligations. I argue this reveals how policymakers perceive their respective nation's identity, 
interests and role in the Pacific. In addition, the study will include other states' views of 
Australia and New Zealand, which should provide a more complete profile of the two 
countries' identities. Combined with my analysis of strategic culture, identity and identity 
change, these variable should help explain the reasons underlying defence policy formulation 
in Australia and New Zealand, how they view regional security and how they understand their 
role in the region. I begin with a detailed examination of the ideational influences that have 
guided Australia's approach to defence. 
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Chapter 2 
Defending Australia: Securing a "Frightened Country"82 
"[ .. }at some time in the future armedforce could be used against us and[ . .} we need to be 
prepared to meet it. "83 
"At present Australia does not face any conventional military threat to our territory nor, on 
current trends, is this likely in the foreseeable future. But we cannot be complacent. "84 
Australia' s approach to defence represents a challenge to traditional materialist 
explanations of state behaviour. Despite the rise of economic interdependence in regional 
relationships and a decline in the function of military capabilities in contemporary 
international relations, the country has not dramatically changed its defence objectives in the 
post-Cold War environment. Australia has been steadily increasing its military might, 
investing millions of dollars in high-tech hardware and training exercises. As Hugh White 
observes, this preoccupation with maintaining armed forces designed for engaging in 
traditional warfare reflects an unusual stance for a state in the contemporary era, when most 
countries have rearranged their priorities to stress such tasks as peacekeeping and border 
control. 85 Why then has Australia pursued this kind of approach to defence? Is it justified by 
the material threats present in the region? What are the driving factors that shape the way 
Australia views its security? 
82 Cited in Alan Renouf, The Frightened Country (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1979) 
83 Department of Defence, Defending Australia Defence White Paper 1994 (Canberra: Australian Government 
Publishing Service, 1994 ), p. 4 
84 Department of Defence, Australia's National Security: A Defence Update 2007 (Canberra: Department of 
Defence, 2007), p. 13 
85 Hugh White, 'Australian defence policy and the possibility of war', Australian Journal of International 
Affairs, Vol. 56, No.2, 2002, p. 253 
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A central mm of this chapter is to demonstrate that there are certain ideational 
characteristics pertinent to Australia's defence strategy which have historically guided the 
course of policymaking, and are likely to remain important in the future. Central to 
understanding the Australian approach towards defence is its strategic culture, which forms 
the basis from which policies emerge. As will be demonstrated in the sections that follow, the 
strategic culture that has shaped Australia's approach to security has been based on 
a historical sense of isolation, vulnerability and fear of invasion from some form of an 
"other", a culture of realist thinking on security, as well as a reliance on the protection of 
a great and powerful friend. 
A History of Fear: Insecurity, Vulnerability and the Threatening "Other" 
Since colonial times, Australia has perceived its surrounding region as threatening. 
It has viewed itself as an anomaly - a European colony of Great Britain, situated in 
a culturally foreign environment and close to large, populous northern Asian neighbours. 
This sense of alienation, combined with a small Australian population, led the country to 
develop a strong sense of vulnerability and insecurity, which has not escaped Australian 
culture and thinking to the present day. 
In the 191h century Australia was acutely wary of foreign players present in the region 
as well as its surrounding neighbours. Great Britain's European competitors in the region 
France, Germany and Russia, were seen as posing a significant threat. For instance, the 
Australian settlers were wary of French expansionism in the Pacific and felt deeply concerned 
when Paris was granted a protectorate over Tahiti in 1844 and annexed New Caledonia in 
1853.86 In addition, fear of Asia during this time was based on the belief that Australia was a 
86 T. B. Millar, Australia in Peace and War: External Relations Since 1788, Second Ed. (Botany: Australian 
National University Press, 1991 ), p. 10 
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sparsely populated colonial outpost incapable of defending itself against a threat from 
culturally and racially different, and possibly threatening Asian neighbours.87 Therefore, it 
was not only a racial fear of the Asian "other", but also anxiety over colonial competitors in 
the region, which contributed to Australia's insecurity. 
Australia's invasion anxiety was soon fuelled by an increase in Asian migrants to the 
continent. In mid-nineteenth century the self-governing Crown Colonies88 witnessed the 
influx of Chinese immigrants, who were attracted to the land by the prospect of discovering 
gold. In 1888 New South Wales Premier Sir Henry Parkes expressed his fear that "[ ... ] very 
probably it might be the design of a considerable number of Chinese to form a settlement in 
some remote part of the Australian territory [ ... ]."89 Drawing on the prevalent fears and 
attitudes of the time, he asserted that "[ ... ] they might become strong enough to form, in the 
course of time, a kind of Chinese colony."9° Fear of the "yellow peril", or Asian 
expansionism, by the end of the nineteenth century was so severe, that all the colonies 
adopted restrictive legislation, forbidding further immigration by the Chinese. 
Invasion narratives at the time often drew on the analogy between the fate of the Aborigines 
and white Australians; warning that the sparsely settled population could easily witness Asia 
"Aboriginalise" the Australian population.91 While Australians were not alone in their fear of 
the north, there was a much greater fear of Asians in Australia than in New Zealand.92 
This was further evident in Australia's adoption in 1901 of the Immigration 
Restriction Act, commonly referred to as the "White Australia Policy", which racially 
87 Michael O'Keefe, 'Australia and the Fragile States in the Pacific', in James Cotton and John Ravenhill (eds.), 
Trading on Alliance Security: Australia in World Affairs 2001-2005 (South Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 
2007), p. 147 
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89 New South Wales Premier Sir Henry Parkes, 'Protecting Australia against the Chinese peril ', New South 
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(Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1985), p. 94 
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restricted non-white immigration to the country. It was the first Act passed by the newly 
formed Commonwealth Parliament and, with bipartisan support continued to be in force until 
the mid-1960s. The maintenance of a unified white society was viewed as an important 
element in keeping the nation secure. Minister for External Affairs and Industry, J. G. 
Latham, warned in 1928 that "[t]he problems which confront [Australia], complex and 
difficult as they are, would be indefinitely multiplied and aggravated by racial heterogeneity 
within the continent."93 The White Australia policy also had internal ramifications for 
Australia's indigenous inhabitants, the Aborigines, resulting in their political marginalisation 
from the construction of Australian nationality. For instance, it was only in 1967 that 
Aboriginal Australians were permitted to be included in official census data. In sum, from the 
onset, Australia's nation-building process revealed a predisposition to confrontation with Asia 
as the country aimed for a cohesive, white society and nationalism that was based on racial 
exclusion.94 
While China was initially feared because its large population seemed threatening to 
the inhabitants of poorly defended and isolated colonies, the sense of threat gradually shifted 
to Japan's military might. Following a Japanese victory over Russia in 1905 and the attack on 
Pearl Harbour in 1941, fear of this country reached an apogee in Australia. Its concerns were 
well founded. After sustaining the only military attack on its soil with Japanese air raids on 
Darwin in 1942, Australia developed an even greater sense of anxiety over possible invasions 
from the North. During the bombing of Darwin 243 Australians were killed and over 400 
were wounded. Along with other attacks on Darwin there were Japanese raids on Sydney and 
Newcastle in May and June 1942. However, it is necessary to underline that the continent was 
not invaded, largely because of the overwhelming geographical and logistical obstacles Japan 
93 J. G. Latham, ' Foreword' , in P. D. Phillips and G. L. Wood (eds.), The Peopling of Australia (Melbourne: 
Macmillan in association with Melbourne University Press, 1928), p. vi 
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would have encountered. 95 Still, the memory of this direct attack on Australia has 
significantly reinforced the main elements of the country's strategic culture.96 The build up 
and maintenance of large military capabilities was viewed as absolutely essential to 
Australia's survival. This theme continues to influence contemporary defence policies, which 
assume that while a major attack on Australia remains a remote possibility, defence planning 
must not dismiss the possibility that an attack may occur.97 
As political circumstances in the region shifted, so too did Australia's threat 
perceptions, with fear of Communist China and the possibility of governments being 
overtaken in Malaya and Indonesia subsequently replacing the sense of threat from Japan. 
Simon Philpott notices that Australia may be perceived as having an "anxious history" and 
that while the prevailing fear has always been of a possible invasion, the shape of that fear has 
changed with conditions.98 Under the Menzies coalition government, Australia's security was 
framed as being primarily under threat from "Imperialist Communism". In 1964 Paul 
Hasluck, Australia's Minister for External Affairs highlighted the threat posed by China, by 
stating that the "doctrines and intentions declared by its Communist Government, its invasion 
of Tibet and India and its political activities throughout Asia today are all plain to read. 
The fear of China is the dominant element in much that happens in the region, and the fear is 
well founded."99 In a similar vein, Australia's Prime Minister, Sir Robert Menzies saw the 
spread of communism as "an imminent danger" and stressed that Australia had "not a minute 
more than three years at the very best" to prepare itself for war. 100 During this time the 
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Democratic Labor Party's stance on China provided the Liberal Coalition Party with 
confidence to exaggerate the Chinese communist threat for domestic political gains, and 
provided little incentive for the Menzies Government to moderate its hard-line policy on the 
matter. 101 Therefore, both parties played on the values of fear and Australia's sense of 
indefensibility when dealing with security matters. 
Subsequent attempts at engagement with Asia have continued to be complicated by 
Australia's cultural fear of its region. As Anthony Burke notes, although the White Australia 
policy was officially abandoned in 1973 and rhetoric of a new approach to Asia was promoted 
in the 1970s and 1980s, the discursive structure of security, with its emphasis on "the Other" 
continued. 102 Malcolm Fraser, Australia's Prime Minister who held office from 1975-1983, 
was more concerned with the "Soviet threat" rather than that of China. Following the Soviet 
Union's invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 in a statement issued to parliament two 
moths later Fraser warned of an imminent danger to Australia's security. He stressed that the 
world was "facing probably its most dangerous international crisis since World War II" and 
that the Soviet invasion could spark a chain of events that might ultimately lead the USSR "to 
enhance its strategic posture in the West Pacific in areas which directly affect Australia's 
security."103 Although the 1976 Strategic Basis document downplayed the threat posed by the 
Soviet Union, the government continued its hard military response in line with its policy of 
"forward defence". Rapprochement with China during the period of the Fraser Government's 
tenure was motivated largely by the perceived need to contain the USSR. Fear of "falling 
dominoes" and of the expansion of communism following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
became the main preoccupation in Australian defence thinking. Therefore, the once enduring 
fear of Asian invasion, and the racial "other" manifested in the idea of "yellow hordes" was 
replaced with "red" communist fears . 
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In the post-Cold War era while fear of communist expansion has subsided, Australia 
shifted attention to the rise in power of Asian countries and the need of maintaining 
a capability edge over regional players, as well as the threat posed by international terrorist 
activity. 104 One way of understanding the enduring anxiety over Australia's neighbourhood is 
to uncover the pattern of realist predispositions in the country's security thinking, which 
combines historical attitudes of fear and vulnerability with realist calculations about power 
relativities. Regardless of the shifts in the domestic political environment, a realist ideological 
framework has prevailed as the dominant lens through which Australian security has been 
assessed and advanced. 
Australia: A Culture of Realism 
Evidence of an Australian worldview that is analogous to what Alastair lain Johnston 
calls "cultural realism"105 can be found in successive Defence White Papers, as well as 
official political discourse. The cultural construction of Australia's environment as inherently 
hostile and threatening has been driven by a belief held by much of the Australian policy elite 
and public, which sees the country's region in pessimistic, inherently uncertain terms. 
This realist strain of thought is evident in political discourse and the country's security 
policies over time, regardless of the political leaning of the government in power. 
Australia's approach to defence has always stressed the centrality of military 
capabilities in safeguarding the country from attack, regardless of the likelihood of such 
a scenario. Despite Paul Dibb's 1986 Review of Australia 's Defence Capabilities, which 
argued that "Australia faces no identifiable direct military threat and there is every prospect 
104 Department of Defence, Defence 2000- Our Future Defence Force, p. 12, p. 55 
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that [its] favourable security circumstances will continue"106, the country' s successive defence 
policies continued to be framed in terms of ever-present, potential threats. All of Australia's 
Defence White Papers reflect a similar line of argument to the one present in The Defence of 
Australia 1987, which argues that the advancement of military capabilities lies at the heart of 
securing Australia. 107 Gareth Evans, Australia's Foreign Minister in 1989 declared that 
"possession of military power will always remain of major importance in international 
affairs." 108 Shortly following the end of the Cold War, Robert Ray, Minister for Defence in 
a similar vein warned his countrymen that, ""peace breaking out" does not mean that we 
require less defence." 109 This kind of thinking is very much alive in the present day. 
Over a decade after the end of the Cold War, Australia continues to view the use of 
force as a natural and essential component of its defence planning, stressing the absolute 
necessity of furthering the country's military power and enhancing its technological 
sophistication. The Defence 2000 - Our Future Defence Force White Paper argues that 
"[a]rmed force will remain a key factor in international affairs. While resort to force will 
continue to be constrained by many aspects of the international system, governments cannot 
dismiss the possibility of major conflict between states." 110 According to this document, while 
Australia does not consider an attack on its territory to be a likely scenario in the near future, 
and openly admits to treating it as a "remote possibility" it stresses the need for defence 
planning to be ready for any possible threat that may arise. 111 
Australia's definition of security is understood primarily m a narrow sense of 
protection from military attack, although the need for countering terrorism has also gained 
106 Paul Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, Report to the Minister for Defence (Canberra: 
Australian Government Publishing Service, March 1986), p. 1 
107 Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia 1987 (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing 
Service, 1987), p. vii 
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10 Robert Ray, Minister for Defence, 'Outbreak of peace isn't a signal to relax', The Australian, May 18, 1990 
110 Department of Defence, Defence 2000- Our Future Defence Force, p. viii 
Ill Ibid, p. 23 
35 
prominence in recent times. Despite the acknowledgement of the latter threat to Australia's 
security, the country's military force continues to be structured predominantly for the purpose 
of fighting conventional war. Defence 2000 outlines that "Australia's most important long-
term strategic objective is to be able to defend [Australian] territory from direct military 
attack."112 These views are manifested despite successive post-World War II strategic reviews 
confirming that in the near future Australia is unlikely to face any attacks. 113 
When it comes to defence, there is a general bipartisan agreement on Australian 
military priorities. In 2001 as Chairman of the Australian Labor Party's Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Defence and Trade Policy, Kevin Rudd put forward the view that 
"Australia's security in East Asia is in large part contingent on it maintaining a significant 
technological gap over other military assets in the region." 114 He expressed the view that the 
ANZUS alliance provides Australia with the best opportunity of retaining the highest 
competitive edge in the region. 115 This perspective was in line with that of the Howard 
government, which in 2004 introduced a cruise missile program, designed to give Australia 
the "most lethal capacity" for strike combat capability in the region. Therefore, both major 
political parties shared the view that advancing traditional military capabilities is central to 
defending Australia. In essence, the debate on defence policy in Australia focuses on the 
balance between expeditionary missions and continental defence, rather than on non-
traditional operations or changes in the character of warfare. 116 
Australia's defence strategy continues to emphasise the importance of a sophisticated 
military, with the 2007 Defence Update arguing that "[a] credible and capable military 
112 Department of Defence, Defence 2000- Australia's Defence Policy, p. 30, emphasis added 
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remains a crucial complement to what some call 'soft power': diplomacy, aid, cultural ties, 
people-to-people contacts, trade, and institution building." 117 Adopting a realist take about the 
anarchic state of international relations, it warns that "there is always the possibility of 
strategic miscalculation" and that regional power shifts may contribute to conflict. 118 For this 
reason, Australian policy-makers have been eager to participate in the revolution in military 
affairs (RMA), that allows for intelligence, high-technology and sophisticated military 
capabilities to carry out operations with extreme efficiency and low levels of danger. This is 
despite the fact that, as Desmond Ball highlights, the RMA is of little relevance to current 
important issues in the Asia-Pacific region such as drug trafficking, environmental issues and 
illegal immigration. 119 Rather, the key drivers of Australia's force structure have been and 
continue to be the goal of maintaining control over the sea/air gap, which mainly comprises 
the Arafura and Coral Seas, defeating enemies that may attack Australia. 120 
Australia's defence policies have also been based on a fear of a regional arms race and 
a perceived rapid growth in the quantity of military capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Australian governments have been concerned with relative power gains of regional countries, 
often viewing these developments in zero-sum terms. In 1988 Defence Minister Kim Beazley 
expressed his worry that Asian countries were increasing their military power as well as 
advancing their technological capabilities. He believed that eventually these states will 
compete for influence and allegiance of regionally weaker countries including Australia. 121 
He argued, that to "assume that no external power will penetrate the South West Pacific [ ... ] 
may be valid for the next five years [ ... ] it is quite invalid for the next twenty-five years."122 
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The following year, Foreign Minister Gareth Evans explained his government' s defence 
approach, by stating that defence planning and capability development "is based on the 
enduring features of our strategic environment and the broad range of capabilities that could 
realistically be projected against Australia."123 This outlook continued in successive policies, 
including Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994 and Australia 's Strategic Policy, 
with the latter warning of regional arms modernisation programs in East Asia and the shifting 
balance between the region's major powers.124 
More recently stress has been given to the growing military might of Asian states. 
In May 2002 Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer, stressed that "[t]he Asia-
Pacific region is home to the world' s six largest armies (China, the US, Russia, India, North 
Korea and South Korea) and, after the Middle East, the world' s three most volatile flashpoints 
-the Taiwan Strait, the Korean Peninsula and Kashmir." 125 Stressing material capabilities in 
this speech, Downer played on the enduring Australian fear of invasion, stating that "we must 
not fool ourselves that terrorism has somehow erased the other daunting concerns in our 
region."126 The belief that a conventional military attack on Australia is of necessity a serious 
threat to the country's security is deceptive, as the only power capable of deploying 
a sustained military force and undertaking such a huge task is the United States. 127 
Yet, Australia is concerned about keeping up with the relative advancements of regional 
countries. For this reason, defence spending is scheduled to continue increasing in the next ten 
years at an average rise of three per cent per annum. 128 
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Tied with the anxiety over growing military capabilities in the region is Australia's 
desire of maintaining the United States' power predominance. It views the commitment ofthe 
US in acting as a key player in the architecture of the Asia-Pacific as crucial to the region's 
stability. 129 Australia is wary of power shifts in the proximate area, particularly if they are to 
threaten the status quo of US-led alignments. In 2001, Alexander Downer emphasised the 
significance of the United States' presence in regional engagement, stating that "the US plays 
a particularly important role in balancing and containing potential rivalries in the region." 130 
He argued that "[a]n Asia Pacific region without a US presence would be a much more 
unstable and dangerous place." 131 Moreover, the Labor party shares this view, as is evident in 
Kevin Rudd's comment that "it is in Australia's national security interests to continue to 
argue for a sustained US strategic presence in East Asia and the West Pacific." 132 In terms of 
protecting not only regional but also global security, Australia's rhetoric highlights the 
necessity of maintaining the political influence of the US on world affairs. Australia believes 
it has "strategic interests in the effectiveness of the UN and the US upholding an international 
system that deters or counters aggression and works against the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction." 133 Robert Patman extends this argument, arguing that Australia views 
globalisation as being centred on the United States, in contrast to New Zealand's belief that it 
reduces the influence of traditional power in the international system and creates a more level 
playing field for smaller states. 134 This ties in with Australia's conviction on the inefficiency 
of multilateral ventures in international relations. 
129 Alexander Downer, Foreign Minister, E and OE, 'Advancing the National Interest: Australia's Foreign Policy 
Challenge', Speech at the National Press Club, Canberra, 7 May 2002 
130 Downer, 'Australian Foreign Policy- a Liberal Perspective', Australian Journal of International Affairs, 
Vol. 55, No.3, 2001, p. 340 
131 Downer, 'Australian Foreign Policy- a Liberal Perspective', p. 340 
132 Kevin Rudd, 'ANZUS and the 21st century', Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 55, No.2, 2001, 
p. 308 
133 Department of Defence, 'Foreword', Defence Review 2000 - Our Future Defence Force, A Public 
Discussion Paper, June 2000, emphasis added, p. 16 
134 Robert G. Patman, 'Giobalisation and Trans-Tasman Relations: Integration or Divergence?', Australian 
Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 55, No.3, 2001, p. 399 
39 
The prevalence of realist thinking on Australia's defence is also manifested in 
pessimism concerning the efficacy and potential of multilateral avenues in advancing the 
country's security. Chris Reus-Smit points out Australia's reluctance to advance multilateral 
co-operation in non-economic issue areas, when this requires international legal rules to 
overtake domestic sovereign rights of the country, as is the case in such areas as 
environmental protection or refugee law. 135 Its long-held reluctance to ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol, which was finally signed by Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd in December 
2007, reveals, for instance, how the country's self-interest has largely dominated over 
considerations on international security, ignoring the significant repercussions for the security 
of regional low-lying atoll Pacific states that have been suffering from climate-related rising 
sea levels. Australia has also been hesitant in committing to regional security initiatives. After 
lengthy delays in signing a non-aggression pact with Asian nations, the country finally 
became a signatory to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2005, when presented 
with this condition for participating in the East Asian Summit. 136 
Australia views international institutions and organisations as playing a secondary role 
to the advancement of bilateral ties and agreements. During his role as Foreign Minister 
Downer pointed to the need for Australia to pursue "practical bilateralism", among which the 
most important is a strong relationship with the US, even if this has negative implications for 
Australia's Asian relationships. Preference for bilateral agreements is underpinned by 
Australia's pessimistic world-view on co-operation and relative power gains. 
Australia's attitude towards multilateralism was summed up in 2003 by Downer, who 
stated that "[ s ]orne multilateral institutions will remain important to [Australia's] interests. 
But increasingly multilateralism is a synonym for an ineffective and unfocused policy 
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involving internationalism of the lowest common denominator."137 Instead, it is possible to 
identify three key policies of Australia's approach to regional security and they include the 
strengthening of its relationship with the United States, furthering and affirming the 
importance of bilateral relations and a limited emphasis on multilateral co-operation.138 As to 
this last aspect, Gerald Henderson concludes that "[ ... ] Australian multilateralism has 
expressed itself in support for alliances." 139 It is therefore the realist perspective that 
dominates security choices over an internationalist outlook. 
While elements of liberal thinking are certainly present in Australia's policies, such as 
the promotion of a liberal economic environment, international organisations, regimes and 
laws; this has frequently been overtaken by realist considerations. For instance, the country 
bypassed the UN in 2003 when it became involved in the US-led war in Iraq. Australia is not 
reluctant to highlight that the United Nations is an organisation with limited powers. 
The country's 1997 Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper entitled In the National Interest, 
bluntly warns that "Australia must be realistic about what multilateral institutions such as the 
United Nations system can deliver. International organisations can only accomplish what their 
member states enable them to accomplish."140 While this may be seen as a general 
observation that points to the inherent limits of international organisations and 
multilateralism, it IS rare for a state to publicly voice this kind of pessimistic outlook. 
In Australia's case, however this framing corresponds with domestic attitudes and the 
enduring strategic beliefs about the uncertainty of the international environment and 
selfishness of states. 
Studies indicate that the Australian people tend to be even more pessimistic about the 
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level of threats to their country's security than their government. For instance, in 1987, 
despite a conservative Fraser Government holding office, 50 per cent of respondents still 
believed that not enough political concern was shown towards national security.141 Polls also 
indicated that Australians were not confident that the country could defend itself. There has 
consistently been strong public support in Australia for increasing the level of military 
spending in the country. 142 Analysing a range of various public polls on defence spending, 
Campbell found that all indicated that majorities were in clear favour of an increase in 
military funding. 143 
The dominant construction of security in Australian political discourse and policies, 
with its emphasis on strengthening the alliance with the US and continued advancement of 
military capabilities, is not limited to politicians of conservative leanings, and can be found in 
attitudes of both Liberal-led and Labor-led governments. Some scholars argue that the realist 
thinking in Australia is a direct result of predominantly Liberal governments holding power in 
the country. 144 However, this is not an accurate assessment, as this perception of the world is 
in fact deeply embedded in Australian thinking and reflected in bipartisan views on defence, 
even if political rhetoric may sometimes diverge. Analysing defence policy in the years 1976-
1980 Hugh Smith found that the differences between the major political parties were in 
practice not as large as rhetoric suggested. 145 There is in fact deep bipartisan convergence on 
how to approach the topic of defending Australia. Both major political parties stress their goal 
of significant military spending. In 1987 the Labor Foreign Minister, Kim Beazley, was keen 
to highlight the defence spending of his government, stating that he had contributed to 
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"the largest defence capital investment in Australia's peacetime history." 146 Beazley was also 
not hesitant in highlighting that Australia's security policy "does not preclude the use of 
offensive tactics to achieve a defensive goal." 147 A similar train of thought was evident in the 
Howard Government's argument concerning the possibility of Australian pre-emptive strikes 
on suspected terrorist bases in regional countries. 
This cultural predisposition to realist thinking coupled with a constant fear of Asian 
"others" and a possible invasion from the North, has led to the general belief in Australia that 
in order to defend the country, it must look towards a powerful ally for protection. This brings 
us to another enduring feature of Australia's strategic culture - the reliance on the protection 
of a great and powerful friend. 
Security through Alliances: The Dependency on Great Power Protection 
Constant perceptions of insecurity that have been present throughout Australia's 
history, have led to the general belief among Australians and their political elites on both 
sides of the political spectrum, that the country requires alignment with a powerful ally in 
order to protect and enhance the nation's security. As the government stressed in its 1976 
White Paper on Defence, there is a need to "display to the world Australia's close defence 
association with the US" in order to deter potential aggressors, and send a serious message to 
the world that "[Australia's] military capabilities and competence should command 
respect." 148 This conviction is central to Australian strategic culture and constitutes 
a perceived vital base for the development of the country's defence policies. 
Specifically, Australia has historically aligned itself with two superpowers that share the 
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country's cultural values. This dependency for safeguarding Australia's security has been 
reflected in the country's history of its first 150 years relying on Great Britain, and 
subsequently, around the last 60 years dependency on the United States. 149 
Reflecting its colonial origins, early in its history Australia along with New Zealand 
forged a strong relationship with their Mother Country, Great Britain. When World War I 
commenced, Australia assured Britain of its commitment, dispatching nearly 330 000 troops 
abroad, of whom 59 000 perished. In the spirit of the ANZAC tradition with New Zealand, 
such a large sacrifice of its population was followed with a participation of nearly 1 million 
Australians in World War II. On the one hand, during the first forty years of the twentieth 
century, Australia followed a foreign policy basically formulated in London and had its 
interests promoted by British diplomatic missions.150 Yet while early twentieth century 
Australian foreign policy continued to reflect British interests and led the country to 
participate in defence initiatives far from any direct security concerns to its territory; it is 
possible to identify an emergent pattern in Australia's independent security thinking. 
Reflecting anxiety over the country's indefensibility, and drawing on its British cultural roots, 
Australia forged a tendency of looking towards a "great and powerful friend" for the 
maintenance of its defence, even if this would involve its participation in distant conflicts. 
The security dependence on Great Britain, however, came into question in the 1940s. 
As G. M. Brown points out, London's failure of to defend its Southeast Asian colonies in 
1942, together with its inability to protect Australia from the threat of Japanese invasion, 
marked the end of the Australian reliance on its Mother Country as its vital guarantor of 
security.151 In a New Year message for 1942 on the implications of the Pacific War for 
Australian defence and foreign policy, Prime Minister John Curtin declared that 
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"Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the 
United Kingdom." 152 Conceived as a guarantee against the threat of resurgent Japanese 
militarism, in 1951 a trilateral security agreement between the United States, Australia and 
New Zealand was established, known as the ANZUS Treaty. 
However, even when the security relationship with Great Britain proved to be no 
longer effective, the country continued to maintain strong links with London. In 1950, at 
a time of fear of Chinese Communism, Australia's Prime Minister, Sir Robert Menzies of the 
Liberal Party, offered Australian territory for Great Britain's nuclear testing programme. 
This policy was justified largely on the grounds of shared interests with the Mother Country. 
Jacques Hymans argues that this loyalty highlights the inadequacies of "realist" arguments 
about the primacy of national sovereignty above other matters.153 In 1967 Britain decided to 
abandon its role East of Suez, leaving Australia under less protection. Yet, despite these 
setbacks, which pointed to the limitation of British power and highlighted its shortcomings as 
Australia's security protector, traces of dependency on the relationship with the UK only 
faded slowly. The continuing rationale for this type of relationship says something of 
Australia's shared identity with Britain and consequently, its perception of mutual interests. 
It appears that Australia's strategic culture promoted the view that limited military protection 
from Britain, albeit no longer as effective as previously, should continue to take precedence 
over the importance of the preservation of sovereignty in security matters. 
After considering its options for the formation of an independent nuclear defence 
system, and facing unbearable economic costs for such an initiative, Australia decided that the 
best option for its security was a nuclear alliance with the US. China's nuclear test in October 
1964 spurred debate in Australia about the possibility of developing independent nuclear 
deterrents. Under Prime Minister Menzies, Australia had to that point in time pursued nuclear 
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guarantees and not nuclear proliferation. 154 It is interesting to note, however that during this 
time rather than viewing its location as an asset that diminished the risk of threats, Australia's 
geographical isolation was seen as a burden that reduced the country's ability to respond to 
a nuclear attack. 155 Ultimately, the United States was granted the right to host elements of its 
nuclear defence system in Australia, and the possibility of an Australian nuclear capability 
diminished. Despite increasing its risk of being a Soviet target, Australia placed absolute 
primacy on aligning its survival with the power of the US. This kind of reliance continues to 
the present day. The Defence 2000- Our Future Defence Force policy outline stresses that 
"Australia relies on the extended nuclear deterrence provided by US nuclear forces to deter 
the remote possibility of any nuclear attack on Australia."156 Likewise, from the time that US 
President Ronald Reagan launched the Strategic Defense Initiative (also knows as "Star 
Wars") program in 1983, Australia has been actively involved in US ballistic missile defence 
programs by hosting missile launch detection systems and relevant information facilities. 157 
For the sake of maintaining its security alliances, Australia has often participated in 
initiatives far away from home. As Graeme Cheeseman points out, in the 1950s and 1960s 
Australia's involvement in conflicts in Southeast Asia, alongside Great Britain and the United 
States, was justified by discourses of danger that took advantage of Australians' fears of Asia 
and necessity of maintaining protection from a greater power. 158 Australian participation in 
joint military initiatives abroad, first with the UK, and later the US, were interpreted as 
promoting common interests and safeguarding the power of Australia's defender. Minister for 
Defence, Shane Paltridge declared in 1965, that "Australian defence policy must be world 
wide because our security is threatened by any blow at the United Kingdom, the United States 
or any other of the countries in the defensive alliances that have been formed in 
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the free world."159 Australia's participation m the Vietnam war, under the Menzies 
government was not only rationalised as backing an ANZUS ally, but also carried out in the 
belief that due to this support, the US would be more likely to aid Australia with regard to 
Indonesia. 160 
During the period of "forward defence" Australia participated in conflicts which were 
not directly threatening to the country's security, but which required the country's 
participation primarily for the sake of alliance preservation. While some of these 
involvements concerned joining the United Nations reponse, others were centered around the 
interests of Australia's main allies. These included the Korean War (1950-1953), the Malaya 
Emergency (1950-1960), The Indonesian Confrontation (1963-66), the Vietnam War (1962-
72) and the Gulf War (1990-91) and most recently, the War in Iraq (2003-). Changes in the 
international environment from the 1970s, including the defeat of Western forces in Indo-
China, withdrawal of American focus away from Asia and the end of the Cold War have 
caused Australia's policymakers to change their approach. 161 Increasingly emphasis is placed 
on security initiatives that are of more direct relevance to Australia, although as the case of 
Iraq demonstrates, the fulfilment of alliance commitments in the form of sending combat 
troops to distant conflicts involving the US, continue to have importance. 
Greater emphasis on defence self-reliance has been apparent in Australia since the 
1970s. During this period, Great Britain was more concerned with maintaining its interests in 
Europe and President Nixon's 1969 "Guam Doctrine" stressed that America was no longer 
willing to act as a security guarantor in the region. Attempts were made in the 1970s to 
promote greater engagement with Asia. By the 1980s, security assessments concluded that the 
country was not directly threatened. Promoting defence self-reliance was among the key 
159 Shane Paltridge, 'Australia's Defence Policy', Survival, January 1966, p. 17 
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arguments ofthe Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities (also knows as the Dibb Report) 
released in 1986 by Minister for Defence, Kim Beazley. The Dibb Report stressed that 
"Australia is one of the most secure countries in the world' and that it ''faces no identifiable 
direct military threat and there is every prospect that our favourable security circumstances 
will continue. "162 In terms of Australia's contribution to its alliance with the US, the report 
suggested that "there is no requirement for Australia to become involved in United States 
contingency planning for global war. " 163 Canberra was urged to focus more on its immediate 
regional environment, rather than fight in distant conflicts of its allies. 
However even when Australia stresses the need for independence m its security 
policies, the sense of autonomy in defence matters remains firmly embedded within a broader 
relationship of reliance with the United States. Support for the alliance continues, despite 
changes to the political environment, calls for greater independence in Australian security 
policies and domestic protests relating to American-led security initiatives. For example, there 
was no shift in position on the relationship in the 1980s, when considerable change was taking 
place due to New Zealand's rejection of US nuclear powered vessels visits. Despite protests 
by peace and anti-nuclear groups, Australia has not witnessed the same degree of outcry on 
this issue as New Zealand. ANZUS, and especially the Australia-US leg of this agreement, 
remains fundamental to Australian security interests. In fact, it is so embedded in the 
country's thinking that, as Gerald Henderson notices, "no major political party in Australia 
has ever contemplated life without the alliance." 164 The only area where political ideas have 
diverged concerns the extent to which Australia should manifest its independence within this 
alliance. This is despite the fact that the ANZUS treaty does not in practice guarantee 
Australia that the US would automatically come to its rescue if needed. 
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Australia's defence interests are framed within the rhetoric of alliance as a central 
component of self-reliance. In its 1976 Defence White Paper the country declared it was 
committed to pursuing self-reliance in its defence; a theme that has continued in subsequent 
1987, 1994 and 2000 Defence White Papers. 165 The Defence of Australia - Defence White 
Paper 1987 states that self-reliance needs to be "set firmly within the framework of our 
alliances and regional associations." 166 Similarly in 1988 Kim Beazley was careful in 
describing Australia's sense of independence in defence matters, saying that "Australia cannot 
sustain a self reliant defence posture [ ... ] our alliance is literally essential to our self-
reliance." 167 This conviction has restricted Australia's freedom to voice political disagreement 
over the policies of its ally. When differences of opinion do happen, as David Campbell notes, 
"Australian opposition to US policies has never been constructed as a threat to the ANZUS 
Treaty or the overall relationship with the United States."168 This idea of self-reliance that is 
inherently formed in accordance with the value of accommodating the need for dependence 
with the United States has continued to the present day. On the one hand, Defence 2000- Our 
Future Defence Force states that "[t]he Government has reaffirmed that the primary priority 
for the ADF [Australian Defence Force] is to maintain the capability to defend Australian 
territory from any credible attack, without relying on the combat forces of any other 
country."169 On the other hand, however, the policy outline stresses that "the US-Australia 
alliance is as important to both parties today as it has ever been." 170 
Politicians on both sides of the political spectrum acknowledge the importance of the 
US relationship for Australia's security and there exists almost a political rivalry over which 
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party can claim credit for the origins of the alliance. Allan Gyngell notes that both major 
political parties can claim ownership for the emergence of the security alliance, with Labor's 
involvement in the wartime alliance and the Liberal Party's subsequent success in forming a 
defence agreement in the form of the ANZUS treaty. 171 As leader of the Labor party, Kevin 
Rudd, was keen to highlight that "[t]he ANZUS alliance is therefore the construction of both 
the Labor and Liberal parties." 172 When the main Australian political parties differ on the 
relationship with the US, there has been only disagreement as to the extent of this alliance, 
with the Labor party offering greater scepticism as to its importance, refusing for instance to 
support the Australian government's Vietnam policy. Still, the Labor party is of the same 
view as the Liberal, that alliance with the US "is one of the key pillars of Australia's national 
security system." 173 Public opinion is also strongly in favour of keeping the US as a security 
protector. The 1996 Australian Election Study survey revealed that the respondents viewed 
the superpower as the most important country for Australia's defence and security relations; 
with 95 percent viewing the US as either "very important" (60 per cent) or "fairly important" 
(30 per cent). 174 However, the overall strong belief in the vital importance of Australia's 
relationship with the United States, has led to a prioritisation of the country's regional 
strategic relationships. For instance, Australia's Defence 2000 - Our Future Defence Force 
White Paper appears to downplay the significance of New Zealand as a strategic partner; in 
a chapter entitled "Australia's International Strategic Relationships" New Zealand is not 
mentioned in the first 4 7 paragraphs. 175 
The primacy of security guarantees over domestic sovereignty is evident in the current 
Australian relationship with the United States, where the latter has been granted Australian 
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permission to its territory to base strategic facilities in Pine Gap, North West Cape and 
Nurrungar. From the 1960s onwards, the US has retained in Australia numerous intelligence 
collecting facilities, such as seismic stations that monitor underground nuclear detonations 
and communication, satellite tracking and navigation systems. Australian governments from 
both sides of the political spectrum have argued that the continuing presence of the "joint 
facilities" is, on the whole, a positive step towards Australia's security. 176 While the United 
States' defence facilities on Australian soil are not a requirement of the ANZUS Treaty the 
country has willingly offered its logistical assistance for the benefit of US-led strategic 
operations and a perceived sense of greater security. 
Perhaps then Australia's reliance on the US for its security represents a rational 
attempt at maximising the country's interests? While the perceived need for a security alliance 
has dominated Australian thinking since almost the country's founding; it arguably does not 
necessarily represent the best means of promoting the country's defence interests. On the one 
hand, a close relationship with the most powerful country offers economic and political 
advantages that provide a rationale for pursuing such a relationship. For instance, as 
Alexander Downer points out, due to its relationship with the US, Australia "will carry 
substantially more weight in Washington in regional affairs-and beyond-than would otherwise 
be the case." 177 On the other hand, however, and perhaps more importantly in terms of 
security benefits, this close alliance has more likely reduced Australia's security. For instance 
in 2004 experts, including FBI's executive assistant director of counter terrorism John Pistole 
and Australian Federal Police Commissioner Mick Keelty, predicted that the country has 
become a greater target for attacks since participating in the US-led war in Iraq. 178 
This raises yet another important question, why has Australia continued its 
dependency on the US alliance? The relationship between Australia and the United States 
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poses a challenge to realist assumptions about the longevity and character of security 
alliances. For instance, realists would expect to see the dissolution of an alliance in the wake 
of a decline in the levels of threat faced by its members. 179 However, Desmond Bell notes that 
ANZUS has remained "threat insensitive". 180 Throughout Australia's history there was only 
one six month period when the country was in any realistic direct military danger - from the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941 to the US defeat of Japan's naval air 
power at the battles of the Coral Sea in 1942. 181 The origin of Australia's alliance with the 
United States was based on a possibility of Japan's post-war military resurgence. 
However, this threat soon diminished; thus removing the initial security incentive for the 
continuance to the alliance. Instead, during the Cold War Australia viewed the ANZUS 
alliance as protection from Japan and later from the threat of Communist expansionism. In the 
contemporary era it provides, what Alexander Downer called "a bedrock of certainty and 
security" in "an era in which threats come from uncertainty". 182 It appears that the 
construction of a threatening environment to Australia's security remains an enduring element 
of the justification for continuing the alliance, even if an assessment of reality may indicate 
that this enduring relationship may have in fact increased Australia's chances of being a target 
of terrorism, due to its close association with the US. For instance, since November 2001 
Osama bin Laden has repeatedly mentioned Australia as a target for attacks by al-Qaeda, 
signalling the first time that the country had been singled out by a large and operationally 
capable terrorist network. 183 
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An explanation that points to a psychological feeling of dependency and vulnerability 
offers a more compelling explanation for the endurance of the United States-Australia 
security relationship than a realist calculation of interests. In studying patterns of reliance in 
post-war Australian foreign policy, Richard Leaver concludes, "[d]ependence, in so far as it 
existed, was [ ... ] voluntary rather than structural." 184 Stephen Walt has found that an alliance 
may persist despite the absence of its original rationale when there is ideological solidarity 
between its members, a shared sense of political values, a substantial asymmetry of power 
between them, as well as when the relationship has a high degree of institutionalisation. 185 
He believes that "alliances will be especially durable when relations among the member-states 
have brought about a strong sense of common identity, but this sort of transformation is 
extremely rare." 186 Australia's defence policy, however, promotes the idea of a shared cultural 
identity, arguing that a "renewed vigour of the US-Australia alliance is founded on enduring 
shared values, interests and outlook, as well as common sacrifices that extend back almost a 
century."187 Hence the continuing rationale for this alliance has a significant cultural 
component, with the argument about shared identity reflected in alleged mutual interests. 
History suggests that Australia is likely to continue relying on the US for its security. 
According to Downer, "The Australia-United States alliance will continue to be fundamental 
to the success of Australia's security and economic objectives."188 The Department of 
Defence projects the view that "[r]egardless of how expensive [Australia's] defence activities 
with the United States become, this bedrock of supporting sustained US engagement in the 
Asia Pacific region will endure." 189 However, while public support for the alliance has 
remained strong despite historical shifts, attention is likely to increasingly tum to significant 
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social, economic, and environmental concems. 190 Still, it seems likely that in terms of military 
security, the Australian-United States relationship will continue to occupy centrality in 
defence planning for the foreseeable future. 
In sum, Australia has always viewed its defence as best served when its proximate 
region is under the control of its great power protector. Following the British withdrawal from 
the Asia-Pacific, the US-Australia objective of maintaining favourable balance and stability in 
the region informed the country's strategic security objectives. Accordingly, following the 
demise of a "Pax Britannica" alliance, Australia turned towards the "American Lake" 
rationale for its security. Australian reliance on the US for its security is so deeply held and 
persistent that it is highly unlikely it will be challenged in defence policies of the foreseeable 
future. 
Constructing Insecurity: Terrorism, War and Refugees 
Australia's fear of its region has been intensified in recent times in the wake of 
perceived instability and disorder in neighbouring Pacific Island states. Fear of its regional 
neighbours, which Australian politicians and officials have described as an "arc of instability" 
has been linked with anxiety over the possibility of terrorist activity. Australia's use of this 
metaphor that is broadly applied to the Asia-Pacific region, and refers to so-called "failed 
states", draws heavily on the country's sense of fear and vulnerability. The use ofthis political 
rhetoric will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, where I will examine Australia's 
rationale for participation in the 2003 intervention to the Solomon Islands and how the 
country has framed threats to regional security. However, this section examines how Australia 
constructs a culture of fear and national security interests, by linking refugees as well as 
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participation in the war in Iraq with the threat of terrorism. While terrorism appears to be 
a highly significant security topic following the attacks of 11 September 2001, it is important 
to point out that the Australian fear that terrorist activity might be occurring in the Pacific 
region is not that new. For instance, in a 1987 ANOP poll 20 per cent of respondents 
identified Libya as a danger to Australia's security, due to its presence in the South Pacific 
and possible terrorist threat. This was at a time when the Australian Government closed the 
diplomatic post of the Libyan People's Bureau in Canberra. 191 
More recently, in constructing a culture of insecurity, the Howard Government played 
on domestic fears, linking the problem of terrorism with Australia's security and 
characterising it as an ever-present danger to the country. In 2003, during a nation-wide 
campaign, Australian residents received from the government anti-terrorism kits entitled 
Let's Look out for Australia: Protecting Our Way of Life from a Possible Terrorist Threat. 
It was part of the Howard government's A$15 million campaign entitled "National Security 
Public Information Campaign", an idea that was introduced two months after the Bali terrorist 
attack of October 2002. The distribution of the kits was aimed at explaining what the 
government has been doing, what the public can do to enhance their security and how to 
identify potential threatening terrorist activity. The anti-terrorism kit framed the issue of 
terrorism as an imminent and omnipresent threat to Australians. 192 Howard urged his 
countrymen to "be alert, but not alarmed" and to report any suspicious activity. In discussing 
what the government was doing to combat the threat of terrorism, the kit underlined the need 
to tum to military tools for enhancing Australia's security, with Howard arguing that moves 
towards the strengthening of Australia's military capacity were "necessary steps to 
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protect ourselves." 193 A similar logic drove the reform of Australian laws relating to the 
nation's security. 
Strict anti-terrorism legislation was introduced in 2002 and 2003, which included the 
Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill and the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation (ASIO) Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill. Despite these bills being 
greeted by unfavourable opinions of the Senate Committee responsible for overviewing the 
legislation, both bills, following amendments, became laws. 194 This anti-terrorism legislation, 
including the subsequent introduction in 2005 of the Australian Anti-Terrorism Act, had 
drawn heated criticism from legal experts and civil society groups, who argued that 
fundamental democratic rights and freedoms were impaired. 195 The somewhat draconian steps 
taken by the Howard government, including comments concerning the possibility of pre-
emptive action on suspected terrorist bases in neighbouring countries, have led to criticism, 
particularly from Muslim Asian nations. For instance, Malaysia's Prime Minister, went so far 
as to issue a travel warning to fellow Muslim Malaysians intending to visit Australia, stating 
that it was a destination "particularly unsafe for Muslims because they are likely to have their 
houses raided." 196 
The Australian government has followed the argument that terrorism is a major threat 
to a country's security and that pre-emptive action is a suitable method for combating it. 
On the one hand, Australia's fear of terrorism and the controversial steps taken to address 
it may be explained by its recent experiences. The terrorist bombing in Bali on October 12, 
2002 claimed the lives of 88 Australians; the greatest single loss of Australian lives since the 
193 John Howard, 'Preamble ', in Eric Abetz, Let's Look out for Australia: Protecting Our Way of Life from a 
Possible Terrorist Threat (North Ryde: PMP Print, 2003), cited in McDonald, 'Be Alarmed? Australia' s Anti-
terrorism Kit and the Politics of Security', p. 178 
194 Christopher Michaelsen, 'Antiterrorism Legislation in Australia: A Proportionate Response to the Terrorist 
Threat?', Studies in Conflict & Terrorism , Vol. 28, Issue 4, July 2005, p. 322, p. 325 
195 Michael Pelly, Tony Stephens and Marian Wilkinson, 'Former leaders call for debate', The Sydney Morning 
Herald, October 25, 2005 
196 Cited in Jim Dickens, 'Malaysian PM Issues Australia Travel Alert', Courier Mail, 7 November 2002, p. 10 
56 
bombing of Darwin in 1942 by Japan. 197 On the other hand, however, the country's response 
to international terrorism has not been based on an assessment of the nature and origins of this 
threat. Instead, as Joseph Camilleri points out, domestic political considerations and 
"a preconceived determination to align Australia firmly with US priorities and strategies" 
drove the policy response. 198 Likewise, the Australian rationale for participating in the US-led 
war in Iraq simultaneously followed the Bush administration's logic and drew on Australia's 
experiences of terrorism to justify the cause. 
Despite a lack of correlation between the two, Australia accepted the US argument that 
war in Iraq was an essential component in the "war against terror". In 2003 Prime Minister 
John Howard stated that "we lost 88 Australians in Bali because of a wilful act of 
international terrorism [ ... ] I will, amongst other things, be asking Australian people to bear 
those circumstances in mind if we become involved in military contact with Iraq."199 
Howard was in Washington the day of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, which is likely 
to have strengthened his convictions about the shared cause of combating terrorism. In terms 
of Australia's participation in the war in Iraq, following the failure of the defensive realism 
argument concerning the dangers of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) that were 
allegedly in possession of Saddam Hussein's regime, the Australian government turned 
towards another rationale for justification - the ANZAC theme - in an attempt to draw upon 
nationalist symbols and persuade public opinion.200 
Under the Howard government Australia had also continued to base its security 
policies on discourses of danger, portraying asylum-seekers and refugees as potential national 
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security threats. In August 2001 the country refused entry to a boatload of asylum-seekers on 
the Norwegian-rescued Tampa vessel, demonstrating that Australia extends its fear and 
enemy rhetoric to refugees. The Australian government framed the asylum-seekers as not only 
security threats to Australia, but also as threatening Australia's sovereignty - a key realist 
concern. Although the "Tampa crisis" captured mass news media attention, sparking interest 
in Australian policies towards asylum-seekers, the tough stance taken did not represent any 
divergence in attitudes from previous similar incidents. As Don McMaster notices, with the 
exclusion of Australia's treatment of Vietnamese asylum-seekers in the 1970s, the country's 
response to refuge seekers "has rarely been sympathetic."201 For instance, shipwreck survivors 
of a boat of 150 refugees who were rescued in 1979 on their way to Darwin by the Shell 
tanker Entalina were refused entry to Australia.202 By not allowing the Tampa vessel access 
into Australian waters, the government prevented the Migration Act from being invoked and 
the refugees chasing their claims on Australia's territory. 
The Australian refusal to allow the Tampa asylum-seekers entry was viewed as 
unlawful by legal experts and condemned by the international community. The Federal Court 
ruled that the removal of the asylum-seekers from Australia was illegal. By refusing the 
refugees entry, the country violated the 1951 refugee convention and sparked widespread 
international condemnation from the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights, 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. The United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees (UNHCR) also expressed its concern about Australia's reluctance to take 
a leadership role in solving the problem.203 Subsequent instances of Australian refusal of entry 
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to asylum-seekers have also drawn criticism. For instance, the UNHCR expressed criticism 
over Australia's towing away of 14 boat people from Australian waters in November 2003.204 
Despite Australia's refusal to allow the Tampa entry being labelled as illegal; there 
was strong domestic support for the firm stance of the Howard Government. There was 
a general bipartisan agreement and public support for keeping the Tampa out by any means 
necessary. A Herald-AC Nielsen public poll, which was published in the 4 September, 2001 
edition ofthe Sydney Morning Herald, revealed that 77 per cent of respondents were in favour 
of the Howard government's stance to refuse asylum-seekers entry to Australia. 205 
A comparable 71 per cent of Australians that took part in this poll believed in the idea that 
refugees should be kept in indefinite detention.206 Likewise, this level of esteem in the 
government's handling of the issue seemed to correlate with Howard's boosting of confidence 
by the public, evident in a 11 per cent rise in the leadership approval rating and 5 per cent rise 
in the preferred Prime Minister rating.Z07 Therefore, a clear majority of Australians approved 
the Prime Minister's decision to reject the Tampa and his rating subsequently rocketed to the 
highest level since he entered office: 57 per cent.208 
The high levels of public support in rejecting asylum-seekers from Australian territory 
and the government's political handling of refugees is best understood when taking into 
account the country's cultural fear of the North, realist pessimism about the anarchical nature 
of international relations and an ever-present anxiety of invasion. Richard Devetak argues that 
by depicting asylum-seekers as possible threats to the country, the Australian government was 
taking advantage of "a persistent fear, perhaps paranoia, in Australia's national psyche- one 
that extends from the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901 to the Border Protection Act 
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of 2001.209 Furthermore, the construction of the image of asylum seekers as constituting 
a problem, representing deviance and constituting a threat to Australia has also been present 
in the dominant news media discourses surrounding refugees in the Australian press? 10 
The prevalent discourse in Australian news media demonises asylum-seekers as no better then 
criminals, deviants? 11 The argument concerning a possible flood of refugees reaching the 
continent's shores from the North remains a central component of the sense of fear, although 
it is unjustified when compared with reality, including statistics on immigration and the 
number of arriving asylum-seekers. 
Polls taken before and after the Tampa incident also indicate that Australians feel 
threatened about the level of immigration to the country. The 1996 Australian Electoral 
Survey found that the public was uneasy about the level of immigrants to the country, with 64 
per cent of the view that immigration had gone too far and 30 per cent having indicated that 
they perceived the government's policies as "about right".212 Following the Tampa incident, 
polls conducted by AC Nielson in September 2001 found that 41 per cent of Australians 
believed that immigration levels were too high.213 More importantly, studies have shown that 
Australians over-emphasise the number of refugees arriving to the country by as much as 70 
per cent, and ignore the statistics on migration. The level of asylum-seekers intending to reach 
Australian shores represents a small number when compared to the number of refugees 
seeking asylum in other Western nations, such as those in Europe. In addition, there is no 
mention in Australia's security discourse on the problem of European immigrants who 
constitute, by far the largest group of "illegal immigrants" due to their status as over-stayers. 
It is the "trickle" of asylum-seekers from the North that due to Australia's strategic culture 
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and discourses on security takes precedence in security concerns. Successive Australian 
governments, however, have used these sentiments, and aside from pointing out the 
possibility of terrorist undertakings, argue that high levels of migration are potentially 
dangerous for the cohesion and social stability of the nation, and therefore decrease the 
country' s security. 
For this reason Australia introduced strict measures designed to discourage potential 
asylum-seekers. Sharon Pickering and Caroline Lambert note that Australia' s refugee policy 
is based on the idea of deterrence.214 The steps adopted to avoid having refugees enter 
Australia are multifaceted. Devetak highlights that despite quite a few countries having now 
established detention centres "Australia remains the only country to detain automatically all 
onshore arrivals."2 15 The country also introduced legislation on 27 September 2001 and 
amendments to the Commonwealth Migration Act of 1958, which among several asylum-
deterring policies, extended Australia's powers of interception, and increased the areas 
excluded from Australia' s migration zone. These policies have continued under both Liberal 
and Labor-led governments.2 16 The idea of mandatory detention of asylum-seekers appears to 
also have substantial popularity in Australia. Almost a decade before the Tampa incident a 
public opinion poll taken in 1993 revealed great support for this policy, with 44 per cent of 
the view that all boat people should be rejected from staying in Australia? 17 
Tied with the policy of mandatory detention of all incoming asylum-seekers, was 
Australia's "Pacific Solution", dubbed by some as Guantanamo Bay in the South Pacific. 
The policy involved detaining refugees outside of Australia, in facilities on unpopulated 
Pacific Islands, such as Nauru, Manus Island and Christmas Island, in the exchange for aid. 
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As Michael O'Keefe points out, this policy clearly demonstrates that despite the fas;ade of 
humanitarianism, Australia has remained"[ ... ] a self-interested sheriff motivated by domestic 
politicking rather than by a benign concern for the region."218 Apart from the human costs, the 
financial burden of this policy is staggering. In the six years following the Tampa controversy 
Australians have spent more than $1 billion to process fewer than 1, 700 asylum seekers in 
offshore facilities, which equates to more than half a million dollars per person? 19 
With the election of Kevin Rudd as Prime Minister in 2007, his government has 
sought to put an end to the controversial "Pacific Solution" policy, whilst retaining a tough 
stance on border security. On 8 February 2008 the last asylum seekers on Nauru, 21 Sri 
Lankan refugees left the detention camp and moved to live in Australia. However, Australia 
will continue to use a processing centre for unauthorised asylum seekers, mainly those who 
arrive without a visa and typically by boat, on Christmas Island, which constitutes Australian 
territory but is removed from Australia's migration zone. 
Despite its geographical isolation from troubled regions Canberra is likely to continue 
pursuing a course of action that is driven by its traditions and suppositions. Constructing 
asylum seekers as threats to Australian security, whether in the context of terrorism or as a 
challenge to the nation's cohesiveness, has been a policy based on well-established Australian 
fears. As Hugh White reminds us, strategic culture reflects a broadly shared set of ideas 
within the policy community and public about the assumptions underpinning the Australian 
national outlook, and it is based in anxieties, prejudices and expectations that form the 
country's approach to defence matters?20 Despite a lack of connection between asylum-
seekers and terrorism, the rationale on offer plays on core aspects of Australia's strategic 
culture, and is unlikely to disappear in the foreseeable future. 
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The Identity Component 
Australia's identity as a Western, English-speaking and predominantly white nation 
has significantly influenced the country's defence posture and regional relationships. 
Apart from its early sense of alienation from the Asia-Pacific region and fear of the "others" 
surrounding the continent, Australia has historically turned towards culturally similar powers 
in the belief of promoting shared security interests. Strong identification with Great Britain 
and the United States largely dictated Australia's security interests. However, as Australian 
policymakers became increasingly more aware and concerned about the need to accept the 
geographical situation of the country and economic relations with Asian neighbours became 
ever more important, a policy of engagement with the northern neighbours was initiated in the 
hope of promoting Australia's interests. 
Australia's attempts at deepening security relations with Asia have remained limited in 
their success, largely due to a lack of a shared identity. In the 1970s Gough Whitlam's Labor 
government stressed engagement with the Asian region, rather then against it.221 David Martin 
Jones believes that this change in foreign policy contributed to "the birth of an illusion" and 
"reflected a rationalist attempt both to engineer a self-consciously Australian identity and to 
renegotiate Australia's place in the 'East Asian hemisphere' and the world."222 However, he 
argues that this supposed transformation in foreign relations was not found in any concrete 
achievements, but only in suggestions of a new identity?23 The move therefore, did not result 
in any concrete changes to Australia's defence strategy. Domestic public opinion did not 
support political discourse that stressed Asian engagement and there was no apparent shift in 
security policy orientation. Therefore, this supposed transformation in foreign relations was 
221 Jones, 'Regional Illusion and Its Aftermath', p. 38 
222 Ibid , p. 38 
223 Ibid, p. 39 
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not found in any concrete achievements, but only in suggestions of a new identity?24 
The failure of the "enmeshment with Asia" idea rested on several factors, among them being 
an attempt to fundamentally reshape Australia's identity without widespread public support, 
differences in values and the lack of assent from Asian countries.225 Asian perceptions of 
Australia did not change, as regional countries did not share the Australian argument about its 
destiny being in Asia, while China and Indonesia, with whom Australia was said to have its 
most important relationships, did not reciprocate in viewing Australia with such 
significance?26 There was little recognition by outside actors of this sudden shift in 
Australia's security approach. Therefore, as Bruce Vaughn argues, Prime Minister Keating 
was forced to abandon the Asian engagement strategy, as it ignored the fact that a nation's 
posture must be based on domestic values of most Australians, who are fearful of advanced 
engagement with the Asian neighbours. 227 The endurance of these ideational variables has 
therefore greatly restricted the policy options that Australia may undertake. 
However, Australia has pursued another identity for itself in the Asia-Pacific; viewing 
itself as a middle power that has some capability and characteristics of a major power, at least 
in its region. It considers itself to be a natural leader in regional affairs and of having the duty 
to initiate policies as it sees fit. Central to the need for Australia to project an image of itself 
as a regional great power is the promotion of advanced military capabilities. In 2003 Foreign 
Minister Alexander Downer projected his nation's confident identity, stating that "Australia is 
not just a "middle power'"', that the country is "a strong commonwealth with about the 12th 
largest economy in the world" and "one of the most successful, peaceful and well-governed 
democracies in history."228 He stressed that "[r]ather than a middling nation, [Australia is] a 
224 Jones, 'Regional Illusion and Its Aftermath' , p. 39 
225 Bruce R. Vaughn, 'Australia's Strategic Identity Post-September 11 in Context: Implications for the War 
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226 Alison Broinowski, About face: Asian accounts of Australia (Melbourne: Scribe Publications, 2003), p. 220 
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228 Alexander Downer, "This 'little nation' packs a mighty wallop", The Australian, 26 November 2003 
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considerable power [ ... ]."229 Australia views itself as a "security leader" that needs to actively 
"lead, shape and engage".230 However both Asian and Pacific Island nations have at times 
perceived Australia's role as regional leader in negative terms, viewing the country as 
a hegemon and self-interested regional policeman. 
Australia has frequently been accused of acting as a regional "deputy sheriff' to the 
United States. Singaporean leader Lee Kuan Yew initially coined this label for Australia in 
the 1960s.231 Decades later, Howard's mention of the possibility of pre-emptive strikes 
against terrorist networks in Southeast Asia prompted outrage from Southeast Asian states. 232 
Australia's image in the region has frequently suffered criticism from Asian states that claim 
that the country exemplifies Western racism and maintains colonial attitudes.233 Pacific Island 
countries have also criticised the country for what they see is hegemonic and self-interested 
leadership in the region. Despite reassurances to the contrary, Australia largely dismissed the 
issues particularly pertinent to Pacific Islanders, such as the need to combat climate change 
and rising sea levels. In opting to pursue a more self-interested regional security agenda, 
Australia has often gone against the "Pacific Way" of working with fellow Pacific Island 
Forum (PIF) members in reaching consensus on regional security matters. This was the case, 
for example in 1997, when during the 27th PIF meeting Australia refused to accept binding 
targets for greenhouse gas reductions; thus forcing Pacific states to accept the Australian 
stance. Tuvalu Prime Minister Bikenibeu Paeniu at the time was so frustrated with this 
outcome that he bitterly stated, "Australia dominated us so much in this region. For once we 
would have liked to have got some respect."234 Arguably, the appointment of an Australian, 
Greg Urwin to the position of Secretary General of the Pacific Islands Forum, a position 
229 Downer, "This 'little nation' packs a mighty wallop" 
230 Department of Defence, Australia 's National Security: A Defence Update 2007, p. 31 
231 Coral Bell, 'Twenty years of danger', The Age, II December 1979 
232 See for instance Craig A. Snyder, 'Southeast Asian Perceptions of Australia's Foreign Policy', Contemporary 
Southeast Asia, Vol. 28, No. 2, 2006, pp. 322-340; Catherine McGrath, 'PM supports action through pre-emptive 
strikes, available online at www.abc.net.au/am/stories/s738657.htm (version current at 16/01/2007) 
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previously assumed by Pacific Islanders, has not eased in changing Australia's image as 
a domineering regional power. When his candidacy for this top bureaucratic job was made 
public, there was concern from smaller Pacific Island states and from former Secretary-
General, Noel Levi that Australia has sought too much control and this top position should 
remain in the hands of a Pacific Islander. 235 This demonstrates that while Australia views 
itself as not having to choose between its history and geography when conducting 
international relations, its identity continues to constitute a barrier in building regional 
relationships. Its predominant identity of a white Western nation, situated in an alien region, 
has remained the key driving force in its security relationships and defence objectives. 
This sense of self and lack of identification with the wider region is also the base on 
which Australia forms threat assessments and in particular, views Indonesia as an inherently 
possible threat to Australia. One aspect that has remained fairly constant and ever-present in 
Australian thinking and the country's defence policies has been a sense of alarm and worry 
over a possible security threat emanating from Indonesia. This fear however has been socially 
constructed, rather then natural. Australia has historically worried for its security due to the 
close proximity of Indonesia and has always felt uneasy about having this largest Muslim 
country in the world, with a population of 225 million, as its neighbour. This is despite the 
fact that the Indonesian military is primarily concerned with maintaining internal cohesion 
and public order. As of 2007 the Indonesian military has approximately 398 000 personnel, 
with a budget of Rp 33 trillion (US$3.6 billion), which is 0.9 percent of Indonesia's gross 
domestic product.236 However, as Bob Lowry points out, while at first glance the army seems 
large, it is in essence an infantry force as two-thirds of it is concerned with internal 
security.237 The general belief of Indonesia's military elite is that the major threats to the 
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country's national security are of an internal nature, in the form of secessionist movements, 
religious radicalism and activities that contribute to class conflicts.238 Alan Dupont further 
points out that "weak states, like Indonesia [ ... ] pose security problems of an altogether 
different kind in the form of internal instability and the proliferation of low intensity conflicts 
that may spill over and draw in Australians as peace makers and peace keepers."239 
It is therefore internal instability in Indonesia that is more likely to involve Australian 
troops, as opposed to a military attack on Australia. However, experts predict that despite 
internal crises, Indonesia will not collapse as a nation. 240 Despite this Canberra has tended to 
ignore the nature of the problem and turned a blind eye as to assessments that indicate low 
levels of threat, maintaining the desire to pursue a traditional war-fighting capable military. 
Examples of this include the signing of the Joint Strike Fighter Production, Sustainment and 
Follow-on Development Memorandum of Understanding by Australia in 2006, which is an 
agreement that provides a framework for the acquisition of new F-35s cruise missiles, and the 
acquisition of twenty-four F/A-18 F Model Super Hornet warplanes in 2007. For this reason, 
it is possible that Australia's preoccupation with a traditional security agenda may hinder the 
promotion of security in the region, as the country's militaristic approach is inadequate at 
addressing and resolving regional tensions. Australia has been so preoccupied with acquiring 
new warfighting capabilities, that the country's leading defence budget expert, Mark 
Thomson notes that as of March 2007 more than $31 billion of additional funding to defence 
had been committed, which exceeds the $28.5 billion as set out in the 2000 White Paper.241 
Fear of Indonesia has been so prevalent in the Australian psyche that it did not subside 
even when a bilateral security agreement was reached between the two countries. A 1996 
238 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, 'Indonesia: Domestic Priorities Define National Security', in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), 
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Australian Election Study survey, which was conducted three months after Australia signed 
a security agreement with Indonesia, found that nearly 60 per cent of respondents perceived 
Indonesia as posing either a "very likely" or "fairly likely" threat to Australia's security?42 
Likewise, more than 60 per cent of respondents either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the 
statement that "[t]he security agreement between Australia and Indonesia means that we can 
trust Indonesia never to be a military threat".243 A similar pattern of attitudes was found in 
relation to China as a potential threat, with voters leaning slightly more towards the "fairly 
likely" scenario of the country posing a threat to Australia, as opposed to the "very likely" 
perception. 244 The public opinion data reflects the anxiety and fear of Australian people when 
developing the country's defence policies. Fear has continued as a comprising aspect of 
relations with Indonesia in a similar manner that trust has remained a lasting characteristic of 
Australia's relations with the United States?45 This worry is not grounded in an objective 
assessment of material threat, but rather requires an ideational approach that takes into 
account how security is constructed, linking signs of "otherness" such as race, religion and 
lack of democracy with fear. 
It appears that regardless of the state of stability and power in Indonesia; Australians 
will continue to be fearful of their northern neighbour and remain on alert. It is interesting to 
note that when Indonesia attained a level of greatest stability Australia's fear of this country 
reached a new high. Simon Philpott notices that Australia was most fearful of Indonesia when 
the New Order was at its height and the country's economic and social prospects looked 
promising, thus indicating a lasting negative outlook among the white Australian culture. 246 
Anxiety was also not eased by the fact that the Indonesian Suharto regime exhibited 
242 1996 Australian Election Study (Table 1) in Ian McAllister and John Ravenhill, 'Australian attitudes towards 
closer engagement with Asia', The Pacific Review, Vol. II, No. 1, 1998, p. 124 
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246 Ibid , p. 380 
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friendliness towards alignment with the US and Great Britain, Australian alliance partners.247 
It appears that regardless of the structural situation of the regional environment and 
Indonesia's material power, Australian defence policy-makers will remain fearful of their 
large, alien neighbour. 
Conclusion 
An assessment of the regional environment and military threats does not explain 
Australia's defence policy over time. Despite various changes to the structure of the 
international system and the nature of regional security threats, Australia's defence policy has 
remained largely consistent and centred on the pursuit of traditional military capabilities. 
An explanation focused solely on material variable.s would suggest that the country's military 
power and technological sophistication, relative to other states to its north, such as Indonesia, 
remains uncontested. The only country that has the capabilities to militarily threaten Australia 
is the United States and from a strict calculation of power relativities, this is the country, 
which should be viewed as the greatest threat and not the closest defence ally. Australians 
also have a natural defence barrier - their geographical isolation - which restricts access to the 
continent and greatly reduces the possibility of invasion. 
However, Australia's defence policy has been based on a continuous desire to advance 
military capabilities over its Asian neighbours, while viewing the country with the largest 
power, the US, as not threatening to its security. Instead, Washington is seen as a crucial 
partner for Canberra in defending the country. It interprets its geographical isolation as 
a burden, rather than a benefit and actively seeks to maintain an army that is designed to 
fights traditional warfare. Materialist explanations therefore fail to explain the logic behind 
Australia's defence policies. 
247 Philpott, 'Fear of the Dark: Indonesia and the Australian National Imagination', p. 380 
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So what is the source of Australian security policy? It's security approach needs to be 
explained by examining the influence of ideas and preferences guiding policy formulation 
which include an ever-present fear and distrust of the regional environment, a culture of 
realist predisposition when dealing with defence and a dependency on a great and powerful 
friend for security. The country ' s sense of fear of its region has been culturally constructed 
and not natural or imposed by the regional power structure. Instead, the sense of anxiety has 
its origins in Australian strategic culture and its identity as a Western outpost in a foreign 
environment. 
An early sense of vulnerability, anxiety over its isolation and alienation from regional 
neighbours that had developed during the colonial era has persisted throughout time and 
contributed to a sustained and lasting sense of fear that has remained remarkably consistent 
and influenced the country' s perspectives on defence. Arguably, this ever-present sense of 
threats surrounding the nation has led to the prevalence of a culture of realist thinking among 
Australian policymakers and the general population. Australia' s strategic culture reflects 
a socially constructed realist understanding of international relations, that with bipartisan 
support, stresses the necessity of military capabilities in safeguarding the country' s security 
and assesses the political environment in pessimistic, Hobbesian terms. While the concept of 
security is always contested in any given country, the realist view has been the prevailing 
ideological framework throughout Australian history. Combined with a culture of reliance on 
a great power protector for its security, Australia has long maintained a relationship with 
Indonesia that is based on uncertainty, even though assessments indicate that this large 
populous country represents no danger to the well-being of Australians. The chapter also 
explored Australia' s construction of insecurity in the era following the terrorist attacks of 
11 September 2001 on the US, and how the politics of fear have been employed to address the 
topics of terrorism, war and asylum-seekers. The preceding analysis indicates that the 
characteristics of Australia' s strategic culture and identity provide an ideational explanation of 
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the country's behaviour, offering an insightful justification for its long-lasting, hard headed 
and militaristic approach towards defence. 
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Chapter 3 
In Defence of New Zealand: 
The Search for Independence and Collective Security 
Throughout most of its history New Zealand largely shared Australia' s security 
concerns and adopted a defence approach that was in line with that of its larger neighbour. 
In the first half of the twentieth century both countries relied on Great Britain for protection 
and followed the logic of forward defence, deploying their forces to conflicts in Europe, Asia 
and elsewhere. Subsequently, the two turned towards a security alliance with the United 
States. In recent decades however, New Zealand and Australia have taken different paths in 
their defence strategies and objectives, with the former moving away from a traditional 
military force structure, preferring to focus its armed capabilities towards maintaining readily 
deployable peacekeeping forces. The divergence was most clearly evident in the 1980s, when 
in contrast to neorealist predictions; New Zealand pursued its anti-nuclear stance, even at the 
cost of its suspension from ANZUS and the loss of the alliance relationship with the United 
States. New Zealand leaders have described the strategic environment as being "exceptionally 
benign"248 . This chapter explores the cause of this divergence in defence thinking and the 
factors that have been shaping New Zealand's perspective on security. 
248 In 2000 Prime Minister Helen Clark stated that "We are very lucky to live in an exceptionally benign 
strategic environment" (Debate- Urgent Public Matter-Cancellation ofF16 Contract, Hansard, 21 March 2000). 
In 2003 she made it clear that this comment refers to traditional security concerns, stating that ' In terms of state-
on state conflict, of course it is a benign environment.' (cited in Tracy Watkins, ' Security review warns of 'real 
threats ' , Dominion Post, 27 February 2003, Edition 2, p. 2). Defence Minister Phil Goff appears to have 
distanced himself from the use of this rhetoric when referring to the Government's Defence Policy Framework 
of 2000, stating that ' While identifying no country as being of direct threat to New Zealand, it did not however 
assume that we lived in a benign security environment. ' (Address by Phil Goff to the visiting class of the 
Australian Defence College, Australian High Commission, Wellington, 3 September 2007) 
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The sections that follow trace the evolution of New Zealand thinking towards 
maintaining its security, identifying ideational influences and preferences that have shaped the 
country's distinct approach to defence. Rather than focusing solely on material factors, such 
as geographical location, size or wealth, the chapter argues that a study of New Zealand's 
approach to defence can best be explained by looking at how feelings of distinctiveness and 
identity have come play a highly influential role in the country's security policies. I argue that 
while New Zealand is geographically more isolated than Australia, with fewer military 
resources at its disposal and a smaller territory to protect; these facts alone do not provide an 
adequate explanation for the country' s defence approach and its increasing divergence from 
Australia. 
While New Zealand' s approach to defence has undergone more substantial shifts than 
Australia's, it is possible to identify certain characteristics or preferences that have 
consistently underpinned security thinking in the country, and which may better explain the 
divergence. For this purpose the study incorporates a long historical timeframe, ranging from 
the late 19th century, to the present. The chapter begins with an exploration of New Zealand 
attitudes towards Federation with Australia and how the decision not to federate impacted on 
the country' s security thinking. It then examines the relationship with Great Britain, followed 
by the tum towards the United States. A summary of New Zealand's strategic culture is 
offered, before turning towards an assessment of the country's contemporary defence policy 
and the impact of identity on security interests. 
Striving for Independence: Early Attitudes towards Federation with Australia 
New Zealand and Australia are in many respects similar countries, in terms of shared 
origins, similar societies, common history and values. Their bilateral relations in a wide array 
of fields, ranging from security co-operation, economic relations, cultural and sporting links 
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and people exchanges are among the most developed anywhere. Yet despite these similarities, 
New Zealand has long been proud of remaining an independent entity. This was manifested in 
the decision not to federate with the Australian colonies in 1901. 
While the underlying reasons for this choice reflect both economic and political 
factors; a significant determining influence on this outcome was the sense of individuality and 
independence that New Zealand strived to maintain for itself. Following the signing of the 
Treaty of Waitangi in 1840 between the British Crown and Maori chiefs, New Zealand 
separated from New South Wales in 1842, becoming a self-governing territory. Michael King 
believes that by the time of the Boer War of 1899-1902, when for the first time troops were 
sent abroad to fight and represent the country, New Zealanders had begun to develop 
a nascent nationalism, wanting to not only manifest their continuous loyalty to Britain, but 
also to establish traditions and precedents that were unique to New Zealand?49 He notes that 
some historians saw this event as a first stirring of nationalism, which greatly contributed to 
stopping New Zealand federating with Australia in 1901.250 The decision not to federate with 
Australia was a significant step for an isolated colony and signalled that despite 
commonalities, New Zealand would pursue an independent path to that of its larger 
neighbour. A study of the attitudes, which prevailed at the time, sheds light as to the factors 
that guided New Zealand security thinking and interests at that time. 
While economic considerations played an important role in New Zealand's decision 
not to federate with the Commonwealth of Australia251 , a greater influence was the lack of 
interest of the New Zealand population and politicians in such an option and the idea that their 
249 Michael King, New Zealanders at War (Auckland: Penguin, 2003), p. 75 
25° King, New Zealanders at War, p. 92 
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'Union with the Commonwealth of Australia: The Case Against, 1901' (The Federation Commission report, 
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(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 266, p. 268 
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colony should not surrender its independence and self-governing powers. 252 During the late 
19th century, no New Zealand newspaper, with the exception of the Evening Post, 
campaigned in favour of federation, and this was coupled with the fact that, in contrast to 
Australia, there was no political leader in New Zealand who firmly argued in favour of 
federation?53 In his study of parliamentary debates for the period of 1884-1900 on the topic of 
joining in a federation with Australia, Keith Sinclair found that over 60 per cent of politicians 
were opposed to the idea, while a third were absent during the main parliamentary debates. 254 
These attitudes were a marked change in opinion. During an address on New 
Zealand's defence in 1884, referring to a possible union with the Australian colonies, 
Governor Jervois claimed that "[s]o far as defence is concerned, New Zealand is probably 
more interested than any other Australasian Colony in the question of federation."255 
Less than two decades later, he was proven wrong as New Zealand remained reluctant to 
seriously consider this option. The Federation Commission report "[ ... ] found that the 
question had been but little considered by the people ofNew Zealand."256 
The reluctance to federate with Australia and widespread ignorance of the issue among 
the New Zealand population can't simply be explained by its geographical remoteness, as 
some colonies within the Australian continent were divided by even greater distances. 
Moreover, the idea of New Zealand becoming part of Australia was not a novel one, as it 
already had been experienced early in the previous century. The fact the lack of interest on the 
252 See for instance 'The Reasons Why New Zealand Did Not Join the Australian Federation. 1890' (Speech by 
Russell in Record of the Proceeding and Debates of the Australian Federation Conference, pp. 41-3 [Melbourne, 
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part of New Zealand in the idea of federation with Australia was widely noticed at the 
Colonial Conferences. Sir John Hall, former Premier and a delegate to the 1890 Federation 
Conference that took place in Melbourne, stated that the "1200 miles between New Zealand 
and Australia were 1200 good reasons why New Zealand would not join the Australian 
federation. "257 Behind the fa~ade of distance, however another influence on the decision was 
the growth of a distinct New Zealand identity that had developed in relation and opposition to 
Australia. Referring to New Zealand's decision not to federate with Australia, R. F. Irvine and 
0. T. J. Alpers noted in 1902 that "Hers [New Zealand's] is too strong an individuality to be 
absorbed in any federation short of the Imperia1."258 
Scholars who have attempted to explain New Zealand's decision not to join the 
Federation disagree as to the main factors for the course of action taken. According to 
F. L. W. Wood, it was the influence of Prime Minister Richard Seddon that played the key 
role in the outcome not to federate, as under his leadership New Zealand "developed a sudden 
spurt of native nationalism which had an element of lunatic imperialistic aspirations in the 
Pacific, but which much more significantly involved special relationships with Britain."259 
Miles Fairburn, in contrast, argues that "the key to New Zealand's aloofness from federation 
was apathy and not, as Wood argues, Seddon."260 While opinion fluctuated in the years 
leading to the decision, New Zealanders did not seriously believe that the outcome of the 
Colonial Conferences would be a federation that would include their colony. In addition, the 
country's isolation appeared to diminish any sense of urgency in issues concerning 
257 Quoted in Denis McLean, 'Australia and New Zealand: two hearts not beating as one', New Zealand 
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foreign relations.261 It seems therefore, that from early colonial days, New Zealand was more 
content with its strategic isolation than Australia. 
While it is difficult to point to a single reason for New Zealand's reluctance to join the 
Australian colonies in federation, it appears that a growmg sense of nationhood, 
distinctiveness and aspirations for autonomy may have played an influential and 
determining role. As Ged Martin puts it; "There is something of a chicken-and-egg 
conundrum here: was there already a distinct New Zealand identity that explains the rejection 
of federation, or was it something that emerged as a consequence of a decision to stay aloof 
which had been taken for other reasons?"262 While it would be too simplistic to point to the 
identity variable as the sole defining component of the decision not to federate with Australia, 
it was nevertheless frequently referred to. In addition, New Zealand's close relationship with 
Great Britain at that time, and the security umbrella that the Imperial connection provided, 
helped its confidence in remaining an independent colony. 
The loyal Dominion and the Pursuit of an Independent Foreign Policy 
While New Zealand felt the need to remain independent from Australia, it stayed loyal 
and firmly linked its "Mother Country", Great Britain. One influence on New Zealand's 
reluctance to seriously consider a union with Australia may have been the close relationship 
with London and its heavy reliance on the Motherland for providing regional stability. When 
it came to security, the Federation Commission concluded that "so long as Great Britain holds 
command of the sea, New Zealand is quite able to undertake her own land defence."263 In case 
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of hostilities breaking out, the Commissioners were of the conviction that "as a separate 
colony New Zealand would render to Australia all possible assistance in war-time; and similar 
assistance would be given by Australia to New Zealand [ .. .. ]."264 Most importantly, New 
Zealand had the assurance that in any event the British Empire would protect its safety. 
Until the mid-twentieth century, New Zealand's security interests, alongside those of 
Australia, were largely those of Great Britain and the Commonwealth. Imperial defence 
remained central to New Zealand's defence strategy. As Ian MacGibbon puts it, New 
Zealand's defence policy in the first hundred years of its self-governing existence was in 
essence "forward in emphasis, conceived and executed in a British framework, and European 
in orientation."265 New Zealand's early strategic culture revolved around the loyal service to 
the initiatives of its security guarantor and the necessary sacrifices that would need to be 
made. In 1885 New Zealand established oversees expeditionary forces and two years later 
subsidised Royal Navy cruisers being stationed in New Zealand waters.266 An emotional 
connection to the British Empire remained very strong. 
New Zealanders retained their attachment to Great Britain longer than Australians. 
As one form of evidence of a greater sentiment to their "Mother Country", Sinclair reveals 
that in 1866, around 220 000 New Zealanders sent 1 000 000 letters to the United Kingdom, 
compared with 630 000 Victorians sending 1 100 000 and 430 000 Welshmen sending 
550 000 letters.267 This stronger attachment may be explained by the fact that New Zealand 
had been settled relatively more recently than Australia, it had a lower proportion of Irish 
inhabitants, and therefore, less anti-English sentiment.268 Writing at the beginning of the 
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twentieth century, Irvine and Alpers reached a similar observation, noting that 
"New Zealanders have so far remained more distinctly English than, perhaps, is the case in 
some of the larger colonies. "269 
As a sign of this identification with the British, in 1899 Premier Seddon called for 
New Zealanders to accept their obligation "as Englishmen" to contribute in the British 
Empire's military venture in South Africa.270 The New Zealand Parliament was the first 
among all the self-governing colonies at the time to offer troops for this cause, and it had 
widespread and popular support.271 During the dispatch of the New Zealand contingent from 
Wellington, Premier Seddon proudly proclaimed that New Zealanders "would fight for one 
flag, one Queen, one tongue, and for one country- Britain."272 At the same time, participation 
in the Anglo-Boer war273 , the first conflict abroad that involved New Zealand troops signalled 
that although New Zealand and Australia were willing participants in the British Empire's 
expeditions, their forces would not combine to form a single Australasian contingent. In fact 
Seddon fought hard to make sure there was a separate New Zealand contingent. 
By 1914, while Australia stressed its goal of naval independence as a sign of a 
deepening sense of nationhood, New Zealand instead opted to remain loyal and dependent on 
Britain's view of naval defence.274 With the outbreak of World War I, New Zealand and 
Australia swiftly offered their assistance to London. They worked together in the Gallipoli 
campaign, remaining largely under British command and forging a co-operation bond that 
continues to be commonly referred to as the "ANZAC" spirit (Australia and New Zealand 
Army Corps). While the ANZAC bond cemented a mutual respect, it also turned the shared 
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experience into a celebration of proud separate nationhood. 275 In 1922 New Zealand accepted 
Great Britain's request for assistance in the Chanak crisis, which in the end did not require the 
dispatch ofNew Zealand troops.276 
During the interwar period New Zealand began to pursue a more independent 
foreign policy. Independence in New Zealand's international relations is often credited to the 
election of the first Labour government in 1935, which gave a moral element to the country's 
foreign policies that was characterised by the pursuit of the ideals of collective security, 
international law and multilateralism; values that continue to be emphasised to the present 
day. The first Labour Government pursued a pioneering foreign policy based on the 
promotion of the League of Nations and collective security.Z77 New Zealand preferred to 
adopt a moral, principled approach to international relations rather than the balance-of-power 
model. Instead, in the spirit of international arbitration and the peaceful resolution of disputes, 
Labour Party Prime Minister Peter Fraser called for the League of Nations to assist in the 
Chanak dispute between the Allies and Turkey, so that a settlement could be reached. 
Despite reservations in London, New Zealand vigorously campaigned in support of the 
League and the notion of collective security, as was exemplified in its vocal condemnation of 
aggression in Abyssinia, Spain and Manchuria in the 1930s. 
In essence, the New Zealand Labour Party gave rise to a sense of nationalism and 
distinctiveness in its outlook on the world, which had a particularly powerful impact on the 
country's sense of identity and interests. As G. A. Wood and Chris Rudd point out, "In a 
colonial setting, nationalism tended to be a cause of the left and this has certainly been the 
trend in New Zealand."278 However, it is worth noticing that Labour in New Zealand had a 
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greater impact on the country's foreign policies than was the case with its counterpart in 
neighbouring Australia. The Australian Labour Party during this time was the only labor party 
among the Anglo-Saxon world that was not enthusiastic about collective security.279 
In contrast, New Zealand became proud of its tradition of being a good international citizen 
by pursuing security via the League of Nations and in voicing its moral opposition to the 
actions of larger states, when their policies were seen to go against the spirit of collective 
security. However, while New Zealand increasingly fought for an independent voice in 
pursuing its foreign policies, even if this meant disagreeing with its ally, its defence interests 
remained firmly linked to those of her security protector. 
Loyalty to Great Britain continued to remain strong and with the outbreak of World 
War II, New Zealand, alongside Australia again declared their allegiance to the British side 
and swiftly send their troops overseas. During this time, the two countries were involved in 
the Singapore Strategy, a British tactic of maintaining a defensive naval base in Singapore to 
counter a possible threat from Japan, the third largest naval power at that time. Shortly after 
the outbreak of the Second World War, New Zealand's loyalty to Great Britain was expressed 
by Prime Minister Savage, who proclaimed; 
Both with gratitude for the past and with confidence in the future we range ourselves without fear 
beside Britain. Where she goes we go. Where she stands we stand. We are only a small and young 
nation, but we are one and all a band of brothers, and we march forward with a union of hearts and will 
towards a common destiny. 280 
As a result, New Zealand decided to fight alongside Britain in Italy, Greece, Crete, Maleme, 
Galas, North Africa and Yugoslavia, while in the first few years of the war Australia focused 
its expeditionary force in the Middle East, Mediterranean Sea and North Africa. In 1941, as 
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war with Japan loomed and a Pacific War appeared inevitable, Australia decided to bring back 
its troops and to focus on its immediate region. 
World War II highlighted the priorities of New Zealand and Australian strategic 
security thinking, testing how the two countries would react when the perils of war reached 
the Pacific area. Australians moved more rapidly away from Great Britain; breaking away 
from the British strategy that was centred on the Middle East and Europe and withdrawing all 
of their troops from the Middle East following Japanese advances in 1942.281 Out of concern 
for its security Australia opted to bring its forces back to its immediate region, while New 
Zealand was comfortable with its troops remaining in the Middle East. 282 
This move highlighted a growing divergence between the Australian and New Zealand 
strategies, with the former becoming more preoccupied with the defence of the homeland, 
while the later remained committed to a defence strategy that was based on the advancement 
of British-led initiatives. New Zealand remained always more willing than Australia in 
fulfilling Britain's requests of help in the Middle East and South East Asia.283 During World 
War II New Zealand contributed in the Mediterranean theatre and it was only in 1941 that 400 
New Zealanders were sent to Southeast Asia.284 In the meantime, Australia fought alongside 
Great Britain and the United States in the Battle of Malaya and Battle of Singapore. 
On 15 February 1942 the British Army suffered their largest ever single defeat when 
Lieutenant General Percival was forced to surrender Singapore to the invading Japanese 
forces under General Tomoyuki Yamashita and the total number of British casualties was put 
at 138,708, of whom over 130,000 were taken prison of war and over one third later died in 
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the appalling conditions in the POW camps.285 The fall of Singapore signalled a dramatic 
change to New Zealand and Australian security arrangements, undermining their confidence 
that their "Mother Country" could serve as a security protector in the Asia-Pacific. 
Following the fall of Singapore and British withdrawal from the region, New Zealand 
and Australia joined forces to form a defence arrangement in 1944; the Australia-New 
Zealand Agreement (ANZAC), more commonly referred to as the Canberra Pact. According 
to J. C. Beaglehole the agreement was significant as it signified a greater sense of 
independence and New Zealand's desire to form a policy in the Pacific that is "intelligible in 
terms not of subordination to British hesitations and abstraction, but of the strategic needs, 
enlightened self-interest, and duty to Polynesian peoples of a quite independent power."286 
While the Canberra Pact is not a military alliance, it is designed to allow for closer security 
co-operation. Prime Minister Peter Fraser made in clear however, that this defence 
arrangement would not hinder New Zealand's independence, stating that "Although both 
countries cordially agreed to closer collaboration and the utmost co-operation [ ... ] there is no 
sinking or subordination of one to the other, or discarding the opinions of either country."287 
The Canberra Pact did not fit well with the interests of Great Britain and the United States, 
however, and there were tensions with Washington in particular over a future role of the US 
in the Pacific. 
Following the end of World War II the interests of the major powers became less 
important to New Zealand. It gave greater emphasis to multilateralism, attempted to introduce 
compulsory jurisdiction in the statute establishing the International Court of Justice and 
argued for the exclusion of veto power in the UN Security Council. While great power 
interests crushed these proposals, the attempts nevertheless demonstrated the country was 
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striving for leadership in advancing a rules-based international order that would protect small 
states, and signalled a growing sense of a distinct perspective on security. Subsequently, while 
fulfilling its first term on the UN Security Council from 1954-55, New Zealand promoted 
international law over great power interests. This was evident in its support for the urgent 
convening of the Council in the case of Guatemala. In June 1954 this small central American 
country issued a complaint over an alleged invasion by armed mercenary forces, emanating 
from Honduras and Nicaragua, which were in essence organised and financed by the United 
States?88 In this case, as well as various other subsequent instances, New Zealand's stance 
was frequently at odds with both that of the United States and Great Britain. 
However, when it came to defence arrangements it was continuity that prevailed. 
Following the end of World War II Australia and New Zealand continued to believe in the 
importance of an effective security relationship with Britain, as was demonstrated in their 
participation in various Commonwealth defence arrangements, designed primarily to counter 
the expansion of communism. In 1949 New Zealand, Australia and Great Britain formed the 
ANZAM defence agreement, which was concerned with the defence of Malaya. 
New Zealanders dispatch a Commonwealth Strategic Reserve to take part in the campaign 
against Malayan communists. In the case of New Zealand in particular, continued attachment 
and reliance on Great Britain was evident not only in the security initiatives, which it pursued, 
but also in the constitutional and legal arrangements that continued to govern the nation. 
New Zealand moved from having Dominion status to full legal independence 
relatively late, compared with other former British colonies. After initially declining to ratify 
the 1931 Statute of Westminster, which was to remove Great Britain's rights to make laws for 
New Zealand, the country finally adopted it in November 1947. It was the last Dominion to 
do so. By 1949 Labour Party Prime Minister Peter Fraser asked for his country to give "the 
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maximum contribution possible to the defence of the British Commonwealth with which the 
destiny ofNew Zealand is wholly and completely bound up"?89 Yet with Britain's inability to 
act as a security guarantor in the Asia-Pacific New Zealand was forced to move away from 
the "Mother Country" to pursue its security interests. The Canberra security agreement alone 
would not suffice in ensuring Australian and New Zealand security from a possible Japanese 
resurgence and both countries turned towards the United States for their protection. 
ANZUS and the Cold War 
Following the decline of Britain's military power in Asia, Australia, along with New 
Zealand found themselves vulnerable to a possible Japanese military resurgence, which led 
the two countries to seek a defence agreement with the United States. New Zealand 
reluctantly turned to America for its security with the tum towards establishing a security pact 
with the US, in the form of the ANZUS treaty of 1951, representing somewhat of an 
unwilling replacement in terms of defence arrangements for the country. It was the first treaty 
that New Zealand signed with a foreign power, which did not include Great Britain.290 On the 
one hand, the decision to join ANZUS must be understood within the ideological context of 
that time and the ideas that shaped the decision. Cold War thinking and the need to remain 
within the Western security alliance dominated New Zealand's security policies, as the 
country's identity remained firmly linked to that of the Western, English-speaking, 
democratic family. On the other hand, however, New Zealand continued to have a greater 
attachment to its traditional defence protector. 
The nature of the security agreement with the US revealed differences between New 
Zealand and Australia; with the former seeking a unilateral declaration of protection, whereas 
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the later looked towards a formal arrangement. New Zealand was more interested in 
a unilateral declaration of protection by the Americans in the event of an attack as it would 
provide the country with, what it perceived at the time, as greater benefits.291 New Zealand 
would be free of reciprocal obligations and commitments and be able to continue its 
attachment to Britain and its overseas defence initiatives in the Middle East and Europe, 
which were seen as more important than in the Pacific.292 However, although the country was 
initially more content with an informal agreement, New Zealand eventually joined Australia 
in seeking a formal security declaration with Washington. It is worth pointing out however, 
that the ANZUS Treaty alliance did not provide for automatic assistance in the event of 
aggression, but rather for consultation in the event of an act of hostility. 
According to Ramesh Thakur, the Labour Party was largely ambivalent 
towards the ANZUS alliance, in part because of anti-American sentiments. However despite 
these sentiments, since its inception, until the 1980s it had, along with the National Party 
officially expressed its position that ANZUS remained the cornerstone of New Zealand's 
defence policy.293 During the Holland Government of 1949-1957, Labour supported the 
National Government's argument concerning the need for New Zealand to obtain a Pacific 
security pact and lent its support to the intervention in Korea.Z94 New Zealand supported 
Britain in the involvement in the Korean War.295 With the backing of the United Nations, in 
1950 New Zealand dispatched a voluntary military force to the Korean War, which 
throughout the conflict totalled approximately 5000 New Zealanders. 
As Cold War concerns dominated New Zealand and Australian security agendas, from 
the mid-1950s until the early 1970s the two countries followed the logic of forward defence in 
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Southeast Asia, which was based on the idea of creating a number of barriers as far from 
home as possible, to deter a potential adversary. In 1954, New Zealand joined Australia, 
Britain, France, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand and the United States in the creation of the 
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEA TO), which aimed to provide for collective defence 
and block the expansion of communism. The forward defence approach was in accordance 
with New Zealand's long-held aspiration to preserve the country's strategic depth.296 To strike 
a chord with New Zealand's values, participation in the forward defence arrangement was 
also framed as a necessary measure in fulfilling the country's responsibilities as an upholder 
of collective security. As the defence white paper of 1961 noted; "If our policy is one of 
collective security we must retain the confidence and support of the countries on whose 
assistance we rely .. .. "297 As the threat of nuclear attack loomed, New Zealand decided upon 
an approach that focused on deterring the use of nuclear weaponry whilst trying to stop their 
production. While critics argued that the safer option for New Zealand would be neutrality 
there was bipartisan agreement on the key strategic concerns facing New Zealand, the 
importance of the US and the path that would need to be taken during this period. 
However, unlike its relationship with Great Britain, New Zealand's defence relations 
with the United States were not based by a similar sense of affinity and understanding. 
In contrast to previous British-led overseas security expeditions, which New Zealand 
enthusiastically supported, it appeared that commitments under the ANZUS treaty were 
viewed more as an unwilling necessity fulfilled to satisfy minimum obligations. Only a small 
percentage of New Zealanders identified the US as the country they considered to have most 
in common with. 298 
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The Vietnam War caused the first major foreign policy disagreement between National 
and Labour. It triggered the end of foreign and defence policy consensus, which largely 
existed between the two major parties since the Second World War.Z99 Despite its security 
relationship with the United States, New Zealand showed great reluctance under 
a conservative government to commit fighting troops to Vietnam. While Australia sent 8000 
soldiers, among them conscripts, New Zealand's contribution was substantially smaller -
around 500. Under National's Prime Minister Keith Holyoake, New Zealand acted as the 
"most dovish of the hawks"300, trying to strike a fine balance between the tensions of fulfilling 
its duties as a loyal ally and its domestic attitudes of reluctant participation.301 In 1968, when 
asked for his views on war, Holyoake's response was "I'm certainly not a "hawk", nor 
a "dove", perhaps somewhere in between."302 He was eager to stress that all the New 
Zealanders that were serving in Vietnam were volunteers.303 Holyoake was acutely aware of 
the domestic sensitivities concerning military involvement in this case. In the end, the 
Vietnam War contributed to a disillusionment among New Zealanders about the cost of 
maintaining an alliance with the US, which led to the eventual rise of the anti-nuclear 
movement in the 1980s and eventual break away from ANZUS.304 
By the 1970s New Zealand and Australia were forced to adapt to a new strategic 
environment. In 1969 the United States established the Guam Doctrine (or Nixon Doctrine), 
which called for allies, including the two Antipodes, to provide for their own regional 
security. Moreover, the declining power of Britain in the Asia-Pacific region was 
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demonstrated in its withdrawal from East of Suez. A shift in policy between New Zealand and 
Australia was noticeable by the mid-1970s, when the two countries moved away from 
"forward defence" in Southeast Asia and towards greater self-reliance and focus on their 
immediate region. 305 These new developments, coupled with popular unrest over the situation 
in Vietnam, gave birth to growing anti-war and anti-nuclear attitudes, which would 
dramatically influence New Zealand's defence interests and arrangements. 
New Zealand's Strategic Culture: The Influence of Anti-war and Anti-nuclear Attitudes 
As the era of "forward defence" in Asia ended, New Zealand pursued an independent 
course of action that was underscored by a deepening sense of identity and distinct strategic 
culture. It appears that the country became freer to pursue its own strategic preferences and 
values. The subsequent path taken in defence of New Zealand reflected and built upon the 
country' s past historical experiences and values, including strong anti-war sentiments. 
A defining influence on New Zealand's emerging strategic culture occurred during the 
two World Wars, where the country suffered huge loss of life. Former Secretary of Defence, 
Gerald Hensley highlights that "over one in twenty of all New Zealanders was a casualty in 
the First World War - 58 per cent of all those who served overseas and per capita the highest 
rate suffered by any nation in that war."306 In the Second World War more New Zealand lives 
were lost on a per capita basis (58 deaths per 10 000 people) than had occurred in any other 
Commonwealth country, and the proportion of wounded (11 0 per 10 000 people) was nearly 
double that, which was suffered by the next Commonwealth country. 307 
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This had a profound impact on New Zealand's future military involvements, even 
though alliance obligations often committed the country to send its troops to overseas 
expeditions. While military personnel deployments to Korea, Malaya and Vietnam were based 
on duties to its ally, following the end of the ANZUS military alliance New Zealand appeared 
to be more reluctant to send troops for combat as expeditionary forces, remaining more 
inclined to send non-combat forces such as peacekeepers to international missions. When it 
came to the use of force, New Zealanders viewed their engagement in overseas conflicts as a 
necessary contribution, as their security was reliant on others. However, as Michael King 
points out, despite their submission to the use of force and the need to go to war throughout 
the twentieth century, "New Zealanders have never accepted anything approaching 
militarism."308 He highlights that New Zealanders have mostly resisted peacetime 
conscription and when a decision to take up arms would be made, it would be more in the 
spirit of amateurism, or a "civilian into soldier" tradition.309 
A major event, which signalled the significance of anti-war attitudes on New 
Zealand's defence objectives, was the war in Vietnam. Vocal domestic opposition to the war 
affected how New Zealand saw itself and its security interests. According to Philips "there 
came out of opposition to that war ideas that would help to create a new vision of New 
Zealand's identity."310 The anti-war movement that from 1965 onwards gained popularity and 
criticised New Zealand for becoming involved, may also be viewed as an element of a 
broader attack on the government's general alliance policies.311 In 1968 New Zealand rejected 
the US request for hosting an Omega facility, a long-range radio navigation system that can 
be used underwater, and which critics point out would provide the US with precise data for its 
armed submarines, while also becoming a tempting nuclear target in the event of war.312 
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While Wellington rejected Washington's request; officials in Canberra agreed to host the 
Omega navigation station. 
At a time when the US was viewed as crucial to maintaining the country's security, 
New Zealand's military participation in the war in Vietnam was as limited and delayed as 
much as was possible. An artillery battery was sent, in the hope that this would satisfy the 
Americans, while remaining an acceptable price to pay domestically. The lengthy response 
was in sharp contrast to New Zealand's responses to the Second World War and the Korean 
War, when the country was at the forefront of the willing participants offering combat troops 
to allies, often attempting to beat Australia in its readiness to fight aggressors.313 One factor 
that may help explain New Zealand's unwillingness to participate in the ally' s war was the 
influence of a new generation that strived for independent thinking on security matters. It may 
be the case that the unpopularity of the war helped to reinforce underlying anti-war 
sentiments, which a younger generation built upon. 
By late 1970s most New Zealanders had been born after the Second World War and 
were more inclined to pursue independence in defence matters, rather than an alliance-based 
security approach. According to Ian McGibbon, the generational divide, which occurred 
during this time contributed to the end ofNew Zealand's traditional approach to defence, as 
was symbolically evident in 1984 when 63-year-old 2NZEF veteran Muldoon was succeeded 
by 40-year-old baby boomer David Lange.3 14 Therefore, in order to understand New 
Zealand' s changing approach to ANZUS, it is necessary to note the growth of a new social 
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class, which exemplified self-assurance and knowledge that would guide the country down a 
path of greater independence in fulfilling its ideas and aspirations. 315 
During this era of increasing independence on matters of foreign affairs, New Zealand 
became a leader in the non-proliferation movement; being among the first countries that in 
1969 signed and ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In 1972 one of the world's first 
green parties- the Values Party- was established in New Zealand, which encouraged a more 
independent outlook in international relations and lobbied for the abolition of the armed 
forces. The growing pacifist and anti-nuclear sentiments were driven by an emerging New 
Zealand identity that incorporated a Pacific component. Breaking from the shackles of its 
British history, the country increasingly realised that its identity and interests were firmly 
linked with its immediate region. 
By the 1970s New Zealand became increasingly more aware of its Pacific connections, 
and that its security is intrinsically linked with the region. The 1978 Defence Review pointed 
to the need to incorporate that fact that "New Zealand is a Pacific country" into the 
formulation of defence policy.316 For New Zealand, the identification with the Pacific 
strengthened its self-perception as a paradise that must be protected from external polluters 
and that traditional threats including Communist China, Soviet Russia, and Communism in 
Southeast Asia no longer appeared as immediate threats to security.317 By the 1980s 
traditional concerns about conventional aggression had been overtaken by concerns about 
global nuclear war. The 1986 Defence Review stressed that nuclear war was "the most 
dangerous threat to New Zealand's security." 
By the 1980s, New Zealanders also identified more with Australians rather then the 
British or Americans. It is interesting to note the divergence between Australia and New 
Zealand and their respective sense of identification. In 1984 McNair Surveys NZ Ltd carried 
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out a public opinion survey for the Australia-New Zealand Foundation, interviewing 1000 
New Zealanders and 1200 Australians. One question asked respondents to identify with which 
country their compatriots considered to have most in common with, with the possible options 
including the United States, Great Britain, New Zealand, Australia and Europe. The majority 
of Australians, nearly 2/3 indicated they had most in common with the US, followed by half 
of respondents pointing to Great Britain. Only 37% of Australians pointed to NZ as the 
country considered to have most in common with. In contrast, an opposite tendency was 
found in New Zealand responses, with 79% ofNew Zealanders indicating that they had most 
in common with Australians, followed by 37% pointing to Great Britain. Only 14% of 
respondents identified the United States as the country they had most in common with.318 
Interestingly, during this time exactly this percentage ofNew Zealanders was also of the view 
that the next greatest threat to their country, after the Soviet Union, was the US.3 19 
The adoption of New Zealand's unambiguous anti-nuclear stance in 1985, which 
ended its security arrangements with the US, was a sign of an independent attitude on security 
matters and maturity for the country. This decision was consistent with the country's role as a 
moral leader in world affairs. New Zealand became the first Western country that rejected 
nuclear deterrence and wilfully submitted to remaining outside of a nuclear alliance in its 
quest for security.320 Unlike some American allies, such as Japan and Denmark, which at 
times were willing to collude with the US and overlook its transgression of laws forbidding 
the entry of nuclear weapons to their territories; New Zealand enacted legislation which gave 
it full powers to control if ships entering its territory could possibly be carrying nuclear 
317 Phillips, 'New Zealand and the ANZUS Alliance: Changing National Self-Perceptions, 1945-88', p. 197 
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weapons.321 This firm stance was directly in conflict with the United States' and Great 
Britain's policies of neither confirming nor denying whether their ships and aircraft contained 
nuclear weapons.322 
While the National Party has placed greater emphasis on strengthening New Zealand's 
relationship with Australia and the United States, successive National governments have not 
challenged the 1987 legislation, which banned nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered vessels 
entry to New Zealand waters. While in power in 1991, the National Party government 
announced that it would commission a study on the safety of nuclear-powered vessels. As a 
result, an independent Special Committee on Nuclear Propulsion published a report in 1992 
entitled The Safety of Nuclear Powered Ships. While the committee found that it would be 
safe enough for these nuclear-powered ships to enter New Zealand, public opinion remained 
firmly opposed to such an option, and the government was forced to abandon an initiative to 
repeal Section 11 ofthe nuclear-free legislation.323 
The restrictive component of strategic culture helps to explain New Zealand's firm and 
persistent anti-nuclear policy stance, particularly given that any challenge to it is destined to 
fail and raise outspoken criticism. Two decades following the bold anti-nuclear move, in 
accordance with the country's symbolic nuclear deterrence posture and nuclear-free identity, 
nuclear-powered ships continue to be banned from entering New Zealand territory.324 
Since the 1980s the country has not debated the possibility of altering the ban, with this option 
remaining firmly out of the realm of possibility. For this reason, when the former leader of 
New Zealand's National Party in 2004, Don Brash, while in opposition, was reported to have 
said that if he was in power, this policy would be "gone by lunchtime"; he was greeted with 
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wide public condemnation for this comment. National's recent Foreign Affairs, Defence and 
Trade Discussion Paper Focusing on Our Core Strengths and Capabilities does not mention 
the possibility of renouncing the nuclear-free status or moving closer to an alignment with the 
US. The anti-nuclear posture has become so embedded in the New Zealand psyche and 
identity that there is broad bipartisan agreement that the ideas underpinning this decision lie at 
the core of New Zealand's state identity. As Prime Minister Helen Clark stresses; 
"Our nuclear free policy and the values which inspired it have become central to our national 
identity and how we project ourselves to the world."325 
New Zealand's Defence Policy: 
Focus on Comprehensive Security and Multilateral Peace-keeping Missions 
While central to Australia's security is the pursuit of traditional military capabilities, 
New Zealand successive defence policies have emphasised the role of peace-keeping and non-
military operations as lying at the heart of the country's defence strategy. In this respect, New 
Zealand has more definitely adapted to the contemporary environment and the modem 
security challenges that are most likely to occur, such as internal instability in regional states. 
A divergence in perspectives among the two Antipodes is particularly noticeable in 
New Zealand defence assessments and policies in the post-Cold War era, although traces of 
departure may also be found in earlier documents. A change in focus in the country's defence 
reviews occurred as early as 1978 and 1983, when, according to McGibbon, "New Zealand 
returned to its 19th -century stance, before strategic influences drew its focus out of the 
region."326 During the Cold War, New Zealand's 1983 Defence Review remained pessimistic 
in its outlook, advising that it is doubtful "whether many countries today would be prepared to 
325 Helen Clark, Prime Minister's Statement to Parliament for 2007, 13 February 2007, available online at 
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gamble that they would not be involved in war within ten years. "327 In this respect, 
the country shared many of Australia's security concerns. However, within four years New 
Zealand's perceptions of its environment changed, and the subsequent Defence of New 
Zealand: Review of Defence Policy, issued in 1987 stated that "The contingency of invasion is 
so remote that it need not form the basis of our defence strategy."328 
While under National Governments the 1991 and 1997 defence policies reflected a 
more realist assessment of the regional environment; they in essence shared the Labour 
Party's main defence objectives and what New Zealand's defence approach should focus on. 
The 1991 defence policy paper confirmed that "There are no direct threats to our [New 
Zealand's] security. Within the South Pacific, security problems will continue to be internal 
rather than externally inspired."329 In effect, the defence paper stressed - what would be 
repeated in subsequent defence policies - that "Defence planning is therefore less concerned 
with New Zealand's security needs, than with New Zealand's security interests."330 
The policy also highlighted that "The aim of a professional defence force is not principally to 
fight wars, but to make an effective contribution to achieving New Zealand's external 
objectives. "331 
Still, the character of the international system was described as uncertain and that New 
Zealand "cannot assume that states, within the Asia/Pacific region or outside it, will not at 
some time in the future use their military capabilities to pursue goals which are inimical to our 
security interests."332 Consequently, in 1997 the Government concluded that "The NZDF 
[New Zealand Defence Force] needs a range of capabilities suitable for a broad spectrum of 
military operations including conventional war, peace support operations, and the support of 
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friends and peaceful uses of military capabilities."333 However, despite the rhetoric of 
pursuing greater military capabilities, under National the result was to the contrary; between 
1991 and 2002 the level ofNew Zealand' GDP assigned to defence nearly halved and it was 
the National government that contributed to the majority of reductions in defence 
expenditure.334 A resurrection of the previous security alliance with the United States also 
remained out of the realm of possibility. 
Under the Labour leadership of Helen Clark since 1999, New Zealand's security 
perspective reflects a shift from Cold War concerns and a focus on inter-state warfare 
capabilities, to that of maintaining a capable and readily deployable peace-keeping 
defence force. The country's defence arrangements are driven by the conviction that it is 
conflicts within states that are most likely to occur in the current environment and that "the 
danger of spillover and escalation, as well as humanitarian concerns, may result in the 
involvement of others."335 According to former Secretary of Defence Gerald Hensley, 
"We have moved away from the concept of military threats, or preparing for future war, 
which so marked New Zealand's experience in the first half of this century."336 Due to the low 
sense of external threat that New Zealand enjoys, the country's defence policy is more 
preoccupied with the defence of New Zealand interests rather then defending the territory 
against an external aggression.337 Therefore, rather then focusing on the defence of the 
homeland, the country has based its objectives on contributing to stability in the Asia-Pacific 
and maintaining international order. 338 
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New Zealand's defence and foreign policies are underpinned by a liberal 
internationalist perspective on international relations, and in pursuing its vision of collective 
security, the country contributes the highest quantity of financial and personnel support for 
UN peacekeeping operations, relative to its size, in the world. The four main aspects that 
(according to the current government) underpin the international legal order are the UN 
Charter and the UN system, internationally agreed legal norms and rules, effective 
international dispute settlement and judicial bodies and regional integration and 
cooperation.339 The New Zealand commitment and dedication in pursuing an international 
rules-based order, in areas such as trade, human rights, or arms control, has been noticeable 
irrespective of the government in power. Examining New Zealand' s defence policy between 
1990-2005, Robert Ayson notes that under a National government the country continued to 
advance such issues as international nuclear disarmament and the disarmament of other non-
conventional weapons, indicating it would not follow a fully realist approach that privileged 
power over norms. 340 
Promotion of collective defence is at the heart of ensuring New Zealand' s security, 
and the United Nations remains the central international organisation in this process. New 
Zealand' s core defence objectives include the pursuit of "comprehensive security through a 
range of initiatives including diplomacy, the pursuit of arms control and disarmaments, 
addressing global environmental concerns, providing development assistance and building 
trade and cultural links."341 New Zealand' s support for the United Nations and the coalition 
mission in the first Gulf War was based on the conviction that the security of small states is 
essentially based on the eagerness of the international community to take action when less 
powerful states fall victim to attack, rather then on formal alliance treaties or the charters of 
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international organisations.342 New Zealand's geographical isolation is seen as an advantage 
for maintaining the country's security. In contrast to Australia, New Zealand is therefore 
content with comparatively low level of spending towards defence. 
By international standards New Zealand's defence expenditure is low both in absolute 
terms, as well as in proportion to the national economy.343 While in Australia public 
sentiments lean to favour increases in defence spending; the situation in New Zealand reflects 
the opposite tendency, with the population more inclined towards reducing defence force 
spending, or keeping the status quo. Hayward notices that from 1991 to 2002 the percentage 
of New Zealand's GDP that has been committed to defence has almost halved, with the 
National Government contributing to the largest reduction in spending. 344 The lack of a sense 
of threat and subsequent public interest in defence matters has contributed to minor political 
interests and in consequence, decline in expenditure.345 This ongoing trend in reducing New 
Zealand's military capabilities and defence expenditure has been widely criticised across the 
Tasman. There is a strong feeling in Australia that New Zealand is not pulling its weight in 
defence matters. Australian defence analyst Paul Dibb has called New Zealand a strategic 
liability for Australia and a re-occurring argument among Australian officialdom and 
commentators is that New Zealand is taking advantage of getting a free ride.346 
However, these comments fail to place New Zealand's defence attitudes in a historical 
context, only comparing its actions with those of Australia. It is important to keep in mind 
that historically, with the exception of the world wars, New Zealand has opted not to spend 
substantial percentages of its budget on the armed forces. 347 Increasingly, New Zealand 
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strives to distance itself from the strategic concerns and security assessments that dominate 
Australia's approach to defence. 
"We're not a single strategic entity"348 : 
New Zealand's Identity and Defence in the 21st Century 
While in the nineteenth and early twentieth century the population in Australia and 
New Zealand was dominated by 'Anglo-Celtic' immigrant communities, setting the basis for 
similarity; this is no longer the case in the present day.349 New Zealand's identity has 
undergone significant changes in the past century, altering defence interests and security 
perspectives. The country's increasing multiculturalism and Polynesian links significantly 
influence New Zealand's social identity as a state, and the kind of defence arrangements that 
it sees as suitable. Looking at the period from 1985-2005, Gustafson highlights that New 
Zealand has experienced a dramatic social change. 350 Mass immigration from the Pacific and 
Asia, coupled with an increase in the Maori population have played a considerable role in not 
only shifting New Zealand's national identity composition, but also affecting the country's 
attitudes, security arrangements and relations with the Asia-Pacific region. 
A noticeable divergence between the populations of the two Antipodes occurred from 
the 1960s onwards, with large migration sources of Pacific Islanders becoming the largest 
non-British source of migrants to New Zealand. 351 While in the 1980s and 1990s the country 
accepted substantial numbers of Asian and South African migrants, bridging a balance 
·between the composition of New Zealand's and Australia's immigrants; this shift was 
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insufficient to counter-balance the effects of different migrant compositions in the preceding 
three decades. 352 
New Zealand's Pacific identity is increasingly celebrated and emphasised, influencing 
the country' s foreign policies. The country is coming to grips with its uniquely transforming 
identity from that of a white British colonial outpost, to an increasingly multicultural nation. 
The influx of Pacific migrants coupled with the population increase of Maori and Pacific 
Islanders in New Zealand has resulted in around 20 per cent of New Zealanders having a 
Polynesian background. 353 Phil Goff argues that "We see ourselves as a Pacific nation with 
key responsibilities in the South Pacific with an increasingly important trading and political 
relationship with Asia."354 To what extent New Zealand' s alleged Pacific identity and regional 
friendliness has impacted on its security policies are a debated issue. Writing in the 1980s 
Malcolm McKinnon was skeptical of the suggested identity transformation, suggesting that 
rather than viewing New Zealand's regional policies that include concerns over nuclear waste, 
fishing and Law of the Sea issues as exemplifying a "Pacific" dimension; they should be seen 
as continuing New Zealand' s idea of independence in foreign policy and reflecting interest-
driven policies.355 Compared with Australia, New Zealand has tended to adopt a more 
indirect, low-key approach when dealing with its neighbours, as was the situation in the case 
of the Bougainville conflict. New Zealand has also tended to place more emphasis on regional 
concerns of environn1ental problems than has Australia, and rather than framing the Pacific as 
a source of threat and insecurity, it has preferred to focus on the humanitarian and 
developmental challenges that remain to be solved. Differences in perspective between 
Australia and New Zealand may partly evolve from a growing distinctiveness in national 
identities between the two countries, coupled with changing demographics and the fact that by 
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2050 almost a third ofNew Zealand's inhabitants will have Polynesian origins.356 
However, this difference should not be overstated. For instance, following the 2006 
political coup in Fiji, Australia and New Zealand both responded with a similar tone, which 
reflected a rigid, non-negotiable stance of a democratic Western country. To what extent New 
Zealand's alleged Pacificness and rhetoric on regional sensitivity is reflected in policy 
remains debated. Gerald McGhie points out that while rhetoric on New Zealand's Pacificness 
and engagement with the region is often repeated, the country has yet to fully address the 
complex nature of the problems facing Pacific states, which requires a change in attitudes as 
to how issues are approached. 357 
Another factor that is changing the ethnic composition of New Zealand and its security 
interests is a substantial increase in Asian immigrants, particularly in the past two decades. 
In Auckland, the biggest city in New Zealand, in 1986 Asians comprised only 2% of 
population; by 2001 they comprised 14%- more then those of Maori descent and by 2016, it 
is estimated that people with an ethnic Asian background will comprise a quarter of the 
city. 358 . The second half of the twentieth century revealed that perceptions of Asia, as seen in 
official speeches have undergone a substantial shift; moving from perceiving Asia with 
suspicion and a sense of threat from the 1940s-1960s decades, to a growing sense of strategic 
and economic interdependence from the 1970s onwards.359 New Zealand's relations with Asia 
may be therefore divided into three phases; suspicion, engagement and finally 
interdependence. 360 While Australia is more wary of any regional shifts in military power in 
the Asia-Pacific, New Zealand adopts a more internationalist attitude, officially recognising 
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that "These increases in capabilities do not constitute an arms race - there is little sign in the 
region of the acute rivalries that an arms race implies."361 
Instead, New Zealand views itself as uniquely positioned in offering a link between 
the West and East. As Defence Minister Goff notices, "As a nation which is genuinely 
multicultural, we have the potential to bridge gaps between the cultures of Europe, the Pacific 
and Asia."362 What underpins this conviction is the country' s ability to pursue biculturalism in 
the domestic context; an area that Australia has been incapable of matching. New Zealand has 
aimed at promoting the principle of reconciliation between indigenous people and other 
citizens as the bedrock of its society. 363 
It appears that under the Clark Government, New Zealand' s identity is not only linked 
to the Pacific region; but it is increasingly emphasised as having its own independent 
perspective on world affairs, separate from the one adopted by Australia. Prime Minister 
Helen Clark stresses the importance of national identity for foreign policy, arguing that "there 
is an evolving New Zealand way of doing things and a stronger New Zealand identity is 
emerging. We pride ourselves on being a nation with a sense of fair play, on being clean and 
green, and on being nuclear free."364 While during the era of forward defence, New Zealand 
was content with viewing itself as a "single strategic entity" with Australia, and continued to 
use this description in the 1990s; this rhetoric has been absent and rejected by the Clark 
government. This phrase was used during the period of "forward defence" in 1976.365 It also 
featured in the Defence Policy of 1983 and 1991 Defence Review. Under a National 
government in 1998, New Zealand was still seen, for practical purposes, as constituting a 
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single strategic entity with Australia.366 However, the successive centre-left administration 
dropped this logic around which defence planning was made. In the words of Prime Minister 
Helen Clark, "Australia is a middle-sized power. We are a small country. 'Close but not 
identical' would sum it up."367 Clark has made it clear to her Australian counter-part that 
"We're not a single strategic entity. It would be quite wrong for New Zealand to suggest that 
we have exactly the same interests, we don't."368 In contrast to Australia, New Zealand views 
its geographical isolation and size as an asset, and is more relaxed about its strategic 
environment, as was evident in Clark's comment about the country living in "an exceptionally 
benign strategic environment. "369 While the comment predated the era of concern over 
terrorism and subsequent cases of instability in the Pacific; it highlights the general 
perspective that influences defence planning in New Zealand. As Rolfe notes, the country 
holds a world view that is quite optimistic.370 The divergence in outlooks is also noticed by 
Minister of Defence Phil Goff who believes that New Zealand views security "in a 
comprehensive way as a partnership between foreign policy and our defence capabilities. 
Australia has tended to view its security as a calculation ofthreat."371 
New Zealand is less concerned than Australia about the likelihood of a possible threat 
from Indonesia and does not see this Asian giant as an inherent threat to any regional state. 
Following a visit to Australia in March 2000, Helen Clark asserted that "the Indonesians have 
had centuries to invade and have never done so."372 That same year, in a review of New 
Zealand defence capabilities, no reference was made to the possibility of armed conflict. 373 
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The country' s geographical isolation may be part of the reason for its greater content with its 
security situation. However, it appears that the strategic outlook is influenced by more than 
just geography. It emanates from New Zealand's perception of the constraints on international 
actors in world affairs, rejecting the Australian realist view that anarchy is the defining feature 
of the international system. 
The country is also less preoccupied with maintaining a close security arrangement 
with the US, although the current relationship appears to have largely recovered from the 
breakdown of the ANZUS security pact. Robert Ayson notices, that the New Zealand Defence 
Policy Framework, which was issued in 2000, while directly referring to Australia, Singapore, 
Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and some Pacific Islands states with regard to security co-
operation; does not even once specifically mention the United States.374 However, it appears 
that the two countries are working around the ANZUS rift. In 2007 President George W. 
Bush conceded that New Zealand' s anti-nuclear stance is a non-negotiable topic in its 
relationship with New Zealand.375 While the foreign policy relationship appears to be working 
well, New Zealand does not see a need to pursue a closer defence relationship with the US or 
consider a return to ANZUS as a possibility. 
In a review of defence capabilities in 2001 , the Clark government decided to 
disband the air combat force, in the belief that it was redundant for pursuing New Zealand's 
defence interests. This move was based on the assessment that it was unlikely for the air 
combat force to be used for low level security purposes in the region and that up to the present 
day, the Skyhawks have not been used for regional security challenges.376 In addition, the 
government decided that only two Anzac frigates were to continue service. Savings from this 
manoeuvre were intended to stay within the New Zealand Defence Force and to go towards 
upgrading other defence capabilities. In contrast to Australia, New Zealand has therefore 
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remained content with scaling down its military posture, and re-focusing its resources towards 
peacekeeping missions. Increasingly emphasis is placed on narrowing the tasks of the defence 
force towards more likely land deployments, rather then warfare involving high-technology. 
This preference is by no means a departure from the country's previous approach to defence. 
As Rolfe notes, "New Zealand's armed forces have rarely been designed or intended to 
defend New Zealand - invasion scares in the late nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries 
notwithstanding."377 New Zealand's defence strategy has always been based on being part of 
a collective entity in the form of either the "Empire", or "Commonwealth", or "free world", 
which would provide the bedrock for New Zealand's security.378 This outlook manifests itself 
today in the country's support ofthe United Nations and its peacekeeping missions.379 
New Zealand's strategic culture is based on the preference of avoiding the use of 
military force and deploying it only in necessary circumstances and in accordance with the 
principles of the United Nations. Officially New Zealand recognises that "Military force is not 
our method of choice. We shall always prefer to use peaceful means to respond to conflict in 
keeping with the principles of the UN Charter and fundamental New Zealand values."380 
However, acknowledging that the use of force may need to be contemplated, albeit rarely, it 
will be done with the highest reluctance with New Zealand governments insisting on a high 
threshold for any such choice. 381 
Security interests are therefore not simply predetermined by New Zealand's resources, 
size and geographical location; but rather emerge from politically redefined ideas about New 
Zealand's role as an international actor and its interests. There is no single national identity 
that influences New Zealand's international relations; rather it is a mix of British ties, 
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evolving New Zealand interests and Polynesian influences that impact on the country's image 
and distinct interests. While much of the literature on New Zealand identity points to the 
1980s as the decade when New Zealand experienced an identity crisis and a significant 
change to its security policies, it is wiser to adopt a longer historical timeframe in order to 
trace the evolution of New Zealand security thinking and the guiding factors that have 
influenced the formulation of defence policies. According to Derek Quigley, Former 
Chairman of the New Zealand Parliamentary Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence 
and Trade, "New Zealand's evolving defence policy is more about our search for who we are 
and what we want to be as a nation, than anything else; and reflects our attempts to develop a 
more independent stance intemationally."382 Therefore, the anti-nuclear policy of the Lange 
government, its subsequent acceptance in the 1990s by the Bolger government as well as the 
present decisions on defence matters may be all interpreted as part of this developing 
process.383 Future defence decisions will likely be based not only on New Zealand's military 
capabilities, but also on the country's distinct ideas, values and preferences of remaining 
nuclear-free, an emphasis on the non-military aspect of defence and the pursuit of collective 
security through multilateral means. 
Conclusion 
New Zealand's shifting approach to defence reflects the country's evolution from a 
colonial outpost to that of an independent nation. In contrast to Australia, New Zealand's 
security thinking has undergone dramatic shifts throughout the twentieth century. 
The country's identity was for a long time linked to that of the "Mother Country", Great 
382 The Hon Derek Quigley, 'New Zealand and Australia: Where Are We Going in Defence?', in Bruce Brown 
(ed.), New Zealand and Australia - Where Are We Going? Papers presented at the Seminar arranged by 
The New Zealand Institute of International Affairs at Victoria University, Wellington on 4 July 200I 
(Wellington: New Zealand Institute oflntemational Affairs, 2001), p. 52 
383 Quigley, 'New Zealand and Australia: Where Are We Going in Defence?', p. 52 
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Britain, with which it loyally pursued security initiatives. At the same time identification of 
not being Australian, although sharing the desire for close co-operation with the larger 
neighbour, influenced New Zealand's early preference for remaining an independent entity 
with separate strategic concerns. By the 1970s the country developed a distinct strategic 
culture; one that is based on anti-war and anti-nuclear sentiments and which continues to 
affect security arrangements to the present day. In recent times, in accordance with the 
growing Polynesian influences on the nation, New Zealand proudly projects itself as being a 
Pacific country and emphasises the non-traditional security concerns of Island states, such as 
those emanating from the environment and the need for informal diplomacy when dealing 
with Pacific countries. 
Influenced by its size, as well as historical preferences, the country adopts a moral, 
internationalist approach to security, and in support of its interests and values, New Zealand 
does not rule out disagreement with British and American ventures. Its worldview bears the 
traces of liberal optimism, that was promoted by the first Labour Government, and which 
continues to promote the ideals of collective security and to dominate security thinking to the 
present day. New Zealand's reluctance to acquire larger military might or to reverse its firm 
anti-nuclear policy must therefore be understood within the system of values and preferences 
that have developed throughout the course of the country's history. 
Until the ideational sphere of influences on New Zealand behaviour is recognised, it is 
doubtful that Australia will better understand the roots of its neighbour's take on defence, and 
vice versa. In both cases, neorealist expectations fall short of explaining both Australian and 
New Zealand defence approaches, or why they have been diverging; leaving the room for 
constructivist insight to shed light as to the driving factors influencing security thinking in 
both countries. 
With the consolidation of distinct identities and strategic cultures in the past few 
decades, the way Australia and New Zealand approach their defences also has an impact on 
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how these two Antipodean states view regional security in the Pacific. The next chapter 
compare how these states approach security challenges facing the region, along with a case 
study, which examines the rationales provided by Australia and New Zealand for their 
participation in the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMS I) in 2003. 
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Chapter 4 
Responding to Instability in the Pacific: 
Australia, New Zealand and RAMSI 
While Australia and New Zealand have been diverging in their approaches towards 
defence, how this impacts on their respective perspectives on regional security in the Pacific 
is worthy of closer examination. The aim of this chapter is to compare how the two countries 
frame the issue of Pacific security and to what extent they converge regarding the issue of 
regional intervention. Specifically, the chapter will examine the rationales given by Australia 
and New Zealand in 2003 for their participation in the largest military and police deployment 
to the region since World War II: the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands 
(RAMS!). I chose to focus on this case as it represents a relatively recent co-operative 
regional undertaking, which has been hailed by commentators as a model for possible future 
interventions. Aside from studying Australia's and New Zealand's political justifications for 
intervening, the study will also take into consideration their degree of congruence as to the 
nature of the operation. Rather than providing a detailed discussion of the mission itself or 
evaluating its success, the chapter seeks to explore the ideational and strategic influences 
underpinning Australian and New Zealand action in the Pacific, and what, if any, predictions 
can be made for their future responses to instability and conflict in the region. 
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Regional Security Concerns: The View from Canberra and Wellington 
To understand Australia's and New Zealand's views of the Pacific, we need to 
understand their broader views on security m the post-Cold War era. These in turn are 
influenced by domestic considerations. Roderic Alley points to the linkage between domestic 
politics and international relations, and how the interaction of these spheres may be utilised by 
actors to further a specific goal. He points out that in both Australia and New Zealand there is 
an ongoing blend of domestic and international concerns. 384 In his book of case studies he 
notes, for instance, that the impetus for New Zealand's World Court Project and nuclear 
disarmament at the international level was domestically driven, while his study on Australia 
and its refusal to limit greenhouse gases revealed the pursuit of domestic interests via 
international means.385 Similarly, Australian and New Zealand domestic considerations help 
explain the countries' perspectives on security in the region. 
In 2000, Mark Burton, New Zealand's Minister of Defence at the time noted that 
Australia paints a "decidedly gloomy" picture of the regional security environment, while 
New Zealand recognises that "we are dealing with an environment that is less predictable and 
more complex, but not necessarily more dangerous."386 Both Australia and New Zealand 
argue that their interest is to keep the Pacific region free from potentially hostile outside 
influences, including the threat of terrorism.387 When its comes to the wider Asia-Pacific 
region, among the enduring concerns of Australia is its "very strong interest in the avoidance 
384 Rod eric Alley, The Domestic Politics of International Relations: Cases from Australia, New Zealand and 
Oceania (Aidershot: Ashgate, 2000), p. 15 
385 Alley, The Domestic Politics of International Relations: Cases from Australia, New Zealand and Oceania, p. 
46,p.250 
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Asia, Vol. 22, No.2, August 2000, p. 395 
387 Speech delivered by Graham Fortune, Secretary of Defence, 'Regional Security in Oceania and East Asia: 
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of destabilizing strategic competition between the region's maJor powers."388 
Whereas Australia directly refers to great power rivalry as a possible regional threat, New 
Zealand is more reserved in adopting this perspective. 
New Zealand does not view great power rivalry and the rise in power of major states 
in the Asia-Pacific as likely developments that may threaten the security of the South Pacific 
region. According to Robert Ayson, the fact that New Zealand was the first Western country 
to open an embassy in China and the only of the Western countries to lose an alliance 
relationship with the US, suggests that New Zealand holds a positive outlook on China's role 
in the region. 389 Looking at security in the 1990s, Don McKinnon, Foreign Minister at the 
time, while noting the extraordinary economic and military growth of East Asia and the fact 
that some saw dangerous shifts in the balance of power, argued that this is not the case in New 
Zealand. Instead, he stressed that "The New Zealand government sees these developments not 
as a threat, but as a major opportunity for New Zealand, and for the wider region."390 
While this rhetoric may have been particularly dressed-up for Asian consumption, it remains 
the case that New Zealand has been less worried than Australia about Pacific states facing 
threats from external actors. Physical isolation from continental Asia may be viewed as one 
factor that influences this perspective. Another may be the fact that, as a study of policy 
statements and speeches indicates; New Zealand tends to approach the "Asia-Pacific region" 
and "South Pacific" separately.391 Therefore, security concerns facing Pacific Islands may be 
addressed without seeing them as connected to the strategic dynamics of the wider region. 
While both Australia and New Zealand recognise that the pursuit of Pacific Island 
security requires a broad, comprehensive approach, Canberra has arguably had a less 
successful record in dealing with Pacific challenges. John Henderson suggests that New 
388 Downer, 'Security Policy in the Asia-Pacific- New Challenges, Enduring Interests' 
389 Robert Ayson, 'Australasian security', Robert Ayson and Desmond Ball (ed.), Strategy and Security in the 
Asia-Pacific (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2006), p. 254 
390 Don McKinnon, 'Security in the 1990s: New Zealand's Approach' in Robert G. Patman (ed.), Security in a 
post-Cold War world (New York : St. Martin's Press, 1999), p. 14 
391 Robert Ayson, 'New Zealand and Asia-Pacific Security: New Rationales for Engagement?' , p. 397 
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Zealand maintains an arguably better sense of the regional security challenges and "new" 
security concerns than Australia.392 New Zealand has frequently taken the initiative in voicing 
a united Pacific opinion abroad on security concerns. The country has prided itself on 
pursuing a comprehensive security agenda, for example placing emphasis on environmental 
issues and effectively voicing the concerns of low lying atoll islands about climate change and 
rising sea level. These concerns were reflected in the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, 
the formal outcome of the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development. This topic is 
particularly significant, because low-lying atoll states such as Tuvalu and Kiribati would be 
drowned if sea level rose by even a small amount. Graham Fortune, Former New Zealand 
Secretary of Defence, has said "For most countries in the region [ .. . ] the new security 
paradigm is vulnerability. [ . .. ] This response does not necessarily require large armed forces, 
nor sophisticated high tech weapons systems or platforms."393 To a large extent, this 
perspective draws from New Zealand's own take on national security and the essentially non-
military threats that it faces as an isolated and relatively small country. 
Australia, while discursively committed to a wide conception of threats to the region, 
has, especially under Prime Minister John Howard's leadership, tended in practice to focus on 
its own interests over those of the wider region. The country has on numerous occasions gone 
against the wishes of Pacific Island nations. In 1990, for instance, Australia went against the 
views of all Pacific Island states, including New Zealand when it supported the United States' 
use of Johnston Island for the dumping of chemical weapons.394 It appears therefore that 
alliance commitments may also interfere in foreign policy making when it comes to regional 
security. Australia has on several occasions prioritised national interest over Pacific Island 
392 John Henderson, 'Oceania and the New Security Agenda', Derek McDougall and Peter Shearman (eds.), 
Australian Security After 9111: New and Old Agendas (Burlington: Ashgate Pub. Co. ,2006), p. 187 
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concerns, often being seen as a bully at the Pacific Island Forum, due to its disregard for the 
Forum's consensus decision-making style of diplomacy and the interests of fellow member 
states. This was clear in the country's refusal of becoming a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol 
and in lowering its carbon emissions and greenhouse gases; a policy that has lasted from 1997 
until the election of Kevin Rudd as Prime Minister in 2007. During the 381h Pacific Islands 
Forum in 1997, which aimed to address the problem of climate change, Howard would not 
settle for a compromise, arguing that he could not agree to binding targets for greenhouse gas 
reduction because millions of Australian jobs would be lost.395 After intense discussions 
between Forum members, the rest of the countries gave in to Australia' s stance. 
Howard expressed his belief that "There were a range of views, but in the end there was 
consensus."396 However, others disagreed that the decision taken reflected common interest, 
with Tuvalu Prime Minister Bikenibeu Paeniu commenting that "Australia dominates us so 
much in this region. For once we would have liked to have got some respect."397 
While Australia has been often criticised for placing national interests first ; New Zealand has 
generally sustained the image of a Pacific partner that tends to respect the concerns of its 
smaller neighbours and their most pressing issues. 
One reason for this more positive regional image may be the fact that New Zealand 
has greater cultural familiarity with the Pacific Islands. Foreign Minister Winston Peters 
outlines that the key factors that define New Zealand's place in the South Pacific region are 
geography, cultural experience, constitutional and historical linkages.398 The country has 
constitutional links with the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau (with the first two wishing to 
retain a free association with New Zealand), giving New Zealand formal obligations in 
395 Bernadette Hussein, 'The big retreat' , Pacific Islands Monthly, November 1997, p. II 
396 Hussein, ' The big retreat ' , p. 11 
397 Ibid 
398 Winston Peters, ' Perspectives on the Pacific ', New Zealand International Review, Vol. 31 , No. 4, July/August 
2006, p.9 
114 
the region. 399 However, this is only part of New Zealand's commitments, as the country's 
substantial Polynesian influences - around 20 per cent of the population is of either Maori or 
Pacific Island descent- give New Zealand a distinct Pacific identity. According to Defence 
Minister Phil Goff, as a "Pacific nation" New Zealand's "strong Pacific population, deep 
linkages and long history with the region, places us in a good position to engage with Pacific 
governments."400 The country's historical linkages with the region and cultural familiarity 
give it an advantage in not only dealing with Pacific states, and demonstrating a greater 
sensitivity to Pacific concerns; but also in assisting in the resolution of regional tensions. 
This is due to the fact that New Zealand diplomacy is not only perceived by Pacific Island 
states as being more sensitive and sympathetic to their needs, but also as less biased. 
A clear example of this was New Zealand' s involvement in negotiating a peace 
agreement between New Guinea and its breakaway province of Bougainville, which greatly 
contributed to the resolution of the conflict. Pacific Islanders appear to be more accepting of 
New Zealand's role, as was reflected in Papua New Guinea's invitation to New Zealand in 
assisting the negotiation of a ceasefire in early 1990s with Bougainville rebels, which saw the 
shipment of the frigate HMNZS Canterbury and later HMNZS Endeavour assist in this 
cause.
401 Subsequently, New Zealand hosted peace talks and provided leadership for the 
multinational Truce Monitoring Group.402 The country had an advantage over Australia for 
two main reasons. In contrast to Australia, New Zealand did not carry with it the legacy of 
opposition to Bougainville's independence, military assistance to the PNG Defence Force and 
support for PNG integrity.403 Moreover, realising how Melanesian politics work, New 
399 John Henderson, 'New Zealand's Relations with the Pacific Islands in the Post Cold War World: Turning the 
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Zealand was effective in taking practical steps towards the resolution of the conflict. In June 
1997, instead of inviting just a small number of key leaders of Bougainville, New Zealand 
invited around 280 Bougainvilleans to participate in the talks at Burnham military base near 
Christchurch and adopted a format that allowed for large flexibility and openness as to the 
agenda of negotiations, which ultimately resulted in a first binding agreement during the 
conflict.404 Therefore, in the words of Phil Goff; "New Zealand's advantage as a small, non-
threatening state enabled the signing of the Lincoln and Burnham peace agreements and 
complemented Australia's ability to contribute substantial resources to maintain the 
momentum of the peace process. "405 
In response to increasing instances of political instability in the Pacific, New Zealand 
and Australia led the calls for a more robust and capable regional Pacific Islands Forum. 
To allow this Pacific organisation to effectively tackle regional tensions and conflicts, the PIF 
adopted the Biketawa Declaration in 2000. This was a major development for the 
organisation, as it committed Forum leaders to accept "the need in time of crisis or in 
response to members' request for assistance, for action to be taken[ . .. ]"406 This step was seen 
as a necessary measure by Prime Minister Helen Clark, who commented, that the Biketawa 
Declaration would contribute to the advancement of the Pacific Islands Forum in becoming a 
"significant regional organization [ ... ] taking a step beyond talk, talk, talk. "407 It marked a 
major shift, as over the last three decades the Forum had not dealt with issues relating to the 
internal politics of a member state, strictly obeying the norm of non-interference. However, it 
wasn't until2003 that the declaration would be directly referred to in times of crisis. 
The next section turns its focus on political instability in the Pacific, with specific 
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reference to the conflict in the Solomon Islands. It begins with background to the case 
provided, so that the subsequent analysis of Australia's and New Zealand's rationales for 
intervening in the country can be put into context. 
Instability and Conflict in the Pacific: The Case of the Solomon Islands 
Since gammg independence, several Pacific Island countries have grappled with 
political instability, violent conflicts, coups and secessionist movements. Notable cases 
include the war in Bougainville from 1989-1998, the Kanak struggle for independence in New 
Caledonia, armed conflict in the Solomon Islands and coups in Fiji in 1987, 2000 and 2006. 
While the underlying causes of political instability in Pacific Island states are complex, it is 
often the case that the colonial legacy of nation-building, in an environment based on 
indigenous systems of governance has contributed to tensions and the failure of political 
stability and control. As David Hegarty and Anna Powles note, turbulence is often the result 
of the incompatibility between traditional norms and mechanism of indigenous political 
culture and the introduced institutions.408 As a result, political control often remains weak in 
Pacific states, as the inhabitants prefer to obey local indigenous forms of authority over that of 
the state. 
However, this does not necessarily have to lead to political volatility and conflict. 
Examining the case of Papua New Guinea, Ron May found that the factors that are often 
considered to be indicators of instability in the country, such as its ethnically fragmented 
society and large turnover of politicians at the national level, may in fact be the forces that are 
giving PNG a considerable amount of political stability when it comes to conventional 
408 David Hegarty and Anna Powles, 'South Pacific Security', in Robert Ayson and Desmond Ball (eds.), 
Strategy and Security in the Asia-Pacific (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2006), p. 259 
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indicators, including regular elections, an independent judiciary and a free press.409 
However, he notes that in PNG a weak state capacity has negative consequences on the 
inhabitants' perception of the legitimacy of the state, which consequently undermines its 
democratic establishment.410 In other cases in the Pacific this lack of political cohesion has 
contributed to volatility, lawlessness and unrest. 
Instances of upheaval in the Pacific have often been categorised under the rubric of 
"ethnic conflict". However, this description is overtly simplistic and inaccurate. According to 
Teresia Teaiwa, "ethnic tensions only really manifest themselves when social inequalities 
already exist."411 She points out that ethnic diversity alone is not the cause of bitterness and 
violence, but rather every major conflict in the Pacific over the past three decades has had at 
its core the problem of inequitable access to resources.412 In the case of the Solomon Islands 
for years political instability, economic downfall, corruption, and deliberately manipulated 
ethnic tensions had run down the country, leaving law and order in the hand of armed militia. 
Some historical context is necessary to understand the recent conflict. 
Since 1978, when the Solomon Islands achieved independence, the country had not 
developed a strong sense of nationhood. This reality was summed up in the words of former 
Solomon Islands Prime Minister, Solomon Mamaloni, who argued that his country had been 
"conceived, not bom."413 Following the end of World War II, the national capital was 
relocated to Honiara and migrants from other provinces of the country were drawn to 
Guadalcanal, the major island of the Solomon Islands.414 The identities of the two main 
islands of Guadalcanal and Malaita are more of a product of colonial and post-colonial times 
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rather then remaining long-established examples of ethnic polarisation.415 Due to frequent 
migration and inter-racial marriage, ethnic divisions eventually became blurred. Therefore, 
the crisis that began to severely grapple the Solomon Islands in the late twentieth century was 
not the direct result of ethnic clashes. 
In the late 1990s Guadalcanal was the scene of armed conflict between the island's 
indigenous inhabitants, the Isatabus and migrant Malaitans. In the belief that Malaitans had 
unfairly prospered at the expense of the local population and in resentment at the loss of their 
land, armed Isatabus militants known as the Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army (renamed later 
as the Isatabu Freedom Movement) forced the migrants out. In a bid to take back jobs and 
land, the Guadalcanal militia launched a violent campaign of harassment and intimidation. 
As many as twenty thousand people were displaced, many of whom were forced to return to 
their islands of origin. In retaliation the Malaitan Eagle Force was formed in 1999, and 
demanded compensation for the Malaitans that were killed as well as for the destruction to 
their properties. In late 1999 Prime Minister Ulufa'ulu announced a state of emergency and 
asked Australia and New Zealand for assistance, but both declined to intervene. 
Leaders of the opposing militant groups deliberately manipulated their differences to 
pursue their causes and ignite hatred. Anti-Malaitan sentiments were reinforced by the use of 
stereotyping that involved an emphasis on negative cultural traits, including alleged 
aggression, assertiveness, as well as insecurity to local "kastom."416 Corruption played a 
major role in igniting trouble. Weapons were supplied to the Malaitan Eagle Force by the 
police, which was mostly composed of Malaitans. Rather than being simply triggered by 
ethnic rivalry, it was the poor policies of successive governments ', a flawed political system, 
socio-economic development problems and poor leadership that lay at the heart of the 
crisis.417 During the conflict the country suffered increasing lawlessness, violent crime, and 
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the political system, including judiciary were either corrupt or terrorised by the warring sides. 
There had been profound suspicion of central government by the other provinces, and 
continuous resistance at local levels, which goes back historically to the era of colonial 
d . . . 41 8 a mm1stratwn. 
The first step towards resolving the conflict took place on June 28, 1999, with the 
signing of the Honiara Peace Accord. Sponsored by the Commonwealth Secretariat and the 
Australian Government, the agreement's purpose was to raise the significance and need for 
address of the issues of concern of the people of Guadalcanal, especially those relating to 
land. Fiji's former Prime Minister and the Commonwealth Secretariat's special envoy, Major 
General Sitiveni Rabuka played a major role in brokering the Accord. Subsequent efforts, the 
Panatina Agreement of 12 August 1999 and Buala Peace Conference were less successful, as 
in the first case the Guadalcanal militants refused to sign the agreement, while in the second 
instance the militant groups did not take part in the meetings. By mid-2000 armed conflict had 
resumed. 
The MEF took control of the capital Honiara on 5 June 2000 and seized the national 
armoury, forcing the Prime Minister Bartholomew Ulufa'ulu to step down. As a consequence, 
two weeks later Parliament created a new government and opposition leader, Manasseh 
Sogavare became Prime Minister; an outcome that despite questions over legitimacy and 
criticism by the Isatabu Freedom Movement, was recognised by Australia and New 
Zealand.419 After this coup, work at the Gold Ridge mine was suspended, which was coupled 
with a drastic fall in commercial revenue, effectively sinking the country's economy. 
The Sogavare government focused its peacemaking efforts on compensation payouts, referred 
to as "kastom", to the representatives of both islands for past grievances. Many commentators 
418 Dinnen, ' Winners and Losers: Politics and Disorder in the Solomon Islands 2000-2002' , p. 286 
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saw this as a euphemism for extortion. The demands for compensation and associated 
reconciliation ceremonies were manipulated for either provincial or personal profit.420 
On 15 October 2000, thanks to the efforts of Australia and New Zealand a formal 
ceasefire was reached as both the Malaitans and Isatabus agreed to the conditions of the 
Townsville Peace Agreement, which involved a weapons amnesty, demilitarisation, 
restructure of the police and the end to the Malaita Eagle Force. Critics of the Townville 
Peace Agreement argue that it had traded human rights for peace as immunity was given to 
former militants for past crimes, making the agreement more of "a quick fix solution: to get 
cease-fire- perhaps at all costs."421 Under the agreement an International Peace Monitoring 
Team was established, charged to observe the disarmament process and made up of around 50 
personnel most of whom were from Australia, New Zealand and the Cook Islands. 
However, while putting a stop to fighting, the peace agreement was unable to develop a 
framework via which the Solomon Islands government could implement peace provisions and 
improve the economy.422 A key Guale militant leader, Harold Keke and his group refused to 
disarm and abide by any agreement and continued to use terror tactics. 
The Townsville Peace Agreement was frequently broken and conflict on Guadalcanal 
became so severe that the Solomon Islands Government requested the military assistance of 
Australia. However, the country refused to intervene, stating that the problems were of an 
internal matter. In June 2000 Alexander Downer, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs stated 
that; "The problems in and around Honiara, and the underlying causes of the ethnic conflict, 
can only be resolved by the will and effort of Solomon Islands leaders."423 Downer held this 
view for the next three years. The decision not to intervene must also take into account 
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Australia's strategic priorities at the time. As Christian Hirst points out, during this time 
instability in the Pacific was of secondary importance to Australia, which was more 
preoccupied with the threat of a potentially disintegrating Indonesia and balkanisation of its 
Northern region, as well as its troop commitment to East Timor.424 
Elections in December 2001 resulted with Sir Allan Kemakeza being appointed Prime 
Minister, but again this development did not lead to an improvement in the security situation. 
By 2002 order yet again had broken down as the Solomon Islands was on the brink of total 
economic collapse, public services seized to function and many public servants went unpaid. 
Criminality, corruption, a weak central government and lack of good governance continued to 
grapple the conflict-stricken country. This was powerfully illustrated in December 2002, 
when Finance Minister Laurie Chan resigned after he was forced at gunpoint to issue a cheque 
to a group of militia members. Extortion, corruption and a bankrupt state prompted the Prime 
Minister to yet again ask for outside assistance, which in 2003 was finally forthcoming in the 
form of the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI). It signalled a 
dramatic shift in Australia's relations with Pacific neighbours. Why this policy shift occurred 
and how it was justified requires a closer examination. 
Failed states and Australia's "Arc of Instability" 
Following the terrorist attacks in 2001 on the US and in 2002 on Bali, where 88 
Australians lost their lives, Australia's concerns over the threat of terrorism reached an all 
time peak. Previously the country had avoided pursuing policies that would interfere in the 
domestic affairs of its sovereign neighbours. However, fear of terrorism sparked the Liberal-
National Party government of John Howard to adopt a more proactive approach, which 
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manifested itself in a controversial proposal for Australian pre-emptive intervention against 
terrorist activity in Southeast Asia, if no alternative was available.425 This post-Bali 
intervention policy echoed the Bush administration's logic that pre-emptive action may be at 
times necessary and required, despite the centrality of state sovereignty in international law. 
Widely condemned by his Asian neighbours for its aggressiveness, intrusion, and conviction 
that Australia had the right to override the principle of non-intervention, the policy later 
returned with a turn of attention to the wider Pacific region. According to Greg Fry this shift 
in focus from Southeast Asia to the Pacific was influenced by Australia's improved relations 
with Indonesia over anti-terrorism matters, the problem of sustaining the pre-emptive 
argument and the growing popularity in the use of "failed states" rhetoric by the US in the 
fight against terror.426 While this so-called Howard Doctrine had many new elements, its core 
motives were not new and had at heart a view of Australia's interests and responsibilities that 
is as old as Australia's strategic thinking.427 This involved making sure that Australia's 
regional environment is stable and under control, so that the country is safe. 
While increasingly instability and civil unrest in nearby Pacific states were viewed as 
a potential danger for Australia's safety and the region, re-engagement and a more hands-on 
approach towards regional security required a convincing strategic rationale in order to 
mobilise popular support. The government needed to rationalise its reversal in regional policy, 
as being wary of accusations of neo-colonial behaviour, during the previous decades Australia 
adopted a hands-off approach to conflicts and unrest in the Pacific, largely limiting its activity 
to the granting of aid. Once the threat of terrorism gained increasing prominence among the 
security agendas of Western governments, however, a new policy direction was sought by the 
425 Catherine McGrath, 'PM supports action through pre-emptive strikes' , Transcript from AM on ABC Local 
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Howard government, one that would restore order in Australia's "backyard". 
Framing the Pacific Islands in negative terms throughout the 1990s provided a sound 
basis for the subsequent adoption of "failing states" rhetoric that would become intertwined 
with concerns over terrorism. Fry points out that the "war against terror" ideas were inserted 
onto already existing ideas about the Pacific, which from the mid 1990's saw the islands 
states being viewed as a group of failed economies that were moving towards a "Pacific 
nightmare" or "doomsday" scenario, unless neo-liberal policies and good governance were 
embraced.428 By depicting the Pacific Islands in this way, Australia framed the islands as 
facing a nightmare of poverty, overcrowding, widespread unemployment, severe 
environmental degradation as well as deteriorating health standards. 429 This approach 
produced a different image of the South Pacific to that used during the Cold War, depicting it 
as "falling of the map" and doing very poorly economically.430 Drawing on World Bank 
reports, in 1994 the Australian Government misrepresented the data collected by the 
organisation in a bid to exaggerate the image of failure. 431 For instance, while World Bank 
information indicated that those Pacific Islands, which were members of the organisation 
(at the time six out of fourteen and excluding Papua New Guinea) witnessed an average 
growth rate of 0.1 per cent per capita, the Australian side used this number to depict the 
average for all Pacific countries.432 Likewise, during this time Canberra ignored World Bank 
Reports, which indicated the health of Pacific Island economies surpassed that of Caribbean 
countries. 433 Another way the Pacific was depicted as failing involved a perception of a 
disparity between an excessive population growth that would not cope with the available 
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income and resources in the region. This "doomsday" depiction, which influenced policy, was 
driven by a project of the Australian National University's National Centre for Development 
Studies entitled Pacific 2010: Challenging the Future. 434 The "failing state" discourse that 
would eventually gain currency sat well with the long-term inclination of Australian policy 
makers, bureaucrats, journalists, and academic political economists to portray the region with 
primarily negative imagery.435 
At the same time the Australian academic community debated the idea that the Pacific 
was becoming "Africanised". In his widely debated article Ben Reilly argued that the South 
Pacific was sharing in the plight of sub-Saharan Africa. Specifically, he pointed to what he 
considered to be similar characteristics which contributed to violent conflict and state 
weakness. They included increasing friction between governments and military forces, 
competition between ethnic identities and rivalry over possession of natural resources, 
weakness of basic primary institutions of governance and the increasing centrality of the state 
as the vehicle of producing wealth and controlling resources.436 This analogy was rejected by 
academics such as Jon Fraenkel and David Chappell. The former argues that the thesis is 
"analytically weak, internally inconsistent and empirically flawed"437 while the later adds that 
such an analogy provides an ahistorical analysis and that "it is ultimately an orientalist 
discourse, whose negative, timeless imaging of "others" is still being used to justify 
metropolitan hegemonies."438 In addition, John Henderson points out that claims about 
violence in the Pacific are often overstated as only two conflicts in the Pacific, West Papua 
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and Bougainville, meet or have met the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme criteria of having 
sustained at least 25 battle-related deaths per year.439 
While the "Africanisation" thesis was not adopted by the Australian policy 
community, an "arc of instability" metaphor did gain currency. The phrase was popularised 
prior to the terrorist attacks on the US and Bali, in order to point to the region's volatility and 
potential security threat for Australia. Warnings were given by scholars, including Paul Dibb, 
David Hale and Peter Prince, who in 1999 signalled the strategic uncertainties facing 
Australia, mainly that "The arc of instability to the north and east of Australia: a balkanised 
Indonesia, a broken-backed Papua New Guinea and a weak New Zealand are very real 
prospects."440 This label has also been popularised by the Australian political community, 
particularly when referring to Melanesia.441 The term "arc of instability" was first applied to 
depict the environment following the collapse of the Suharto regime, the effect of the Asian 
economic crisis and the possibility of unrest following the gaining of independence of East 
Timor.442 The rhetoric has spilled over from concerns over Southeast Asia and has been 
connected to and been applied to Oceania, bridging the regional boundaries.443 It has therefore 
served as a frequently referred to label that stirs fear, and a more proactive security approach, 
despite the lack of a precise definition or agreed geographical area. However, the "arc of 
instability" rhetoric alone was insufficient in changing Australia' s hands-off policy towards 
the Solomon Islands conflict. 
Despite repeated calls for assistance by the Solomon Islands Prime Minister, and 
reports of the dire situation in the conflict stricken country, the Howard Government remained 
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long reluctant to consider intervention in the troubled neighbour. In January 2003, Downer 
proclaimed that "Australia is not about to recolonise the South Pacific, nor should it.'>'~44 
He stressed that "Sending in Australian troops to occupy the Solomon Islands would be folly 
in the extreme. It would be widely resented in the Pacific region."445 Moreover, he was ofthe 
conviction "that it would not work - no matter how it was dressed up, whether as an 
Australian or a Commonwealth or a Pacific Islands Forum initiative. The fundamental 
problem is that foreigners do not have the answers for the deep-seated problems afflicting 
Solomon Islands."446 This view was also reflected in Australia's 2003 Defence Update, which 
argued that the Australian Government "should not be expected to solve the problems of 
Solomon Islands, and anyway cannot do so. It is only the people and their leaders who can 
end the violence and give Solomon Islands the stability necessary to address its economic and 
political problems."447 The following month The Economist concluded that "The Solomon 
Islands faces the prospect of becoming the Pacific's first failed state."448 It is likely that by 
this time the government was coming to grips with the possibility that the situation in the 
Solomon Islands would only worsen and could potentially lead to a security threat for 
Australia. 
Discourse relating to failed states and their vulnerability to terrorist exploitation 
entered the policy arena in Australia relatively late. In contrast to other developed countries 
including the UK, the US and Germany, following the September 11 terrorist attacks 
Australia did not move to securitise failed states and in fact, did not connect state failure to 
terrorism until mid-2003.449 Why and when this shift occurred, may be linked to an influential 
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report of a leading Australian think tank, which provided the base for which the political 
rationale for the intervention would be formulated. 
Launched in June 2003, Our Failing Neighbour: Australia and the future of Solomon 
Islands, was drafted by the government-funded think tank the Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute. It warned that the Solomon Islands was on the brink of becoming a failed state and 
that it could, among several things, become exploited for terrorist purposes. The report argued 
that; 
[ .. . ] Solomon Islands risks becoming-and has to some extent already become-a petri dish in which 
transnational and non-state security threats can develop and breed. Despite its poverty, there is wealth in 
Solomon Islands for those with the will to extract it: gold, timber and fish . If the state cannot provide 
security and a legal framework in which such extraction can occur, others will. And their methods will 
be far from attractive.450 
The report also warned Australians that "A failing state on our doorstep engages Australia's 
interests at many levels, from short-term economic, consular and humanitarian concerns to 
our most enduring strategic imperatives."451 Launching the report Foreign Minister Alexander 
Downer hinted that new thinking on regional instability would be adopted by his government, 
which would reverse the previous hands-off approach. Here we can see how Anglo-American 
security discourse impacted on the approach taken by Australia, with its emphasis on assisting 
a "failed" state before terrorist activity might threaten Australia.452 Downer asserted that 
"In some countries of the South Pacific, our assistance might need to take a more proactive 
form than in others."453 In this respect, he introduced Australia's new doctrine of "cooperative 
intervention"; a policy based on a strengthened approach to regional security, which would be 
characterised by direct engagement whilst working with others and at the request of the 
450 Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), Our Failing Neighbour: Australia and the Future of the Solomon 
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relevant government.454 In stark contrast to his prevwus vtew on the Solomon Islands 
situation, Downer asserted that "If we don't fix up the Solomon Islands no one will be able to. 
We're the only country with the capability to do this."455 
Our Failing Neighbour is likely to have contributed to a renewed plea for help from 
the Solomon Islands Kemakeza government, as in April 2003 draft of this document 
circulated in Honiara leading to comments from government officials.456 In June 2003 Prime 
Minister Kemakeza asked for military help to restore law and order in his country, to which 
he received a positive reply. 
Australia's justification for participating in the intervention in the Solomon Islands 
drew on the rationale offered in ASP I' s report, which followed the logic behind American 
thinking on security and fit well with Howard's agenda on defence. As Fry notices, 
"Where the pre-emptive doctrine was developed against the backdrop of the US pre-emptive 
doctrine for Iraq, the new intervention policy was developed against the backdrop of US 
policy on 'failed states' and their link to terrorism."457 It is therefore Australia's security 
interests that were at the centre of the shift in policy towards the Pacific. Howard pointed out 
that "it is not in the interest of Australia for a whole range of reasons to have failed states on 
our doorstep."458 Reference to fear blended well with discourse on Australian regional 
leadership. 
In an interview on 20 July 2003 Howard played on the domestic fears of invasion 
stressing that; 
I'm sure the Australian people will understand if the Solomons becomes a failed state it is a haven 
potentially for terrorists, drug-runners and money launderers. We don't want that on our doorstep. It is 
in Australia's interest - forget about any other country for the moment - it is in Australia's interest 
454 Downer, 'Our Failing Neighbour: Australia and the future of Solomon Islands', 
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that the Solomons not fail. That's why we're going to get involved and that's why we have significantly 
changed our policy. What we're doing in the Solomon Islands represents a very significant change in 
policy.459 
After getting the permission of the Solomon Islands government to restore law and order, and 
international legitimacy for the operation from the Pacific Island Forum and the 
Commonwealth; the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) was 
established in July 2003. The United Nations was not involved. China would likely have 
vetoed a Security Council vote, as the Solomon Islands has diplomatic relations with Taiwan. 
Led by Australia, the initial RAMSI deployment consisted of 2225 personnel, among 
whom 1500 were members of the Australian Defence Force, 105 were New Zealand defence 
personnel and 35 were from the New Zealand police. The regional mission also included 
personnel from Fiji, Tonga and Papua New Guinea and the diversity was also helped by 
representatives of Samoa, Vanuatu, the Cook Islands, Nauru, Tuvalu and Kiribati also taking 
part. Sending a force to the Solomon Islands was the largest Australian deployment to the 
Pacific since World War II. 460 
In his Ministerial Statement to Parliament on the Regional Assistance Mission to the 
Solomon Islands (RAMSI) Howard fused the "state failure" and "terrorism" arguments, with 
reference to Australian safety and its role as regional leader, stating that: 
The international community looks to Australia to play a leading role in the South Pacific. Our 
leadership of the regional assistance mission to the Solomon Islands reflects both a national interest and 
an international expectation. A failed state would not only devastate the lives of the peoples of the 
Solomons but could also pose a significant security risk for the whole region. Failed states can all too 
easily become safe-havens for transnational criminals and even terrorists. Poor governance and endemic 
corruption provide the conditions that support criminal activities. If Australia wants security, we need to 
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do all that we can to ensure that our region, our neighbourhood, is stable- that governance is strong and 
the rule of law is just. 
That is why we have joined with the other nations of our region to lend a helping hand. Failure to act 
would have sent the wrong signal to those who are endeavouring to maintain stability in other parts of 
the Pacific.461 
Howard also made sure to refer to Australia's regional obligations, stating "the rest of the 
world expects Australia to shoulder a lot of the burden because this is our part of the world, 
this is our patch."462 Highlighting his country's role as a major regional player, the Australian 
PM also asserted that "The rest of the world sees Australia as having a special role in this area 
and I believe that the Australian Government and the Australian people should assume it. "463 
Moreover, to add to the culture of fear, allegations surfaced that Indonesia, was offering the 
Solomon Islands military assistance. 464 
Rhetoric on Australian leadership was also reflected in renewed engagement with the 
main regional organisation. In 2003 at the Pacific Islands Forum it was the Australian Prime 
Minister who attended the meeting - a role previously delegated to foreign ministers - which 
signalled a greater desire by Australia to play the leading role in regional policies.465 
From 1996 to 2003 Howard had taken part in just three of the six Pacific Island Forum 
meetings. 
To strengthen the rationale for intervention a financial argument was also put forward 
to support the security one, with Howard arguing that; 
If we do nothing now and the Solomon Islands becomes a failed state, the challenges in the future of 
potential exploitation of that situation by international drug dealers, money launderers, international 
terrorism-all of these things-will make the inevitable dealing with the problem in the future more costly 
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and more difficult, and we would pay very dearly for our indifference if we were to adopt that course 
now.466 
This view was echoed in 2004 by the Australian High Commissioner to New Zealand, Allan 
Hawke, who said that "the financial costs and potential threats to Australia from failed States, 
including transnational crime and international terrorism, would be immense."467 
The job of Prime Minister's special co-ordinator of the RAMSI force was given to 
former High Commissioner to Papua New Guinea - and at the time of his appointment -
ambassador for counter-terrorism, Nick Warner.468 His appointment suggests at how Australia 
viewed the threat in the Solomons. The government's logic for intervening was echoed by 
Warner, who stated that "experience elsewhere shows that weak states are also attractive as 
havens for money laundering, people smuggling, drug smuggling and terrorism. "469 This line 
of argument mimicked Ellie Wainwright (the leading author of the ASPI report), who argues 
that "Failed or failing states are often Petri dishes for transnational criminal activity such as 
money laundering, arms smuggling, drug trafficking, people trafficking, and terrorism."470 
The "arc of instability" label, which played an important part in shifting Australian 
attention to events closer to home, served, and continues to serve a strategic purpose. 
Its boundaries have proven flexible and grow to include countries that suffer the latest signs of 
instability, as was the case, for instance, when East Timor and the Solomon Islands suffered 
unrest in 2006.471 The use of this terminology has both strategic and political utility. First, it 
focuses attention to the long-held view in Australia about the importance of stability and 
security in its proximate archipelagic and Pacific region, and warning of the possible 
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exploitation of weak states in the region either by terrorists or by larger North Asian powers, 
namely China and Taiwan and their potentially dangerous competition for influence.472 
Robert Ayson suggests the "arc" metaphor serves as a warning notice, drawing parallels to 
concerns over Soviet penetration in the Pacific in the 1980s.473 Paul Dibb says that the "arc of 
instability" is "one defence planning construct [ ... ]. Given the vast geographical distance that 
that involves, it will always give the government of the day options for operations much 
further afield-if you like the phrase, expeditionary operations."474 The phrase therefore has 
powerful political utility. 
The political significance of the "arc" is reflected in the metaphor's power as an 
"organising framework", implying a systemic process that is taking place and performing the 
role of a recognisable symbol in political debate.475 As such, it draws on core fundamentals of 
Australian strategic culture and associated fears of attack. The "arc of instability" metaphor 
has been espoused and strategically used by both sides of the political spectrum. For instance, 
Kevin Rudd has shared the use of this language with John Howard when criticising his 
political rival. Rudd claims that "In the period of Mr Howard's prime ministership, the 
southwest Pacific has become an arc of instability."476 Adopting Howard' discourse, Rudd 
who was the Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs, Trade and International Security, at the 
time, warned in August 2006 that "within this arc of instability, Australia's strategic and 
economic influence relative to other external powers is declining."477 
While still in Opposition, Rudd argued in July 2007 that; 
Within our more immediate region, the 'Arc of Instability' to our North and North-East has gone from 
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being a strategic concept a decade ago to becoming an unsettling strategic reality today- with Jema'ah 
Islamiyah's continued operations in the Indonesian archipelago; police and military crises in East 
Timor; continuing challenges to political stability in Papua New Guinea; ethnic violence in Vanuatu; 
the implosion of law and order in the Solomon Islands; a series of coups d'etat in Fiji; a constitutional 
crisis combined with unprecedented street violence in Tonga; and Nauru the region's first properly 
defmed failed state having also become a centre for international money laundering.478 
The logic continues to be espoused by Australian Governments. The 2005 Defence Update 
reaffirmed that "Failing states may provide the opportunity for recruiting, training and 
deploying terrorists."479 Likewise, the defence White Paper stresses that "The risk of 
convergence between failing states, terrorism and the proliferation of WMD remains a major 
and continuing threat to international security."480 In 2006 the then Defence Minister, 
Brendan Nelson warned that; 
We cannot afford to have failing states in our region. The so-called 'arc of instability' , which basically 
goes from East Timor through to the south-west Pacific states, means that not only does Australia have 
a responsibility in preventing and indeed assisting with humanitarian and disaster relief, but also that we 
cannot allow any of these countries to become havens for transnational crime, nor indeed havens for 
terrorism. 481 
The "arc of instability" label therefore continues to draw on deeper Australian fears, its sense 
of insecurity, and urge for regional leadership, all factors that form the core of Australia's 
strategic culture. 
The failing states logic and Australia's pessimistic view of the region were also used 
as a rationale for increasing the size of its military. Under Howard's leadership in 2006 the 
Australian Army substantially increased in personnel. The Prime Minister justified this 
increase by stating that: 
The reason why we need a bigger Australian Army is self-evident. This country faces on-going and in 
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my opinion increasing instances of destabilised and failing states in our own region. I believe in the next 
ten to twenty years Australia will face a number of situations the equivalent of or potentially more 
challenging than the Solomon Islands and East Timor.482 
Despite official endorsement, the use of state failure, terrorism and the "petri-dish" 
scenario as a rationale has been criticised by some as fundamentally flawed in its reasoning 
and an inaccurate depiction of the region. The reference to terrorism is inappropriate. 
According to R. J. May: 
Pacific Island countries are unlikely bases for terrorists: there is no local constituency for terrorism, the 
arrival and presence of outsiders in small, personalised societies is generally very obvious, and the 
logistics of undertaking terrorist activities from small island countries must be unattractive. 483 
Instead, he argues that; 
A more serious problem for Pacific Island countries has been small-scale criminal activity, often 
involving sole operators, which has targeted small island governments (including those of Nauru, Tonga 
and Vanuatu) or their populations through fmancial swindles. Corrupt business practices and pyramid 
credit schemes- and such activities have not been attracted by state failure .484 
Jon Fraenkel adds that "Although borders are often poorly policed and passport scams -
notably in the Marshall Islands, PNG and Solomon Islands-have opened avenues for identity 
fraud, the small, close-knit and often predominantly rural societies of Oceania would prove an 
inhospitable environment for terrorist cells. "485 Indeed, in 2003 the British Police 
Commissioner in the Solomon Islands, Bill Morrell, dismissed the view that the country may 
pose a terrorist threat.486 Likewise, while the notion of "failed state" may be useful to the 
extent that it draws awareness to the importance of the territorial state in human affairs; this 
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description is deceptive when it assumes that independent and strong states had existed in 
Oceania but have by some means collapsed over time.487 
The "arc of instability' thesis has also drawn plenty of academic criticism. David 
Hegarty points out its flawed logic in that "it both over-simplifies and over-dramatises a 
region of vast diversity and complexity."488 He also criticises the label for concealing rather 
than revealing of the governing dynamics in Melanesia and the Pacific Islands.489 
Similarly, Dennis Rumley points out that "Australia's immediate region is not 
homogeneously unstable" and "that the arc of instability concept is an overgeneralization, an 
oversimplification and even an exaggeration and that the term "vulnerability" might be 
preferred to "instability."490 The label implies that the Pacific is inherently and continuously 
prone to conflict. But as John Henderson rightly points out, that "With the notable exception 
of the Melanesian sub-region [ ... ] Pacific conflict can be described as sporadic rather than 
endemic."491 Perhaps this is one reason, why New Zealand has been less inclined to use this 
rhetoric. 
New Zealand's Rationale for Intervention 
Once Australian intervention was assumed, New Zealand's participation in RAMSI 
appeared almost inevitable. The country's involvement in assisting its troubled neighbour 
received unanimous support from all sides of the House of Representatives. The only political 
487 Terence Wesley-Smith, 'There Goes the Neighbourhood: The Politics of Failed States and Regional 
Intervention in the Pacific' in Jenny Bryant-Tokalau and Ian Frazer (eds.), Redefining the Pacific? Regionalism 
Past, Present and Future (Burlington: Ashgate, 2006), p. 122 
488 David Hegarty, "Through and beyond the 'Arc oflnstability', in Ivan Molloy (ed.), The Eye ofthe Cyclone: 
Issues in Pacific Security (Sippy Downs: Pacific Island Political Studies Association and University of the 
Sunshine Coast, 2004), pp. 50-51 
489 Ibid 
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debate focused on the nature of the deployment, with several political parties attacking the 
Labour-led coalition government for acceding to a heavier military approach than they 
desired. For instance the Green Party queried the need for 2000 military personnel to part in 
the deployment.492 On the other side of the spectrum, the National Party argued for 
intervention "with enough force to actually make a difference."493 
New Zealand's rationale for intervention was markedly different from that offered by 
Canberra. From the outset it stresses values and its desire to engage in a multilateral regional 
response with limited use of force. The country was concerned that RAMSI should adopt a 
Pacific approach towards resolving the conflict. Central to its regional security policy is the 
conviction that "New Zealand is a Pacific nation- through our geography, our culture and our 
outlook."494 In line with this view Helen Clark told a Ceremony to Farewell the Solomon 
Islands Contingent that; 
Three years ago, the Pacific Island Forum meeting in Kiribati adopted the Biketawa Declaration. 
It envisaged a situation, like that which exists in the Solomon Islands, where member countries might 
need help. It is in that spirit that New Zealand and other Pacific countries have joined with Australia to 
support the Solomon Islands. 
This is a Pacific solution to a Pacific problem. Thus it is important that our involvement is handled in a 
Pacific way. We must be sympathetic to the interests and needs of the Solomon Islands people. 
Our approach must be low key and helpful, and enable the Solomon Islands to build the capability to 
progress their own development.495 
The reasons that were offered for the intervention included concerns about transnational 
crime, New Zealand' s regional responsibilities, concerns over the spread of instability to other 
492 Keith Locke, Urgent Debates - Solomon Islands - Deployment of Police and Military Forces, Debates 
(Hansard) Speeches, Vol. 609, p. 6703 , 1 July 2003 
493 
'NZ opposition backs proposed armed intervention in Solomon Islands' , Radio New Zealand International, 
9 June 2003 
494 Phil Goff, ' Challenges and responses for the Pacific', 23 February 2004 
495 Helen Clark, Address at Ceremony to Farewell Solomon Islands Contingent, 24 July 2003 
137 
parts of the Pacific, obligation under the Biketawa Declaration496 and New Zealanders' 
expectations. 497 
Officials were eager to stress that the intervention would not be military in character. 
The Labour/Progressive Coalition Government of Helen Clark argued that this would be a 
police-led deployment. Mark Burton, New Zealand's Defence Minister at the time claimed 
that the mission's main purpose was to aid the country's own police and civilian 
authorities.498 Foreign Affairs Minister Phil Goff said that; 
New Zealand is well placed to offer the kind of non-combat elements necessary to support the police 
contingent. Our personnel will play a key role in facilitating civil and humanitarian assistance, 
providing helicopter transport, engineers for refurbishment of facilities , and medical staff who will work 
to re-establish community level medical support.499 
Recognising that a military component to the operation was inevitable, Minister of Defence, 
Mark Burton downplayed the heavy-handedness that would be involved. He reassured the 
House of Representatives that the mission " must be a police- a civil-intervention" while 
noting that in order to restore civil control and order "it will require, to the extent that is 
necessary, military support to back it up."500 
Despite their agreement as to the necessity of this regional intervention, there were 
early differences between Australia and New Zealand as to the exact nature of the operation. 
Allan Hawke, the Australian High Commissioner in Wellington stressed that "As far as 
RAMSI itself is concerned, Australia and New Zealand agreed on the end to be achieved, but 
496 Adopted in 2000 by the Pacific Islands Forum, the Biketawa Declaration broke with the previous rule of non-
interference in the internal affairs of member states, commiting Forum Leaders to accept " the need in time of 
crisis or in response to members ' request for assistance, for action to be taken on the basis of all members of the 
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Secretariat, available online at http: //www.forumsec.org/ resources/article/files/Biketawa%20Declaration.pdf 
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'RAMSI: The New Zealand Experience' , in John Henderson and Greg Watson (eds.), Securing a peaceful 
Pacific (Christchurch: Canterbury University Press, 2005), p. 215 
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we had quite different views about the means that should be employed to that end."501 
Phil Goff acknowledges that "New Zealand and Australia did not have identical views" and 
that New Zealanders "were more cautious in [their] approach". 502 There were heated 
exchanges across the Tasman, fuelled by the Howard government's announcement of details 
about the size and shape of the intervention force prior to obtaining approval by the Solomon 
Islands' Parliament and participating countries. 503 New Zealand was initially wary of 
Australia marking for itself a new role of a Pacific policeman.504 Moreover, the country was 
apparently anxious to install a deputy for the operation, due to concerns over Howard's 
security agenda for the Pacific and the conviction by the New Zealand side that a New 
Zealander's oversight would be crucial in the success of the sensitive intervention.505 
The New Zealand government was also keen to make sure that the operation would adopt "as 
low-key an approach as possible."506 However, it appears that the differences were eventually 
put aside. Alluding to these concerns, in December 2003 Alexander Downer said that, 
"everyone now warmly accepts Australia's new role, even New Zealand."507 He went on to 
say that while his neighbour across the Tasman was "a bit hesitant and thought it might be a 
regional version of United States pre-emption [ ... ] they [New Zealanders] feel comfortable 
now with what we are doing and are throwing their weight behind what we are doing."508 
Despite reservations about the nature of the deployment, New Zealand did share some 
of Australia's concerns about the possibility of terrorist manipulation of troubled Pacific 
states. Like Downer, Phil Goff said that "New Zealand and Australia and the other countries 
in the Pacific know there are huge costs if the state collapses in the Solomon Islands - the cost 
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of the place becoming a haven for drug smugglers, people smugglers, terrorists. "509 In May 
2004 Helen Clark repeated this line, explaining that; 
The problem to be confronted in our region is not so much that terrorists will seek to attack the citizens 
of institutions of Pacific countries. It is rather that the Pacific might present a tempting target, either for 
an attack like the one in Bali, or as a base from which terrorist cells might undertake the planning and 
groundwork for an attack. 510 
However, New Zealand generally appeared to be less concerned about the likelihood 
of terrorist activity being carried out in the Pacific, downplaying the threat to the immediate 
region. In 2004 Goff stated that; 
International terrorism is an issue in the wider Asia-Pacific region, with AI Qaeda links to the Abu 
Sayef Group in the Philippines and Jemaah Islamiah in Indonesia. In the Pacific, the threat is lessened 
by the fact that people in the region are predominantly Christian in their religious adherence. This 
makes it difficult to establish the sort of radical and extremist networks that have supported terrorism in 
some Islamic communities. However, the characteristics of the Pacific do make it vulnerable to 
organised crime, violence by local militia groups, and potentially vulnerable to terrorist groups 
exploiting the region as a weak link in the security chain.511 
Although New Zealand shared some of Australia's rationale for the intervention, it 
justified its position quite differently, using language about regional obligations and norms, 
not the logic of the "arc of instability". Indicating that there was overwhelming public 
support in the Solomon Islands for outside intervention, Goff asserted that his country "will 
endeavour to provide that assistance, as we have previously done in the Pacific in East Timor 
and Bougainville, in a way that maintains and builds upon that public support."512 New 
Zealand framed its intervention more as a humanitarian obligation, rather than a security 
challenge. While the country followed Australia's actions, it framed the need for intervention 
509 Ray Lilley, 'New Zealand says armed intervention necessary to return stability to Solomon Islands ', 
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differently for domestic political purposes. 
This raises the question, why did New Zealand follow the Australian action? 
As Stephen Hoadley notices, "New Zealand's rhetoric was more circumspect but did not 
contradict the thrust of Australian activism."513 It may the case that once Australia's 
willingness to intervene was confirmed, New Zealand's participation did not require a new-
found rationale, but rather one that would fit well with domestic attitudes. In this case, while 
references to failing states and terrorism were made, New Zealanders did not focus on 
framing the Solomon Islands conflict as a security threat to their own country, as was the case 
in Australia, when providing the justification for intervention. Rather, it was New Zealand's 
regional obligations, in the form of both the formal Biketawa declaration and informal duty to 
assist fellow Pacific Islanders, which formed the main thrust behind the country's 
involvement. 
A qualitative study of official discourse by Australian and New Zealand governments 
reveals that while the former referred to the threat of terrorism on each occasion when 
justifying its involvement in the intervention in the Solomon Islands, the latter did not directly 
link this cause to New Zealand's participation. While the idea that terrorism could penetrate 
the Pacific region was shared by both countries, and reflected in several speeches by the New 
Zealand side, this security argument was absent from the official explanation outlining the 
basis ofthe country's commitment. 
The Ramifications of RAMSI: Scenarios for the Future 
Despite some challenges RAMSI has generally been hailed as a success in stopping 
the conflict in the Solomon Islands and starting to rebuild the country. This led John Howard 
513 Stephen Hoadley, Pacific Islands Security Management by New Zealand and Australia: Towards a New 
Paradigm, Working Paper 20/05 (Wellington: Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, 
2005), p. 7 
141 
to suggest that "in the long run the RAMSI way is really the way of the future if other 
countries get into similar difficulties."514 In particular, as Downer noted, Australians will be 
"working with those states that lack the capacity to address the kinds of threats to their 
sovereignty that may one day threaten ours."515 
However, despite initial praise for RAMSI, Australia has been accused of heavy-
handedness by the Solomon's leadership. The Solomon Islands Prime Minister, Manasseh 
Sogavare accused Australia that "It was supposed to be a regional assistance mission to the 
Solomon Islands but it has become AMSI - basically just an Australian mission."516 
Tensions were fuelled by disputes between Howard and Sogavare over Julian Moti, an 
Australian lawyer accused of child sex charges and who was selected to become the Solomon 
Islands' Attorney-General. Australia accused the Solomon's of helping him escape from 
PNG, where he had been arrested. In September 2006, Sogavare expelled the Australian High 
Commissioner from his country. The following month raids of Mr Sogavare's office were 
carried by Australian police, in a bid to search for proof of his involvement in the Moti matter. 
While RAMSI never assumed sovereign powers in the Solomon Islands, RAMSI 
personnel had a large influence over government policy. 517 According to Morgan and 
McLeod, "While there have been multiple attempts to demonstrate that RAMSI is not a neo-
colonial exercise, it is difficult to deny the fact that Australians working in line positions, and 
even advisory positions, are promoting (and in some cases enforcing) the use of barely 
modified Australian processes."518 This may be partly why RAMSI has been criticised for 
offering a "band-aid" solution, failing to address the underlying deep social structures causing 
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conflict and the limits to state-building in the Solomon's.519 In April 2006, violence again 
briefly erupted, as allegations that the newly appointed Prime Minister, Snyder Rini was 
involved in corrupt activity with Chinese businessman to buy Parliamentary votes. 
Accusations led to riots and the destruction of Chinese businesses in Honiara. 
In light of criticism over the nature of RAMSI, Pacific Island Forum countries agreed 
to an independent review of the mission. Sogavare however boycotted the review and his 
foreign minister, Patterson Oti even protested before the UN General Assembly about 
Australia's "occupation" of the Solomon Islands. In 2007 the Solomon Islands government 
announced that it would carry out its own review of RAMSI, scheduled to be completed by 
July 2008. Despite Australian criticism of this idea, New Zealand gave its support for the 
evaluation of the mission. 520 
Australia's recent approach to instability in the Pacific and security discourse suggests 
that they country may be more inclined to unilaterally and directly engage or intervene in the 
domestic affairs of Pacific states, despite the rhetoric of "cooperative intervention". 
Greg Urwin, an Australian currently serving as Secretary General of the Pacific Islands 
Forum Secretariat suggests that; 
While New Zealand and Australia's interests in the region will continue to be similar, they will not be 
identical and may become in some ways less so. There should be no essential problem in this, provided 
both countries remain aware of the processes at work, domestic and regiona1. 521 
While cooperation, similar to the one witnessed during RAMS! is likely to remam the 
preferred policy option in Canberra and Wellington, Australia's greater fear of its region and 
sensitivity to shifts in the status quo are more likely to propel the country to adopt a pre-
emptive security stance. Australia's sense that it is the regional metropolitan power, together 
with its close association with the US, is likely to propel Canberra to be more active in 
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maintaining stability in the Pacific in the hope of preventing Pacific states of becoming 
"havens" for terrorists. While New Zealand is likely to continue to share Australia's concerns 
of maintaining regional stability and to work closely together on issues of regional concern, it 
may chose not to pursue the same kind of rhetoric as Australia, whilst providing assistance to 
troubled countries under the heading of humanitarian obligations. 
Conclusion 
The Solomon Islands case suggests that while Australia and New Zealand had 
different assessments of the nature of the regional security environment, and different 
justifications for assisting a Pacific state they ultimately can arrive at a similar point and unite 
in cooperating in the Pacific. Australia focused on its security objectives, referring to the "arc 
of instability" and threat offailing states falling to terrorism, as well as the country's duty and 
quest for leadership, when justifying its involvement in the Solomon Islands. New Zealand 
preferred to allude to its historical and cultural links with Pacific Islanders and the country's 
moral and regional obligations to assist, downplaying the link to terrorism. The two countries 
drew on their distinct strategic cultures and identities in the explanations they give 
intervening, which is why political rationales were so starkly different. The justifications 
matched their beliefs and perspectives and fit well with their respective domestic audiences. 
Incorporating strategic culture and identity as variables sheds light on the influences 
guiding policy formulation in Australia and New Zealand and their possible responses to 
conflict in the Pacific. It is not without its challenges however. One question that remains is 
at what point in time and in what circumstances does the strategic use of symbolic language 
and argumentative discourse take hold. For example why did Australia change its policy on 
the Solomons so dramatically between 2000 and 2003? The closing chapter considers this 
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issue and explores whether strategic culture and identity can be useful tools for the prediction 




This thesis has sought to demonstrate that in order to explain Australia and New 
Zealand's approaches to defence, why they have been diverging in their broader security 
strategies and how they respond to instability in the Pacific, it is necessary to incorporate non-
material variables. Specifically, it argued that the inclusion of the variables of strategic culture 
and identity provides a more comprehensive explanation of the influences guiding 
policymaking and interest formation in the two countries. The preceding chapters have aimed 
to point out an alternative way at looking at the formation of state interests and policies, by 
acknowledging the multiplicity of influences that guide security thinking in the Antipodes. 
These ideational influences included historical links and experiences, the countries' varying 
interpretations of their geographical location, the presence and persistence of attitudes, such 
as ideas, values, fears and preferences that have emerged and consolidated over time. 
This concluding chapter critically evaluates the utility of identity and strategic culture 
as explanatory tools in light of the two cases examined. A summary of findings is offered, 
followed by a critical assessment of the limits of an ideational approach in predicting state 
behaviour. Finally, I point out a number of challenges that remain for future research on the 
security policies of states. 
Explaining the Security Policies of Australia and New Zealand: Why the Divergence? 
The study adopted a long historical timeframe in order to examine the formative 
influences on the development of defence policies in Australia and New Zealand. It noted 
areas of commonality, particularly during the first half of the 20th century, and identified 
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a growmg divergence in their security strategies, something that has become prominent 
particularly m the past couple of decades. Despite variation m external threats, and 
particularly following New Zealand's adoption of an anti-nuclear stance and departure from 
ANZUS, both countries have exhibited and continue to pursue policy preferences challenging 
explanations based on solely materialist assumptions. However, it is one thing to criticise a 
neorealist explanation and another to offer a convincing alternative. How well then does an 
ideational approach explain Australian and New Zealand security strategies? 
A study of Australia's approach towards the country's defence identified several 
patterns and enduring policy preferences, among which was a strong tendency to view 
security through a realist lens, a perceived continuous need for furthering military might, as 
well as an ongoing conviction of the necessity of having a powerful protector for securing the 
nation's defence interests. The Australian view on security has been underpinned by fear of its 
geographical remoteness from allies combined with its proximity to a culturally unfamiliar 
Asia. This sense of alienation from its immediate region and unease caused by its situation 
has been fuelled by a sense that international relations are inherently unpredictable. 
By realising the way material and ideational factors interlock, providing a social "map" that 
informs an actor which conditions should be interpreted as dangerous and how other states 
and their militaries are to be perceived, this study has pointed to the social construction of 
insecurity in the Australian psyche and policymaking setting. In the case of Australia, the 
study found that its dominant strategic culture proves to be a highly useful variable in better 
explaining the country's past and current historical security arrangements and policy 
preferences, and that its core characteristics have remained remarkably steady throughout 
Australian history . 
Whereas strategic culture helped to point out the ideational context in which policy 
and defence strategy emerged, along with the attitudes that underpinned it, the identity 
component helps us understand why Australia has formed a strong alliance with the United 
147 
States, while its relationships with Asian neighbours remain less familiar. As a culturally 
alienated nation, that sees itself belonging to the English-speaking Western camp, Australia's 
relations with its Asian neighbours have largely been underpinned by a cautious, ongoing 
recalculation of relative power gains in the region. In contrast, the US is seen as culturally 
familiar and strong. It is viewed as indispensable to Australian security, something manifested 
in nearly blind support for its America's international undertakings, as was most recently 
reflected in the country's support for the US-led military venture in Iraq. This shared 
identification with the world's superpower has also ramifications for how Australia perceives 
security challenges in the Pacific, as was evident in its rationale for RAMSI. Canberra framed 
its involvement in the Solomon Islands ·as a matter of national security, employing discourse 
of "failed state" and "terrorism", along with the label of "arc of instability" all of which 
echoed the Bush administration's security vocabulary. In summary therefore, the Australian 
case suggests that despite major shifts in external threats and domestic politics, there are 
deeply embedded ideational factors that guide security thinking and policymaking in the 
country, constituting a framework within which policy is constrained and developed. 
Like Australia' s strategic culture, the country's identity has also largely withheld the test of 
time, even as Australia's demography has changed to reduce differences with Asia. 
The case of New Zealand is more complex, as the strategic beliefs underpinning 
defence policy formulation in the country shifted more than was the case in Australia 
throughout the 20th century. During its time as a colony and dominion New Zealand heavily 
relied on Great Britain for security, consolidating a strong emotional attachment to the 
"Motherland". With the growing desire for independence in foreign policy, evident 
particularly from the 1930s onwards, New Zealand pursued a strategy that sought to advance 
multilateral diplomacy, whilst retaining its military alliances. New Zealanders however were 
never as convinced as the Australians regarding the need for advancing hard military 
capabilities and the necessity of maintaining a security guarantor. By the middle of the 20th 
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century, the country had developed a more distinct strategic culture, one that focused on 
independence in strategic thought, the pursuit of multilateral security arrangements, and, from 
around the 1970s onwards, non-aggressive means of furthering security based on anti-war and 
anti-nuclear sentiments. These interests were underpinned by growing distinct values and an 
independence of thought that continues to govern policy preferences to the present day. 
New Zealand's predominant state identity has gradually been evolving from a British 
colonial outpost that was seen as the most loyal dominion, to that of an independent Pacific 
nation. This evolution has impacted on the country's defence priorities and regional security 
approach. It is most evident in political rhetoric, and is more subtly evident in changing policy 
orientation. The country does not have such a strong identification with the United States as is 
the case with Australia, which may be seen as part of the reason for its breakaway from 
ANZUS. It does, however have stronger connections with its immediate Pacific region, 
largely due to its demography and increasing Pacific population. This has been manifested in 
a more indirect and low-key approach to resolving regional crises as well as an arguably 
greater sensitivity to regional security concerns, such as those caused by climate change. 
The centrality of upholding a firm anti-nuclear stance is also better understood once this 
policy is interpreted with an identity framework. 
The divergence between the Australian and New Zealand approaches to defence 
matters and their different rationales for intervening in the Pacific is therefore better 
understood once non-material variables are included. Factors such as the geographical 
location of each country, their size and wealth still matter, but more importantly it is the way 
these aspects are interpreted and given meaning, which determines their significance. 
Hugh White believes that during the Cold War the differences were muted, and that now as 
each nation is trying to define itself and determine how to relate to the region, the "deep-
seated differences are coming to the fore."522 He points out that it is important to recognise the 
522 White, 'Living without illusions: Where our defence relationship goes from here', pp. 134-135 
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enduring differences in Australian and New Zealand strategic perceptions and policy 
preferences, so that the future defence relationship is based on a better mutual understanding 
of the two countries' approaches. 523 He has a point. Australian officials have in the past 
criticised New Zealand for downgrading its hard military capabilities, while in turn New 
Zealand has been wary of what it sees as Australia's heavy-handed take on security. While the 
trans-Tasman bilateral defence relationship seems to be largely unaffected by their diverging 
security worldviews, both countries appear to point out the "irrationality" of their neighbour's 
approach, without fully understanding the "rationality" that underpins it. Once an ideational 
explanation is added to the examination of policy, it becomes more apparent why each 
country has pursued the strategy it has and what its rationalisation has been. 
This study has particularly focused attention on the divergence in how Australia and 
New Zealand seek to defend their countries, in the belief that this occurrence is an interesting 
puzzle for investigation. However, it should be stressed that the divergence should not be 
overstated, in that the two countries' security policies continue to converge in many respects, 
and that often their differences are a matter of emphasis and not a matter of fundamental 
disagreement. As Phil Goff notes Australia is New Zealand's closest partner, especially in the 
economic and defence sphere and yet despite this "there will be differences of perspective, 
often reflected in a difference in tone."524 
The Limitations of Strategic Culture and Identity 
Making use of fluid concepts such as strategic culture and identity as research tools is 
a challenge, one that not only requires a robust methodological framework, but also 
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acknowledgement that as concepts that are not cast in stone, but rather remain in constant 
fluidity, they have limited explanatory power. This partly explains neorealism's appeal. It is 
preoccupied with material factors, which are easier to measure, while researchers of strategic 
culture have a more complex task at hand, seeking to examine variables that are inherently 
difficult to define and quantify. 525 This study has sought to demonstrate that this is a task that 
can and should be attempted, despite the challenges. That said it is useful to point out some of 
the main limitations in using ideational variables for analysis, which this study has 
encountered. 
One of the major problems in operating the variables of identity and strategic culture is 
their comparative imprecision. It is difficult, if at all possible, to identify in time when 
a country's identity and strategic culture emerges, when it changes, or how exactly one may 
define it. Even upon an agreed definition, as fluid constructs they require constant re-
assessments of how a country perceives itself, its role and values, as well as how it is viewed 
by the outside world, such as regional neighbours. While the study has focused on examining 
political discourse and speeches made by leaders in which they refer to their sense of self, 
their country's goals and values, this kind of examination is by no means complete. 
To assuage some of these concerns, this analysis has attempted to include other useful sources 
such as public opinion data and the views of regional countries. However, this task has also 
been limited due to the complexity of studying how others perceive Australia and New 
Zealand and the inherent problematic nature of conducting such an investigation. 
In the case of New Zealand, the study found it difficult to pinpoint the end of the 
country's "traditional" strategic culture and to identify a point in time where we can begin to 
distinguish a more independent identity, beliefs and values. This is probably due to the fact 
that the formation of strategic preferences and identity formation is an ongoing, fluid process. 
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Therefore my analysis provides generalisations of the kind of identity New Zealand and 
Australia have acquired, views which are open to criticism, and which in practice perhaps 
required a more detailed examination than was possible in a study of this length. For instance, 
the issue of whether New Zealand is in fact a "Pacific nation" or to what extent it has this kind 
of identity needs to be studied by not only adopting an inquisitive approach that examines the 
congruence between political discourse and policy, but also an investigation as to how the 
outside world (primarily Pacific states) view New Zealand. It might also be valuable for 
a future study of identity to go beyond the examination of official political discourse, 
extending attention to sources like the news media, literature and non-governmental 
perspectives, in order to provide a more comprehensive picture of the domineering identity of 
a state, as seen by its population and outside actors. When examining strategic culture, the 
objects of analysis could also be expanded, to include not only discourse of political elites, but 
also how images of war and peace are portrayed by the media, military ceremonies and 
so on.
526 
Another challenge is establishing causation. To what extent are ideational variables the 
direct cause of policy? As Maja Zehfuss points out, there is a problem of disentangling 
identity and behaviour. It is difficult to determine whether something is the result of a change 
in identity or just a change in behaviour. 527 Constructivist theory holds that a change in state 
identity affects the security interests and policies of a state.528 While I argue this has been the 
case in New Zealand's shifting security priorities, particularly as it promoted a more 
independent identity, it is also important to recognise the possibility of external shocks 
impacting on state security policy. Kowert and Legro notice that some sources of change that 
are externally inspired, such as exogenous historical events and revolutions are incapable of 
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528 Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter J. Katzenstein, 'Norms, Identity, and Culture in National 
Security', p. 52 
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being explained within an ideational logic of culture. 529 This appears to be the case, when due 
to external pressures; New Zealand turned to an alliance with the United States in 1951 , 
despite its initial reservations and greater identification with Great Britain. 
A related challenge concerns the extent to which strategic culture impacts on policy. 
Macmillan, Booth and Trood believe that "Strategic culture produces tendencies, it creates 
predispositions, but it does not determine policy."530 This study supports this view. New 
Zealand's participation in the war in Vietnam may be an example that can be interpreted 
within this logic, in that despite its anti-war predispositions, the country, largely due to 
external pressures and its alliance obligations supported American efforts in the war. 
The duration of a particular identity and strategic culture also poses a challenge to 
scholarly analysis particularly because it raises questions as to their predictive potential. 
An inherent challenge facing scholars who use a constructivist approach concerns the 
identification of causes of change to the ideational variables that have guided policymaking in 
a particular state. Macmillan, Booth and Trood attempt to find a way around this problem by 
arguing that "change in strategic culture may be the result of external circumstances, the 
follow-on from a profoundly dramatic event, a consequence of technological innovation or the 
result of political manipulation by elites. "53 1 They suggest therefore that there is an interactive 
link between material and cultural variables, where the former, in the form of technological 
equipment for instance, may lead to cultural or ideational changes. This very broad list of 
possible factors hinders the use of strategic culture as a predictive tool. Kowert and Legro 
point out a similar shortcoming in that a sociological approach has difficulty in explaining 
both patterns of stability and change. 532 The strength of strategic culture and identity appears 
529 Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, 'Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise' , in Peter 
Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia 
University Press, I 996), p. 489 
530 Macmillan, Booth and Trood, 'Strategic Culture ', p. 13 
531 Ibid, p. 12 
532 Kowert and Legro, 'Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise ', p. 488 
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to lie in their power to expand our understanding of policy formation, while they can perhaps 
at best only provide a limited prediction of future state behaviour. 
Challenges for Further Research 
In order to add rigour and test the utility of ideational explanations like the one offered 
here, more case study research should attempt to examine the degree to which political leaders 
are socialised by their strategic culture and state identity and whether these constrain their 
policy options. Comparative case studies could be useful in comparing the policies and 
security interests of states which are similar in material terms and facing a relatively similar 
political environment. It is also important to study the level of domestic political consensus on 
the strategic values of a particular country, in order to test the influence of ideational variables 
and their effect on socialising political leaders into adopting key strategic values and 
preferences of a polity. 
Future studies might examine the problem of discontinuity of strategic culture and 
identity and whether it is possible to develop a set of "predictive signs" on when this process 
is most likely to occur. Studies could start with testing the congruence as to security policy 
direction in a polity and examine the extent of divergence when changes in governments 
occur. If a strategic culture is as influential as advocates assert, than one should expect that 
parties of both political leanings will be socialised into the main values and ideas 
underpinning security thinking in the country. If that is not the case, and a significant 
departure in defence policy takes place then researchers should evaluate whether there has 
been a breakdown in the previous strategic culture underpinning security thinking, by 
examining, for instance the level of debate on security in the time leading up to the change or 
the impact of external shocks. Public opinion polls may also be useful in assisting this kind of 
investigation. The fact that strategic cultures and identities are not cast in concrete for all time, 
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remains a challenge for scholarly analysis and more investigation is needed in order to 
provide a framework that deals with not only explaining continuity, but also change m 
strategic thought. 
In terms of methodology, scholars who use discourse analysis as a source for tracing 
identity and strategic culture must also be wary of its sometimes misleading and limiting 
nature. The problem of studying rhetoric is that states often project an image of the way they 
want to be seen, and not necessarily of the way they are. That is why a study confined solely 
to political discourse may provide limited insights, unless it is supported by other sources of 
data. This as was the case here, may involve the inclusion of public opinion poll data, the 
views of other regional players, and perhaps most importantly an effort to compare discourse 
with policy and behaviour. As culture and identity are not confined to just the political sphere, 
it might be useful for further research to draw on other sources that represent the country's 
self, including the content and framing of domestic news media. 
These conclusions suggest the best approach might be an eclectic method, drawing on 
a range of sources and using different variables for analysis. As this study on the defence 
approaches of Australia and New Zealand has indicated, it is crucial to understand the 
domestic setting and the ideational factors influencing the choice of security policies by 
states. The use of a flexible methodology incorporating both strategic culture and identity as 
explanatory variables greatly assisted in the exploration of the historical origins of policy 
preferences and patterns of behaviour in security matters. The findings suggest that an 
approach based solely on material factors cannot provide an adequate explanation for the 
diverging security paths taken by the two countries. This is a lesson that needs to be 
appreciated by policymakers and officials on both sides of the Tasman. Until the roots of 
Australian and New Zealand thinking on defence issues are better understood and seen to 
grow out of different strategic cultures and identities, the two neighbours will continue to 
struggle to grasp the logic behind their respective policy decisions. 
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